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Internal conflict is steadily increasing in importance. Whether it is called low intensity 
conflict or operations other than war, current conflict theories do not adequately explain the 
dynamics of internal conflict nor provide clear prescriptive policy guidance. This thesis 
serves two purposes. The first is to provide a model to analyze and describe internal conflict 
dynamics. The second is to provide decision makers with a strategic, systemic framework 
to successfully conduct internal war. The thesis is divided into four sections. The first 
examines internal conflict theories and develops a model. The second tests the model in 3 
case studies demonstrating the explanatory effectiveness of the model. The third looks at the 
theoretical and practical implications of the model for an external actor such as the United 
States. The fourth section concludes the study and highlights policy prescriptions. A 
systemic approach to internal war provides policy makers at the NSC, DOD and DOS with 
a useful and objective decision making tool. 
V 
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This thesis examines the dynamic process of internal conflicts. Many theorists have 
stated that internal war is different than conventional war. The primacy of political over 
military factors, local domestic factors, international ramifications and US domestic politics 
limit the ability of the US to intervene. This does not mean that the US can not intervene, but 
that the US must carefully review its organizational and operational methods. 
This study seeks to examine the dynamics of internal conflict to determine what 
factors lead to long term stability in a given state faced with an internal conflict. The first 
step in developing a solution to internal wars is to define the system, identify system 
dynamics and identify the key variables for systemic stability. The key level of analysis is 
the organization. Internal war involves an organizational struggle between the state and 
opposing organizations and a mobilizational struggle as organizations seek to expand their 
own resource base and interfere with the resource base of their opponents. 
Theories of insurgency and political violence serve as a base line to establish the 
overall contextual environment of internal conflict. Organization theory is used to outline the 
task environment of the interaction between organizations. The contextual environment 
forms the base for the mobilizational struggle. It is here that the organization builds links 
with local supporters and resources. The task environment contains the specific actions and 
reactions of organizations against each other and their support base. 
A theory must address both the mobilizational and organizational aspects of the 
struggle. There is a tendency in military doctrine to look at tactics, techniques and procedures 
suitable to the struggle with opposing organizations and to pay only superficial attention to 
political, economic and social factors in the mobilizational struggle. Conversely, political 
agencies such as the Department of State and US Agency for International Development 
focus on the mobilizational aspect and underestimate the organizational struggle. This study 
develops an integrated model to aid decision makers integrating effort and developing 
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comprehensive, systemic level plans. Plans that operate below the system level lead to 
unexpected systemic interactions that cause plans to fail. 
Restructuring host nation organizations take time. US planning in Haiti, Panama and 
currently Bosnia greatly underestimate how long it takes to reorganize and train host nation 
organizations. The US intent to rapidly withdraw is complicated by this problem. This leads 
to an unwanted extended commitment of US forces. Organizational change during and after 
internal conflicts is explicitly examined to determine more effective methods to allow US 
disengagement. 
An organizational model of the process of internal war is developed and tested to 
determine its descriptive and prescriptive explanatory power. Three case studies are used to 
test the model: the Malayan insurgency from 1948 to 1960, the Northern Ireland insurgency 
from 1969 to 1995 and the current Algerian insurgency from 1992 to 1995. Long term 
stability depends on contextual and organizational factors within the local environment. The 
study is taken from the perspective of the challenged state and its opponents to determine 
what factors led to the eventual outcome. 
Chapter VI examines a second perspective. The model is used from the viewpoint 
of the external intervenor. The Powell doctrine is used theoretically to examine its impact 
on the local state and society. The Powell doctrine can create counterproductive long term 
problems for both the host nation and the US. Alternative strategies and considered to 
expand the US ability to intervene. The model serves as a tool to determine both the short 
and long term implications of US strategic courses of action. 
The findings of this study are that the organizational model serves as a useful tool to 
analyze internal wars. The model can assist in developing and implementing policies for an 
organization operating within the state or for an external actor seeking to influence the 
outcome. This work is a preliminary work and suggests the need for linther research into the 





This thesis focuses on organizations and the process of internal conflict. Internal 
conflict is defined as the use of violence by organizations that challenge the policies or 
political structure of a ruling regime. Unorganized violence such as riots, high crime rates 
and individual acts are not included. These events have marginal long term impact on the 
status quo of a government unless they are used by an organization. 
The origins, process and outcome of internal conflict are examined in relation to the 
interaction of organizations. A dynamic relationship between the environment, 
organizational structure and decision making, this thesis explains the role that the 
organization plays in shaping both the process and the outcome. A systemic model of 
internal conflict is presented that depicts interaction as a cyclic process, rather than a linear 
cause and effect relationship. The hypotheses from this model are tested against three case 
studies: the 1948 to 1960 Malayan Insurgency, the 1969 to 1995 Northern Ireland 
Insurgency and the current conflict in Algeria from 1988 to 1995. 
B. THEORY. 
There are two major schools in insurgency theory. A macro approach focuses on 
insurgency as a societal phenomenon. Broad historical and social forces create an 
insurgency and determine the outcome. In this type of approach, the revolution itself is an 
event. What matters is the forces that occurred before the onset of the insurgency, those 
that predetermined the outcome. The second approach is a micro view. It examines why 
individuals revolt. The individual approach focuses on relative deprivation and rational 
choice theories to determine why individuals choose political violence. 
A third approach is to use the organization as a level of analysis between the macro 
and micro views. The societal and individual schools attempt to explain why rebellion 
occurs. The organizational approach focuses on how rebellions occur. There is value in 
describing the origins of revolutions. Yet, a descriptive theory only states what already 
occurred and can not serve as a basis for policy and action to influence a conflict in 
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progress. The organizational approach serves as an effort to examine the strategic methods 
best suited to favorably influence the conflict. 
1. Macro Approaches. 
The premise of the macro approach is that broad social and historical forces drive 
change. The level of analysis is on broad social segments such as "state", "class", "ethnic 
group" or "social movement". Three major schools of thought are the systems 
disequilibrium approach, the Marxist structural approach and the opportunityhesource 
approach. 
a. Systems Disequilibrium Approach. 
Chalmers Johnson developed a theory stating that revolution is caused by 
change within societies. "Rapid change leads to systems disequilibrium which produces 
individual pathologies as well as collective movements."' Samuel Huntington argued that 
revolutions are a byproduct of socioeconomic modernization. Revolutions are progressive 
in that they lead to ''the creation and institutionalization of a new political order."* 
Modernization changes social and economic power in society which creates a political 
disparity which can lead to violence. Political violence stabilizes society and allows for 
further growth. De Toqueville and Weber also believed that "revolutions usually led to 
stronger, more centralized and more bureaucratic states.It3 
b. Structural Approach. 
The structural approach maintains that the social structure of a state 
determines the path of its development. Marx, Moore and Skocpol are the three best 
known structural theorists. Marx believed that the inherent contradictions between the 
Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence" 
in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict, (New York: The Free Press, 1983), 
pp. 135-166. p. 146. 
* Samuel P. Huntington, "Revolution and Political Order" in Jack A. Goldstone, ed., 
Revolutions: Theoretical. Commrative and Historical Studies, 2nd edition, (Fort Worth: 
Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), pp. 37-44. p. 38. 
Goldstone, p. 37. 
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economic classes of those who produced and those who controlled production was 
deterministic. The socioeconomic structure of feudalism led to capitalism which would 
inevitably lead to c~mmunism.~ 
Barrington Moore broadened the range of outcomes from communism to include 
democracy and feudalism. For Moore, class structure determined political outcome such 
as his belief that democracy was not possible without a middle class.' Skocpol supported 
the social historical determinism of the structural school. She added the role of the state as 
a factor in preventing the outbreak of revolution. As soon as world historical forces 
weakened the state, the inevitable revolution would occur.6 
c. OpportunityAtesource Approach. 
Charles Tilly modified the macro approach. He looked at broad aggregate 
groups in society as having collective interests in common and competing with other 
groups. The systems and structural approach held that these groups are created by world 
historical forces. Tilly allows for other factors such as political, regional and ethnic factors 
to create cleavages in ~ociety.~ Collective interests lead to competing polities struggling to 
control the state. The opposition gains power only through taking advantage of 
opportunities and resources to compete with the regime. 
2. Micro Approaches. 
The micro theorists take a very different approach. They hold that the aggregate 
sum of individual preferences shape social forces as opposed to the macro view that social 
Peter C. Sederberg, Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change, (New 
York: HarperCollins, 1994, pp. 176-9. 
Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1966). 
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979). See James DeNardo, Power In Numbers, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), pp.28-32 for a thorough discussion and critique of Skocpol's theory. 
Sederberg, p. 189. Gurr, 1983, p. 147 
forces shape individual preferences. The two major micro schools of thought are the 
relative deprivation approach and the rational choice approach. 
a. Relative Deprivation. 
Relative deprivation theory was developed by Gurr to explain why 
individuals resorted to political violence. His theory states that social, economic and 
political forces cause individual frustration which results in collective violence. Gurr 
developed a highly complicated model to determine what led individuals to join in 
collective political violence.8 He relies on individual, cultural and structural variables in 
his model. 
The problem with a detailed, comprehensive model is that it is diflicult to use. How 
do you measure the individual preferences of every person in an entire society? "Empirical 
studies question whether variations in relative deprivation account for the occurrences of 
violent o~tbreaks."~ 
b. Rational Choice. 
Rational choice regards the individual as a rational actor who bases his 
decisions on a cost-benefit analysis. The weakness in this theory is that individuals benefit 
by free riding. Free riding is allowing others to bear the burden of taking collective violent 
action and benefitting from the future changes. The problem is that if everyone free rides, 
no one benefits." Leites and Wolf posit that the revolutionary organization can offer 
assisted preferences to overcome free riding behavior." 
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
Sederberg, p. 127. 
lo See Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma, (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1995). 
Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on 
Insurgent Conflict, (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1970). 
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3. Origins of Conflict. 
The problem with macro and micro theories is that they seek to explain the origins 
of an internal conflict. They do not explain the process by which the conflict occurs or the 
ultimate outcome. Whether armed organizations are formed by macro social forces or 
micro individual efforts does not explain who wins. Some organizations are more effective 
than other organizations of the same relative size. Structural approaches attempt to predict 
outcomes from origins. These theories have proven to be empirically false. The former 
Soviet Union was not the vanguard of the future, but a broken remnant of the past. 
4. Organization as Level of Analysis. 
The true problem in internal conflict is in studying the process in order to determine 
policies to effect the outcome. The macro and micro theories provide a tool to examine the 
roots of conflict but have nothing to say on how to win. Tilly, Leites and Wolf, DeNardo 
and Gurr all touch upon the role of organizations in the process without focusing on the 
organization itself as the level of analysis.12 Social and individual explanations are 
important to studying origins, but the organization is the level of analysis for the process 
of internal conflict. 
Macro and micro theories are event models of internal conflict. Revolution occurs 
when certain conditions are met. This is empirically not true. Revolutions take time and 
the decision to join revolutions is not spontaneous. The organization plays a key role. 
Organizational growth is gradual and revolutionary outcome is determined in a protracted 
interaction between the regime, society and the organization. Therefore revolution is a 
process, not an event. 
The organization exists between the macro political, economic and social structures 
and the individual. What are the links between the organization, its environment and 
individuals? The macro theories identify the many political, economic and social forces . 
that divide society. These forces form distinct social movements within society. The 
Leites and Wolf use economic theory to examine the market for insurgency. DeNardo 
uses revolutionary strategy as a level of analysis. The organization itself functions within 
the market of insurgency and one of its outputs is strategy. 
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organization recruits from one or more social movements. At the micro level, the 
organization uses selective incentives to recruit individuals from the social movement 
preference base into the organization. 
Thus, the organization exists between the macro and micro perspective. The 
organizational model presented in this thesis provides several advantages. First, a social 
movement is difficult to measure. It is formed by preferences and it is difficult to measure 
the contents of people's minds. Organizational membership requires action and is 
observable. Second, a social movement is a collection of people with common preferences. 
It does not have articulated goals or strategies. Organizations have fixed goals and use 
strategies and tactics to achieve them. Third, organizations exist between social 
movements and individuals. Yet, they also exist in relationship with other organizations. 
It is rare for only one organization to exist within a given social movement. Normally, a 
social movement consists of several different organizations. The existence of multiple 
organizations reveals the incoherence of a social movement. If the macro theories are 
correct, the social movement should determine the success of an organization. In reality, 
the organization is independent from a social movement and succeeds or fails on its own 
actions. For example, after 19 17, the Bolsheviks successfully seized power in Russia over 
the larger Mensheviks. If the preferences of the social movement were deterministic, the 
Mensheviks would have won. 
C. AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH. 
1. Problem Statement. 
What is the process of internal conflict? What role do organizations play in the 
process and outcomes of internal conflict? 
2. Definitions and Limitations. 
Internal conflict is defined as the use of political violence by organizations to 
change the policies or political structure of a regime. Internal means within a state. 
Internal conflict occurs in many cases across national boundaries. For the sake of 
conceptual clarity, this study will focus on the state as the field of conflict so as to clearly 
identify the role of participants. 
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. . . . 
Further, the thesis will study organizations that are not part of the existing regime. 
Coups and power conflicts within the ruling elites occur within the ruling social movement. 
Organizations outside the existing power structure are components of different social 
movements with different preferences for the distribution of political, economic and 
political power. 
3. Significance of the Study. 
The study of the process of internal conflict facilitates examination of the type of 
organizations and organizational actions that lead to success or failure. Developing a 
process model provides a prescriptive approach to determine the organizational actions to 
be taken by either the regime or its challengers. An understanding of the process an 
external actor such as the United States to develop prescriptive policies. Current United 
States doctrine does not include organizations and strategies that lead to success in internal 
conflict. 
D. OVERVIEW OF THESIS. 
1. Theoretical Support. 
The thesis examines the relationship of the organization to its environment, the 
relationship between the organization and individuals and the relationship between 
organizations and other organizations. The level of analysis is the organization. The 
organization is studied within the context of a state. The state is used as a systems 
boundary containing the population of society divided into a variety of cooperating and 
competing social movements. 
Organization theory is used to examine the organization itself. Organization theory 
contains a classical structural approach and an individual human relations approach that 
parallels the macro and micro theories of internal conflict. Contingency theory is used 
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because it describes various types of organizations and links the organization to its 
environment. This theory states that the optimal organizational design is contingent on its 
environment.'3 
Organization theory also distinguishes between the political, economic and social 
forces that form the contextual environment of the state and the separate task environment 
formed by the size, location and activities of all of the organizations that operate within the 
state. 
Resource Mobilization theory is used to clarify the way divisions within society 
form social movements. Organization theory is designed for firms in an economic 
environment. Resource Mobilization theory is used to convert organization theory from an 
economic focus to a political focus. 
Political network theory focuses on the relationship between organizations and 
individuals. It is a variation of rational choice theory. The individual level of analysis is not 
the focus of this study. Nevertheless, social networks help explain the method by which 
organizations recruit and maintain membership. The Appendix explains the implications 
of political network theory on how organizations survive and grow and the actions 
organizations use that lead to growth. 
2. Thesis Outline. 
Chapter I1 presents the process model of internal conflict. This model locates the 
organization between macro social forces and the individual. It establishes the nature of 
the relationship between an insurgent organization and the regime and other organizations 
in the state. Three hypotheses drawn from the theory are tested in case studies. 
Chapters 111, IV and V test the hypotheses from the model in separate case studies. 
Malaya was selected as it is regarded as a classic model of a successful counter insurgency 
I3This is not to be confused with Eckstein's use of contingent-inherent theory, used to 
explain political violence as structural phenomenon. The authors focus is on the 
organization and its environment. See Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to 
Explaining Collective Political Violence," in Ted R. Gurr, ed. Handbook of Political 
Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1983), pp. 135-166. 
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and there are many different theories that attempt to explain outcomes. It provides a 
comparative case against other theories. Northern Ireland was selected as a tough test for 
the theory. The explosion of violence in 1969 appeared to many observers as a 
spontaneous event that resembled the macro theories of environment determining outcome. 
This resembles a revolution as an event. It provides a test of the null hypothesis which 
states that organizations do not matter because environment determines outcome. The last 
case study is the current crisis in Algeria. An efficient theory should not only describes 
past events, but helps predict future events. Algeria is a current internal conflict of great 
interest to the United States. 
All three case are characterized by a minimum of external intervention. This 
enhances the focus on factors within the state that lead to success and failure. The impact 
of external factors is assessed in the case studies and broadened in Chapter VI. Chapter VI 
focuses on external intervention from the perspective of the United States. The Powell 
doctrine is analyzed using the organizational model. The strategies and options of the 
external actor are reviewed providing a frame for future doctrine development. 
Chapter VII summarizes the conclusions of the study. It examines the empirical 
support for the model in the case studies, evaluates the hypotheses and compares the theory 
to existing macro and micro theories. 
9 
10 
11. THE THEORY AND AN ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL. 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter examines the relationship between the organization and its environment. 
Three issues will be examined. The first is to determine the opportunities and constraints the 
environment frames for the organization. The second issue is determining the optimal 
strategy given a certain environment. The third issue is to determine the optimal 
organizational design of the organization given its environment and intended goals and 
strategy. 
A model is developed that relates the process of internal conflict to the organization 
embedded in its environment. Three hypotheses and ten propositions from the model are 
framed so that the theory may be tested. Finally, the final section outlines the case study 
selection and design in which the hypotheses will be examined. 
This study will use the state in which the internal conflict takes place as a system. 
The political, economic, social structures of that state and its own unique history, geography 
and demographics define systems parameters. Systemic behavior complicates macro and 
micro theories. The conditions that create divisions and grievances in society lead to 
unexpected outcomes in a systems environment. The system itself can reinforce or balance 
against the impact of a given variable. Systemic reactions can reinforce the magnitude of the 
action by increasing its effect. Conversely, balancing reactions counteract the effect of the 
action to preserve the status quo. Systemic reactions can lead to varying consequences in 
time and space. 
An action can have a beneficial effect in one part of the system and a harmful impact 
in another. For example, organizational actions may produce a beneficial impact on the 
organization's own social movement increasing recruitment and resources to the 
organization. The same action may lead to an increase in the recruitment and resources 
available to opposing organizations. Thus, the organization increases in strength, but so do 
its opponents. This is a common result of violent acts in internal conflict. 
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An action may produce a beneficial effect in the short run and harmful effects in the 
long run. Violent acts can increase the prestige of the organization but over time cost the 
organization the support of its own social movement. Movements lead to countermovements 
in ~0ciety.l~ 
Systemic reactions may involve a time lag between action and outcome. The 
organization may take the most appropriate action possible, but if the organization is 
eliminated before the action can have effect nothing is accomplished. Members may become 
frustrated at the lack of results in the short cycle and take action that eliminates the benefit 
of the original action. The organization must be persistent and avoid impatience as it seeks 
to accomplish its objectives. 
B. A CONTINGENCY MODEL OF INTERNAL CONFLICT. 
Contingency theory is based on the premise that the appropriate structure for an 
organization is contingent on a number of internal and external variables that shape the 
organization's operational environment. It is part of organization theory and was developed 
by the work of Lawrence and Lorsch." There are two different environments that together 
form the system in which the organization operates. One is formed by the aggregate of all 
the individuals that exist in the state. The other is formed by the aggregate of all of the 
organizations within the state. 
1. Contextual and Task Environments. 
The organization exists within two types of environment: a contextual environment 
and a task environment. 
l4 See Mayer N. Zald and Bert Useem, "Movement and Countermovement Interaction: 
Mobilization, Tactics and State Involvement", in Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, 
ed. , Social Movements in an Organizational Society, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Books, 1987), pp. 247-272. 
l5 Paul Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Organizations and Environment: Managing 
Differentiation and Integration, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, 1967). 
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The distinction between organization and environment highlights the key boundary 
transactions that sustain an organization on a day to day basis and influence its long 
run survival.16 
In its daily operations, the organization interacts with its customers, competitors, government 
agencies and other elements that directly affect the organization. Dill called this the task 
environment.17 This concept is a narrow view of the total environment that faces the 
organization. The task environment represents the system where the organization acquires 
its inputs, takes actions and conducts its production and markets its outputs. The 
organization attempts to take action and achieve its goals in this environment.l8 
The firm also operates in the broader contextual environment. This represents the 
political, economic, social, cultural and demographic factors that shape the organization's 
overall environment." The overall viability of the organization is shaped by the contextual 
environment. The contextual environment is less dynamic than the task environment in that 
the nature of society changes slower than that of an individual market. Nevertheless, it is the 
interaction of the contextual and task environments that form the degree of stability and 
certainty in which the firm operates. 
Traditional macro and micro theories focus on the contextual environment to explain 
internal conflicts. Broad social forces and individual preferences and decisions are important 
in determining the potential scope and intensity of a conflict. Yet they do not explain 
organizational behavior and it is the ability and actions of organizations that determine the 
process of an internal conflict. The task environment is the field of organizations that 
operate within the broader contextual environment. Organizational behavior is affected by 
l6 Gareth Morgan, Creative Organization Theory, (London: SAGE Publications, 1989), 
p. 72. 
l7 William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy", 
Administrative Science quarterly, 2, 1958, pp. 409-443. 
l8 W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational. Natural and Open Systems, (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), pp. 133-4. 
l9 Morgan, p. 72. 
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forces within the contextual environment and by interaction with other organizations within 
the task environment. 
2. The Process of Organization and Environment. 
Contingency theory shifts the focus from the structural perspective to a process 
perspective. "A process view is taken not only of the internal operations of the organization 
but of the organization itself as a system persisting over time."20 Figure 2-1 shows the 
relationship between the contextual and task environments for a political organization. The 
contextual environment does not cause internal conflict. It creates conditions that an 
organization can exploit to grow. 
Environments are created by drawing a border at some level within a system to 
separate some element from the rest of the system.21 The borders of the contextual 
environment are those of society. The borders of the state form the geographic boundaries 
and the vertical and horizontal cleavages of society form the contextual environment. 
The organization develops from an associational base of leaders and followers that 
form groups in politically or socially defined openings in society. These openings can be a 
political party, a trade union, religious or cultural groups or family and social groups. These 
groups form over various issues and recruit members from within the horizontal and vertical 
cleavages in society. Over time, these groups unite to form a larger functionally 
differentiated organization with a structure and goals. The organization develops a strategy 
to attain these goals. The contextual environment is the arena where an organization 
develops within a society. 
The task environment is the arena where the organization seeks to achieve its goals. 
The political organization, the regime, and society form the task environment. The regime, 
its opposing organizations and society form a triangular interactive system. Actions taken 
by one actor causes interaction with the other two components. This interactive process 
2o Scott, p. 93. 

















Figure 2-1. Organizational Model of Internal Conflict. 
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creates a unique task environment that is favorable or unfavorable to the organization. The 
organization responds to this environment by new action (or inaction) as its strategy 
contributes to perceived organizational success or failure. 
Time dynamics serve to form the boundary between the contextual and task 
environment. The task environment operates in a short cycle. This action-interaction 
process operates in the near term. The contextual environment operates in a long cycle. The 
political, economic and social characteristics of society take more time to develop and 
change than the nature of a specific market. 
The border between the contextual and task environments is permeable. Changes in 
the political, economic and social structure of society will be reflected in the triangular 
relationship between the regime, the opposition and society.22 In turn, the process of action 
and interaction can have a long cycle effect that changes the political, economic and social 
structure. Thus, there is a gradual interaction between the task and contextual environments 
as well as the immediate interaction of regime, counter regime and society. 
The overall environment for internal war is the state and the society it contains. The 
counter regime organization mobilizes resources and uses violence in an effort to change 
regime policies or to change the government of the state. The organization designs a 
structure to operate within the contextual and task environments. The organization takes 
action within the short cycle of the task environment. An interaction process occurs 
between the regime, counter regime and society that affects the munificence, complexity and 
dynamism of the environment. The outcome of the short and long cycle process is the 
increase or decrease in the size of the organization. 
3. The Environment. 
The contextual and task environments frame the system for the organization. 
Socioeconomic divisions frame preference groups in the contextual environment. The 
organization has little impact on the contextual environment and must take advantage of 
22Gordon McCormick, Naval Postgraduate School Class Lecture, Monterey, California 
(Spring, 1995). Dr. McCormick used the triangle in classes he teaches on revolution. 
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existing opportunities and constraints. The organization's own actions help shape the task 
environment, and it is here that organizations have the most leverage. The task environment 
also forms the largest threat, as actions of other organizational actors can limit or destroy the 
organization. 
a. Internal Conflict is a System. 
The environment of internal conflict is the system that contains the regime, 
counter regime and society. The borders of this system vary with the specific case, but 
normally are the borders of the state itself. A specific case may contain a society split 
between states such as the Kurds or numerous other variations. International law and the UN 
Charter differentiate between the rights of states and those of nonstate actors. The state 
forms the unit of analysis for the system. Thus, the Kurdish struggle is different if viewed 
from the state perspective of Turkey, Iran or Iraq. 
Within the boundaries of the state, the system consists of the regime, counter regime 
and society. Many theorists analyze the interaction of the regime and counter regime and 
fail to analyze the interaction of both with society. As parts of a system, actions taken by 
one causes reactions in the other two. These actions can be reinforcing when the system 
works to increase the impact of the action. These actions also serve as balances when the 
system counteracts the action to maintain a status The total membership of both the 
regime and its opponents is a minority of the total population of society. The system itself 
must be analyzed, not just some of its component parts. 
The system of regime, counter regime qtd society can be analyzed though its 
environmental structure. The environment is divided into a contextual environment and a 
task environment. The contextual environment consists of the structural factors that change 
slowly or not at all. These factors include geography, the political, economic, and social 
structure of state and society. The task environment is formed by the interactions of the state 
23 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning 
Organization,(New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994), p. 79. 
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and non state organizations that exist within the system. The task environment can change 
rapidly since it is driven by the actions and reactions of organizations and events. 
From the perspective of the organization, the environment shapes the opportunities 
and constraints for action and growth. The contextual environment shapes the size and 
nature of the potential supporters of the organization. The task environment shapes the 
ability of the organization to conduct actions, recruit and survive. 
b. Contextual Environment and Market Size. 
The contextual environment forms common preference groups within a 
broader society. These preference groups become the market for organizations that seek their 
support. Market size represents the elements of the horizontal and vertical cleavages in 
society where the organization hopes to recruit members. The market represents the demand 
side for an organization. The contextual environment consists of a number of markets, based 
on the unique set of vertical and horizontal cleavages in a given state.24 
For example, in a hypothetical example, the organization might consist of urban 
intellectuals and rural Chinese peasants. Together these groups form 10 percent of society. 
The organization's market size 10 percent. Under these conditions, if they recruited every 
possible supporter, they could gain no more than 10 percent of the total population. The 
organization would have to shift goals and policies to reach out to additional groups to 
expand to other markets. The firm may adapt itself to suit the market, but it does not create 
a market. The preferences of individuals within society are a function of structural factors, 
many of which are beyond the reach of any organization. 
The existence of several markets within the same system allows market interaction. 
The mobilization of one preference group trying to change the system normally leads to the 
24 Leites and Wolf regard all of society as part of the same market. When the cost is low 
enough, all will join. However, in a system the organized rebellion of one group causes 
other groups to mobilize to protect the status quo. This means that as demand rises in one 
market, it increases demand in others. A differentiated view of several markets in society 
is a more empirical view of the actual systemic behavior of societies. See Nathan Leites and 
Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analvtical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, 
(Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1970), p. 28. 
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countermobilization of other groups to protect the system.*’ These preference shifts 
influence demand, but preferences alone do not determine supply. Organizations must act 
to convert preferences into membership. Leites and Wolf called this assisted preferences.26 
Organizations try to use preferences and the contextual environment to their best advantage. 
Organizational actions to manipulate preferences are influenced by the actions of other 
organizations in the task environment. 
c. Task Environment and Space. 
The task environment represents the organizational component of the regime, 
counter regime and society. At a given point in time, the system contains a variety of 
organizations that are part of the regime or counter regime or are neutral to both. These 
organizations interact with each other. The task environment is influenced by the 
interactions of these organizations. 
Mobilization space represents the human and geographic space within the system 
where the organization attempts to influence preferences and recruit new members. An 
organization operates in an open space when there is no competition from or constraints 
caused by other organizations in a given space. Competition from other organizations 
through legal and illegal means limits the space available to the organization. 
Mobilization space originates in the contextual environment. At a given point in time 
the organization exists in legal and cultural space. Legal space exists in the political 
structure. Political parties, labor unions and other associations are examples of legal spaces. 
Cultural space arises from religious groups and institutions, ethnic associations, social 
associations and other groups and organizations in society. 
Once internal conflict starts mobilization space becomes dominated by the task 
environment. Organizations use legal and illegal means to deny space to their opponents. 
The regime will create new laws to limit the legal and cultural space of the insurgents. The 
25 Useem and Zald, pp. 247-272. 
26 Leites and Wolf, p. 42. 
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insurgents seek to disrupt the government and can even try to create a parallel government, 
or dual power situation, where the insurgents control the space in a given area. 
Mobilization space is best defined through presence. Space is the area where an 
organization could operate, and presence is where an organization does operate. In a given 
space such as a village or a province, an organization has presence if members of the 
organization are permanently present. A regime can declare its opposition illegal. The 
governments proclamations are mere rhetoric, if the government has no presence in a given 
area. A given area can have one organization present, organizations competing for presence, 
or no presence for either side.27 
To grow, the organization must have presence in an area that contains mobilization 
space and a market. Presence in an area with denied space means that the organization is 
underground and not capable of action. Presence and space without a market means the 
organization has a product that no one desires. It can interfere with the efforts of opposing 
organizations but at best can only coerce the local inhabitants. Space and a market without 
presence may lead to unorganized actions and sympathizers but the organization must create 
presence and organize its supporters if the organization is to be sustained over time. 
Given a fixed market size and space, recruitment still requires presence. Presence 
is the location of organizational elements within society. For example, if there are no legal 
barriers to the organization and it is using labor unions for recruitment, the organization must 
still be able to send elements into the space and potential of society to reach, influence and 
recruit members. The urban Malayan Communist Party had initial difficulties sending urban 
intellectuals to recruit rural squatters simply due to geography. They lacked presence in the 
rural communities and it took years plus the fortuitous occurrence of World War I1 to build 
an initial presence in the rural squatter community. 
27 G. C. Alroy examines why underdeveloped rural areas so frequently participate in 
insurgencies. The absence of government presence in rural areas creates a political vacuum 
that allows insurgents free room to develop and organize. See G. C. Alroy, "Insurgency in 
the Countryside of Underdeveloped Countries", in Sam C. Sarkesian, Revolutionary 
Guerrilla Warfare, (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1975). pp. 257-266. 
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d. The Nature of Organizational Competition. 
The organization seeks to gain support within its own market. It competes 
with other organizations within the same market. This group of organizations within a given 
market forms an industry. It is very rare for an insurgency to have only one organization. 
Most have a variety of organizations. Some of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan spent as 
much effort fighting each other as they did the regime. This means that while the contextual 
environment forms markets, the task environment consists of competing industries. An 
organization competes with competitors within its own industry as well as against all the 
organizations in competing industries.28 
For simplicity, three industries will be examined: the regime industry, the 
counterregime industry and the neutral society industry. The regime and counter regime 
industries contain the market of individuals whose preferences support one side or the other 
as well as the organizations that recruit from this base. The society industry is not as 
cohesive as either the regime or counter regime. It includes individuals or groups not 
involved in either side of the conflict. In internal war, the society industry normally contains 
the majority of society. Internal wars are fought by minority groups. A counter regime of 
one or 2 percent of the population may fight a regime with support from 5 percent.29 
The size of the society industry compared to both the regime and counter regime is 
significant. In conventional war, armies wage war on other armies. They do not recruit 
personnel and resources from the opposing society. Internal war is unconventional in that 
both organizations recruit from and operate within the same society. The society industry 
of both organizations and individuals often forms the center of gravity in internal war. 
28 Resource Mobilization (RM) Theory develops the relationships between preference 
groups, organizations and industry using the terms Social Movement, Social Movement 
Organization and Social Movement Industry. The authors use RM theory to examine the 
competition within and between organizations. See Zald and McCarthy, pp. 20-21. 
29 Leites and Wolf discuss Malaya and Vietnam as examples where only 1% actively 
supported the insurgents with tacit sympathy from society. Leites and Wolf, pp. 9-10. 
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e. The Security Dilemma. 
The role of violence provides the key characteristic of internal conflict that 
differentiates insurgency from social movement theory. The organization is not simply 
competing for preferences but also for survival. The organization must balance its actions 
and recruitment against the need to survive. Organizational action leads to reactions. Violent 
reactions threaten the organization and constrain activity. Growth also must be balanced 
with survival. Growing quickly increases the ability of opponents to infiltrate and break up 
the organization. 
The environmental interaction of market size and space frame the opportunities and 
risks available to an organization. The contextual environment provides a larger or smaller 
market size. This represents the population which prefers the organization but has not 
joined it. Mobilization space varies from opened to closed based on the efforts of opposing 
organizations and the existing presence of the organization. Figure 2-3 illustrates the four 



























Figure 2-2. Relationship between Space and 
Market Size and Effect on Organization Growth 
and Security. 
Large market size allows the organization to grow. If mobilization space available 
the organization can conduct recruitment and take action to create expectations and selective 
incentives favorable to growth. If mobilization space is closed then the organization can take 
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action to open mobilization space. Acts of violence can kill or intimidate government 
supporters allowing the organization to expand. 
Small market size means that the organization has little prospect of growth. The 
main issue facing the organization is survival. Open mobilization space allows the 
organization to survive. Closed space makes survival a critical issue. With a low potential 
market, the organization uses violence to survive hoping to increase its support base. 
Violence that leads to government atrocity such as Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland can 
alter unfavorable market size by forcing previously neutral individuals to become involved 
in the conflict. 
C. HOWTOACT. 
Organizational actions are not determined by the environment. The organization 
designs goals and strategies to maximize its advantages and limit its constraints in the 
contextual and task environment. The two dimensions of organizational interaction are with 
individuals in the contextual environment and organizations in the task environment. These 
dimensions define the two types of struggles an organization must wage to be successful and 
grow. The organization wages a mobilizational struggle to gain recruits and resources fiom 
the contextual environment. The organization is also engaged in an organizational struggle 
with other organizations in the task environment. Figure 2-2 illustrates the two types of 
struggle. 
Organizational choice must balance the need to grow along the mobilizational axis 
and survive along the organizational axis. The balance between growth and survival also 
represents the organization's strategy. The organization selects goals and strategy to achieve 
some mixture of one or both types of struggle. The organization's strategy leads to an 
interaction and response fiom both individuals on the mobilizational side and other 
organizations. A strategy that would work in a task environment with no organized 
competitors may completely backfire in a task environment with many rivals who counteract 
every strategy. It is the task environment that complicates organizational choice. Other 
organizations actively seek to disrupt both the plan and the organization. 
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Figure 2-3. Dynamics between regime, counter 
regime and society. 
1. Optimal Decisions. 
Given environmental factors, what are the optimal decisions for an organization? 
Contingency theory states that the successful organization has an organizational structure in 
harmony with its contextual and task environment. The organization develops an 
organizational design to carry out its strategy. The organizational structure is designed to 
carry out certain mobilizational or organizational tasks. Organization design represents a 
strategic weight between acting or mobilizing. The organization ideally wants to do both, 
but some organizational structures are more suited to operating along one axis than the other. 
Organizational structure is a necessary but not sufficient characteristic of the 
competent organization. Changes in the environment can leave an organization with an 
inappropriate structure. Since it takes months or years to change organizational structure, 
the competent organization must overcome a handicap in structure while still achieving its 
goals. The initial structure selected optimizes the organization toward certain types of 
actions and away from others. Changing strategies will be constrained by the last 
organizational decision on organizational structure. 
A competent organization must be efficient and effective. Organizational eficiency 
is defined as the organizations ability to use minimum resources to produce maximum 
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output. Organizational effectiveness is the degree to which the organization achieves its 
goals. Short cycle decisions stress efficiency. In the short cycle, current resources and the 
contextual environment are a given. The organization seeks to make most efficient use of 
available resources. Long cycle decisions stress effectiveness. In the long run, the 
organization strives to overcome environmental and organizational constraints to allow the 
organization to grow and achieve organizational goals. 
2. Cyclic behavior. 
The organization balances the need to grow with the need for security. Over time, 
organizations show cyclic behavior. Periods of growth are followed by periods of 
consolidation. A large and rapid influx of new members creates instability in the 
organization. The new members have lower commitment than the established membership. 
A consolidation period allows commitment to be raised in the new members. The 
organization can absorb the new members into the existing structure or expand the 
organizational structure. This process of growth and consolidation occurs is common to the 
organizational development process. 
In insurgency theory, these periods of growth and consolidation are reflected in stage 
concepts of development. Mao's three stage theory starts with an organizational development 
phase, shifts to a guerrilla war phase and ends in a conventional war of movement. Each 
phase contains a different organizational structure. The initial stage requires the 
establishment of political networks and extensive organization development in local 
communities. "Before the first stage is begun, there must be penetration of the target social 
system by the revolutionary cadre ... conditioned by the particular characteristics of the 
population and territory."30 The second stage requires an extensive political and military 
organization capable of waging war on both the political and military fionts. In the final 
stage, the organizational development process is complete. The insurgents have established 
their own government structure in its base areas and the military structure has developed into 
30 See the discussion on the revolutionary stages in Sam C. Sarkesian, Revolutionary 
Guerrilla Warfare, (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1973, pp. 8-1 0. 
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a conventional army. The insurgents wage a conventional offensive and consolidate power. 
The organization changes and adapts as the insurgency becomes successful and grows. 
Success is aided by a parrallel development and adaptation by the ~rganization.~’ 
Organizational presence contributes to cyclic behavior. It takes time to establish 
presence in new areas. The organizational members are vulnerable until they have 
consolidated their position in the community within existing social networks. Once 
established, presence allows selected incentives to help form sympathizers and active 
supporters. Presence serves the same function as dust particles to rain. Dust particles 
accumulate microscopic moisture. Over time, the moisture reaches a critical mass, growth 
accelerates and the drop becomes so heavy it falls ??om the sky. The time taken to establish 
presence within a community is often unobserved until it is reflected in organizational 
actions. Nevertheless, it takes time and effort to establish the initial links that have a high 
payoff later. Establishing presence is an investment for future growth. 
3. Short and Long Cycle Decisions. 
The organization faces opportunities and constraints from the contextual environment 
formed by state and society, the task environment formed by the interaction of organizations 
within the state and society and by the internal structure and membership of the organization 
itself. These forces are not deterministic: they influence what the organization can and 
cannot do, yet the organization retains free choice. Systemic influences go both ways. The 
organization is capable of influencing the contextual and task environments and its own 
structure. It is this ability to influence its environment that makes organizational actions and 
decisions crucial to the process of internal conflict. 
The competent organization can overcome external and internal constraints and still 
be successful, the incompetent organization cannot. There are situations that so favor one 
side or the other that the organization either cannot win or cannot lose. Castro’s victory in 
Cuba saw an incompetent insurgent beat an incompetent regime. Yet, most internal conflict 
31 DeNardo states that revolutions require years of political organization to be effective. 
See DeNardo, pp. 254-7. 
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situations are not so clear cut. The competence of the competing organizations becomes a 
crucial variable in prolonged internal conflict. 
Organizational structure has an influence on the decision making process of the 
organization. Decision making in an organization is a function of the interrelationships 
between leaders, followers and organizational structure.32 The organization decides its 
actions based on changing goals, organizational structure, strategy or The nature 
of the organizational decision is reflected in actions which have a short cycle impact in the 
task environment and a long cycle impact in the contextual environment. 
Short and long cycle decisions result from a crucial organizational choice. The 
organization chooses between a strategy that relies on taking action now or a strategy of 
preparation and organization for future action later. A short cycle decision focuses on 
current actions while a long cycle decision prepares the future. The organization must do 
both to be successful. The strategic dilemma is in choosing how much of each to do under 
different conditions. 
A strategy of all action and no organizing leads to failure. The failure to invest effort 
in the future growth of the organization means that no growth occurs. The organization 
cannot receive the benefit of future growth that results from successful short run actions. 
Thefuco theory in Latin America is an action strategy that expects the actions of a small 
group to create massive mobilization potential. Foco theory failed consistently in all of its 
applications since the organization lacked the presence and organizational infrastructure to 
mobilize and organize this potential into organizational strength. Fuco theory assumed that 
potential alone would lead to victory. This conceptual failure is reflected in operational 
failure. 
32 H. Wayland Cummings, Larry W. Long, Michael L. Lewis, Managing 
Communication in Organizations: An Introduction, (Scottsdale, AZ: Gorsuch Scarisbrick 
Publishers, 1987), pp. 47-8. 
33 Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political 
Terrorism", in Orbis, 29 (3), Fall 1985), p. 477. 
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... . 
A strategy of organizing without action also leads to failure. The organization 
becomes a group of coffee house intellectual revolutionaries who always plan and never act. 
The Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States had a very sophisticated 
organizational chart and elaborate plans that led nowhere due to the very small 
member~hip .~~ A shift to action led to the elimination of the organization since it lacked 
organizational depth. Preparation alone is not enough. A few highly committed ideological 
members can sustain a small group. Yet for an organization to grow it must use selective 
incentives and presence to reach out and recruit members. 
The organization must balance its acts and its organizing activities so that they build 
on one another. Short cycle actions include acts of violence and acts of recruitment. Long 
cycle actions include creating presence in new areas, forming coalitions with other groups, 
and acts to increase mobilization potential and space. There is an interaction between short 
and long cycle actions where actions now create space and potential for actions later. For 
example, violence now can create space. The organization can create presence and recruit 
later in this space through future short cycle actions. 
D. HOW TO ORGANIZE. 
Structural design is a strategic choice that requires time to implement and change.35 
When an organization selects a strategy, it must adopt a structure tailored toward 
accomplishing stated goals within the parameters of the environment. Structure defines the 
internal limitations and constraints of the organization and consequently, influences internal 
and external competitors. Regardless of the opportunity existing in the environment, 
structure can reduce or enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of a selected course of 
34 John B. Wolf, "Organization and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist Groups", 
in Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1978, pp. 169-186. p. 175. 
35Another similarity between resource mobilization theory and contingency theory is the 
focus on two types of organizational structures. Resource mobilization theory uses 
inclusive and exclusive structures to describe organizations. Contingency theory uses 
mechanistic and organic structures. 
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action. Structural design choice influences an organization's ability to compete in the 
mobilizational and organizational struggle. 
Once a given structure is implemented the organization tends to conduct operations 
that focus either on mobilizing support or fighting the organizational struggle. The 
competent organization makes adjustments in strategy to accommodate changes in the 
environment. When an organization determines that the structure is unsatisfactory, the 
leaders can choose to modify the structure. But changes take from a few months time to 
several years, depending on the specific organization and environmental situation.36 An 
organizational design that facilitates rapid adaptation to the changing environment can 
improve efficiency and effectiveness. The critical implication of structural design lies in the 
extended time period required to change it. Organizations must select strategies that 
accurately meet the requirements of the environment. 
1. Two Types of Design. 
There are two types of structures: open and Closed structure is exclusive 
and open structure is inclusive. These two categories exist in a bipolar relationship. No 
organization is strictly open or closed. However, organizational behavior demonstrates a 
tendency to favor one or the other. Organizations are characterized by traits associated with 
the open, inclusive and the closed, exclusive structural designs. 
In the absence of a violent, organizational struggle, open organizations are best suited 
for dynamic environments. Open structure facilitates the rapid growth. However, this type 
of organization is vulnerable to violent interaction *th the state and with other organizations 
in society. The optimum structure is a blend of the two types adapted to the environment. 
36The dynamics of internal war are distinctly different from the base assumptions of 
contingency theory and resource mobilization theory. The presence and use of violence 
creates pressure to force more rapid change than the 3 to 5 years of organization theory. 
The case studies will examine the time required for organizational change in a threat 
environment. 
37Bard ONeill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Modern Revolutionary Warfare, 
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc, 1990) p. . O'Neill uses the terms selective and 
mobilizational structures to describe the two ideal type structures for internal conflict. 
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a. Closed Structure. 
The closed structure is exclusive and is characterized by its small, highly 
committed, clandestine membership. Closed organizations have several advantages. These 
include: its high level of security, differentiation, specialization, and decentralized 
execution. Exclusive membership policies enhance security and provide highly committed 
members. Differentiated subelements perform specific tasks such as recruitment, political 
actions, logistics, propaganda, armed action and other specific tasks. 
High levels of commitment to organizational goals compensate for the inefficient 
command and control mechanisms associated with closed organizations. The subelements 
work independently towards group objectives with little guidance from a central command.38 
Differentiation and specialization decrease the efficiency of command and control. 
Hierarchical command structure and a distinct gap between leaders and followers are 
characteristics of a closed ~rganization.~~ 
The closed organization uses indoctrination to inculcate organizational goals during 
the initiation of new members. This increases their security. High organizational cohesion 
and unity of effort toward common goals facilitates decentralized operation, even in high risk 
environments. Closed organizations use indoctrination and coercion to instill organizational 
values. Coercion is also used to prevent defection from the organization. Yet, the use of 
these techniques, combined with the adverse consequences of compromise, makes the closed 
38This organization structure displays several characteristics of Bums and Stalker's 
organic organization. 
39 Edward E. Rice, Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 52-9. Shultz and Slater, pp. 37-9, 
Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements, ((Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp. 68-72., James C. Scott, "Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants 
and Commissars", in Theory and Society, (January - March, 1979, pp.97-133). pp. 100-101. 
There is a well documented tendency for the leaders to be from an urban intellectual middle 
class background while the followers are from an urban or rural background. However, this 
is not universal. Exact demographic composition varies with the individual case. 
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organization less adaptable to changes in structure or goals. Dissent is met with expulsion 
or punishment, not organizational change.40 
The closed organization experiences disadvantages associated with it's security and 
decentralized structure. Command, control, and communications are a serious problem 
created by this type of organizational design. Security measures require duplication of 
effort. Time is critical to secure communications systems. Decisions made at central 
command reach take time to filter down to subelements. The cumbersome communications 
problem can result in subelements conducting activities that damage the size of the market. 
Organizations constantly search for a balance between centralized and decentralized control. 
Control must be either too centralized, imposing rigidity on strategy and 
tactics; or too loose, allowing a dangerous flexibility to those on the 
fighting periphery.41 
The communication problem and commitment to organizational goals make internal dissent 
very difficult to resolve within the organization. Closed organizations often resort to 
internal repression and become riddled with schisms.42 
b. Open Structure. 
Open structures are inclusive. The open structure is less secure than the 
closed, but more capable of growth. The open model is used by political parties. It is less 
tied to goals and therefore more flexible and open to attracting support from a wider 
mobilization base. Lower initial costs and wider appeal creates opportunities with fewer 
constraints. As a result these organization types are less homogeneous than the closed 
40 Gamer and Zald, p. 127. 
41 J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the 
Underground", in Terrorism and Political Violence, (Spring 1990, pp. 194-21 1). p. 202. 
42 Crenshaw, pp. 482-4. Wolf, p. 18 1. Kent Layne Oots, "Organizational Perspectives 
on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups", in Terrorism, (Vol. 12, No. 3, 
1989, pp. 139-152), pp. 148-9. 
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~rganization.~~ The open organization's greater heterogeneity results in less cohesion and 
lower member ~ommitment .~~ 
Open structures tend to be larger than closed structures and have better 
communication systems. These organizations recruit individuals and form of coalitions 
with other organizations or associational networks. In contrast to closed organizations, 
members can defect relatively easily in a non munificent environment. High levels of 
commitment are difficult to achieve in open organizations due to the tendency to 
compromi~e.~~ The willingness of inclusive groups to compromise leads to faster growth 
than in an exclusive organization. 
The primary weakness in the open organizational design is its vulnerability to 
counter organizations. Open structures provide little protection in a violent environment. 
Violent and nonviolent countermeasures taken by competing organizations can curb growth 
by limiting or closing the mobilization space. 
Environment and organizational strategy force organizations to balance the need 
for growth and the need for survival. This requires blending the characteristics of open and 
closed organizations to meet the demands of the environment. Organizations tend toward 
either an open or closed structure. Activities conducted by organizations exhibit inherent 
structural strengths and weaknesses and members assume certain levels of risk in an effort 
to balance growth and survival. 
43 Kent Lane Oots, "Bargaining with Terrorist Organizations", in Terrorism, (Vol. 13, 
NO. 2, 1990, pp. 145-158.), p. 148. 
44 Michael A. Berger and Mayer N. Zald, Social Movements in Organizations: Coup 
D'Etat, Bureaucratic Insurgency and Mass Movement", in McCarthy and Zald,(pp. 185- 
222.) pp. 204-7. 
45 Zald and Garner, pp. 133-5. 
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2. Environment and Structure. 
Environment and structure influence  decision^.^^ The environment defines market 
size, space, base levels of organizational presence and resources of the organization. 
Organizational structure sets constraints and limitations that affect the organizational 
survival and growth. 
The structure of each revolutionary organization is as likely to determine 
the choice of strategy of national liberation as to be determined by it.47 
Environment influences structure and both environment and structure interact to influence 
decision making. The relationship between market size and space creates four different 
situations for open and closed organizations (See Figures 2-4 and 2-5). 
a. Large Market and Open Space. 
In this situation popular sentiment favors opposition organizations. Many 
would like to join and the regime and countermovements are not interfering in the 
organizations mobilization efforts (either due to no legal blockages which means implicit 
consent or due to lack of presence in the area of opposition operations). This situation 
allows rapid growth with a low survival threat. The closed organization survives, but is not 
capable of efficiently taking advantage of high growth rates due to its exclusive 
membership process. 
b. Large Market and Closed Space. 
When a large market exists, but space is closed, popular sentiment favors 
mobilization. But the lack of legal and geographic space prevents the organization's contact 
nets fiom recruiting. The closed organization is better suited for survival and growth in a 
46 Thomas J. Peters, "Strategy Follows Structure: Developing Distinctive Skills", in 
Henry Mintzberg and James Brian Quinn, ed., The Strategy Process: Concepts and 
Contexts, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice - Hall, 1992, pp. 443-8), p. 443. Peter C. 
Sederberg, Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change, (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1994), p. 261. DeNardo, pp. 144-150. 
47 J. Bowyer Bel1,On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1976), p. 186. 





















Figure 2-4. Effects of Market Size and Space on 
Open Organizations. 
hostile environment than an open organization. It can use violence to expand its market 
and use the regime's efforts to close space as leverage for recruiting. Open organizations 
are less capable of overcoming closed space and are more vulnerable to repression and 
counter organizational efforts. 
c. Small Market and Open Space. 
In this environment, popular SenLnents do not favor joining the 
organization even though open opportunity exists for the organization. Open organizations 
maintain stability in this environment. It is capable of sustaining itself due to its lower 
initiation and commitment costs. Since the transaction costs of membership have less 
appeal in an open space environment, the organization is vulnerable to defections and 
factions. These factions may have lower transaction costs. 
34 
d. Small Potential and Closed Space. 
In this situation, popular sentiments do not favor the organization and the 
regime and counter organizations are containing the organization. The higher costs 
imposed by the regime encourage members to remain in the closed organization, while they 
cause defections in the mobilizational organization. Festinger's concept posits that higher 













Figure 2-5. Effects of Market Size and Space 
on Closed Organizations. 
organizations. Less member commitment combined with higher security costs are 
weaknesses of the open organization. 
Both types of structures are better off with popular support. The open structure has 
an advantage in open space. Closed structure has an advantage in closed space. A blend 
is required to make the structure adaptable to the environment. The exact combination of 
closed and open characteristics is contingent on the situation. When sentiment is low and 
popular support wanes, the closed organization is more capable of retaining existing 
membership than the open organization. 
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3. Environment, Structure and Future Decisions. 
The counter regime organization begins the conflict from a position of weakness 
relative to the regime. If successful, it passes through several stages of development. 
Success depends on the ability of the organization to adapt organization structure to the 
changes in the environment associated with each phase. The organization must adjust itself 
to conduct operations in the short cycle. If it is successful, it must adapt its organization to 
allow a shift to the next phase of the conflict. This creates a unique paradox. An 
organization that is completely optimized to operate in the short cycle may be less capable 
of changing itself to take advantage of the new opportunities for success caused by its own 
actions. 
There exists tension between an organization optimized for action in the current 
conditions of the short cycle and its ability to be successful in the long cycle. In the short 
cycle, the contextual environment is a constant. The organization acts and reacts to actions 
by other organizations. In a stable environment, the optimal organizational design 
specializes and differentiates its subsections around set tasks and procedures. It develops 
standard operating procedures to support a given tempo of operations. However, if 
environmental conditions change the previously optimized organization may find its tempo 
of activity counterproductive. For example, an organization can use a bombing campaign 
to bring the government to negotiate. If the government negotiates and the organization can 
not shut off its bombs, it can give a serious political advantage to the regime. 
The organization can change its task environment by successful operations relative 
to the regime. Organizational success in the short cycle creates the conditions for new 
strategies and organizational growth and development. The organization must be capable 
of taking advantage of its own success. Adaptation may also be required due to changes 
in the task or contextual environment caused by factors beyond the organization's ability 
to influence. The task environment can change due to actions by the regime or other 
counter regime organizations. The contextual environmental can change due to external 
events such as a war or economic booms from an event like the 1973 oil crisis. Since the 
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organization can not control the cause of environmental change, the organization must be 
capable of reacting to change. 
A closed organization is more efficient than an open organization. Highly 
specialized, differentiated cells use high commitment and standard procedures to achieve 
the highest return from its available resources. For example, 1,000 terrorists can influence 
society more than 1,000 members of an open political party. This is based on the dynamic 
that violence produces in the environment. Higher commitment facilitates the organization 
planning and execution of violent operations. These activities become very efficient in 
order to maintain members and protect the organization. 
The open organization is less efficient and more effective than closed organizations. 
Its structure places fewer demands on the members and makes less efficient use of available 
resources. This decrease in costs results in less short run eficiency, but over time 
encourages growth. Closed structures give the organization a comparative advantage in the 
short cycle and the open organization has an advantage in the long cycle. Hence, the closed 
organization is more efficient and the open organization is more effective. 
Strategic choice determines the organizational design. This strategy is reflected in 
the associated structure. Structural strengths and weaknesses are determined by choices 
between emphasizing survival or growth. As stated previously, closed organizations are 
survivable and efficient in short cycle interaction while open organizations are less 
survivable but more effective in long cycle dynamics. Weaknesses in closed structures lie 
in the tendency to focus on short cycle action and reaction in the organizational struggle. 
This hurts the closed organization in the mobilizational struggle. 
Organizations can choose to resist the tendency to allow the structure to pull it 
along a predesignated path. The environment is influential but deterministic. Leaders must 
consider the best options available for action, in relation to the environment and 
organizational structure. Changing structure takes time, effort and especially the ability to 
recognize the need to change. The organization must balance its organizational design and 
strategy between the need to be efficient in the short cycle and the need to be effective in 
the long cycle. Efficiency in the short cycle requires specialization, training and standard 
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operations. Effectiveness in the long cycle reqires the ability to restructure tasks and 
procedures to adjust to changing conditions. 
4. Summary. 
The tension between survival and growth creates an organizational design 
dilemma.48 Each structure is characterized by strengths and weaknesses based on whether 
space is opened or closed. Closed organizations provide more security in a hostile 
environment and their members have higher levels of commitment. High levels of 
member commitment results in more efficient operations, particularly in the organizational 
struggle. Superior efficiency is offset by the closed organization's smaller size, which 
hinders its efforts to compete with the open organization in the mobilizational struggle. 
The closed organization's homogeneity and higher level of security, in contrast to that of 
the open organization, reduces its potential for growth. Contrary, to the closed structure, 
an open organization offers potential for greater growth in the mobilizational struggle. 
However, in a hostile environment, the open structure can be easily defeated by coercive, 
counter  organization^.^^ 
E. HYPOTHESES. 
1. Theoretical Support. 
This section provides a summary of the theory. The authors use ten propositions 
to support three hypotheses. These propositions define the parameters used to develop the 
hypotheses. This thesis project tested the hypothesis in the case studies. The null 
hypothesis is that the environment determines outcome and organization creation and 
behavior is determined by broad social forces that precede the conflict. 
Proposition #l. Internal conflict is a system. The internal conflict system 
parameters consist of the geographical and demographic boundaries of the state. The 
process model (Figure 2-1) depicts the theory. 
48 DeNardo, p. 15 1. 
49 Lichbach, p. 97. 
Proposition #2. There is no single optimal organizational design that fits all 
internal conflicts. Optimal design is contingent on environment factors. This proposition 
represents the central tenet of the contingency theorists--Lawrence and Lorsch. 
Proposition #3. Optimal organizational action is influenced by environment and 
organizational design. However, this influence is not deterministic. Organizations are 
independent actors capable of free choice. 
Hypothesis #l. Optimal organizational strategy is contingent on organizational 
structure and the contextual and task environment. Successful organizations grow by 
aligning strategy and organizational design with environment. 
Proposition #4. The environment is defined by the contextual and task levels of 
analysis. The contextual environment is defined by the boundaries of the system. It 
consists of the dynamic relationships between existing political, economic, and social 
structures in a given state. The contextual environment includes all individuals living in 
the society. The task environment constitutes the dynamic relationships between all 
organizations operating within the contextual environment. It includes all individuals that 
participate in organizations within the society. 
Proposition #5. There are two broad types of organizational designs: closed and 
open. Once a specific organizational structure is established, it optimizes an organization 
between a balance of growth and security. This design adds to the opportunities and 
constraints available to the organization in the short cycle. Internally, it influences 
organizational behavior. Closed and open organizations exist in a bipolar relationship 
between one tendency and the other.” 
Proposition #6. Organizations make decisions that result in short and/or long cycle 
system dynamics. Short cycle decisions are intended to produce a short term effect within 
50 These typologies are derived from RM and contingency theory. The authors combine 
the two concepts in order to build a model more suited to organizations involved in violent 
conflict, rather than business or social movements. 
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the limitations of existing resources. Long cycle decisions are intended to achieve long 
term organizational development goals.51 
Proposition #7. Organizational growth provides the best measurement of the 
outcome in an internal conflict. Organizations act to survive, conduct maintenance 
functions and grow. Growth is an indicator of success. 
Hypothesis #2. Growth is a function of market size, mobilization space and 
organizational presence. Given these three conditions an organization can take short cycle 
actions to recruit and grow. 
Proposition #8. Market size represents the preferences of the subelements of 
society. This mobilization potential is formed by the contextual en~ironment.~~ 
Proposition #9. Mobilization space is defined by the space within the contextual 
environment available for organizational growth. Organizational presence and activities 
of organizations within the task environment form the determine the size and nature of 
mobilizational 
Proposition #lo. Presence is defined as the actual location of organization 
members within the existing social networks of society. The organization may not 
necessarily have members in mobilization potential and space. Presence amplifies the 
abilities of an organization to recruit, maintain security, and gain information to support 
growth.54 
510rganizational design changes generally take 18 months to five years (short cycle) 
while organizational development may take five to 15 years. The introduction of violence 
makes existing organizational theory on the dimension of organizations difficult to predict. 
52RM theory uses the term social movements to represent preference blocks. 
53Derived from RM theory, this definition of mobilization space is formed by the task 
environment and represents the areas available to social movement organizations (SMO) 
and social movement industries (SMI). 
54David Knoke, Political Networks: The Structural Perspective, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 69-74. Political network theory supports the role 
and function of organization presence. 
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Hypothesis #3. Adaptation provides a crucial advantage to an organization both 
within its own industry and in competition with organizations in other industries. 
Contingency theory rests on the assumption that the best organization design 
depends on the nature of the environment. In internal war the process of conflict changes 
the environment over time. The successhl organization must adapt to a changing 
environment. There are two variables that reflect the organizations ability to adapt.55 
First, the ability to test reality reflects the organizations perspective on their 
environment. When the organization conducts a strategic reassessment, it assesses its 
success or failure to factors within its overall environment. This reveals the organization's 
ability to perceive all three levels of analysis. Organizations will identify constraints and 
opportunities offered by their current activity and environment. This can be compared to 
a historical analysis of their actual situation to see if the organization has identified all three 
levels and how accurately they have assessed the situation. 
Second, the organization develops a strategy to meet the constraints and 
opportunities it identified in its assessment. This strategy reflects the level to which the 
organization adapts. The organization may perceive problems in the contextual 
environment and choose only to take action at the level of events. For example, the 
organization can decide to make no changes to current goals, structure or strategy but 
simply increase operations tempo: the fight harder approach. A competent organization 
plans for both short and long cycle effects. Both types of organizations must balance short 
and long cycle effects to be successful. In an internal war this ability becomes crucial 
whether for the regime or its opposition. 
The adaptable organization is most capable of growth in the long cycle. The 
adaptable organization perceives changes in all three levels of environment and is capable 
of adapting to all three levels. All other factors being equal, closed organizations have 
more trouble changing goals and structure than open organizations. Nevertheless, 
5 5  This section is adapted from Edgar F. Huse and James L. Bowditch, Behavior in 
Oraanizations, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1973), pp. 3 10-3 12. 
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organizations are better off if they can use characteristics of both types and if they can shift 
relative weights between the two types in response to changing environmental conditions. 
Changing structure involves change to the internal power relationships within the 
organization. It requires effective leadership and internal cohesion. Organizations not 
capable of changing goals and structures are limited in their ability to adapt. In the long 
cycle, this leads to lack of growth and creates opportunities for more adaptable 
organizations to compete with the existing organization. 
2. Outcome and the Dependent Variable. 
The model shows the relationship of the environment, organizational structure and 
decisions on the size of the organization over time. The dependent variable is the 
membership of the organization. DeNardo's proposition is relevant in that there is power 
in The question remains: how much growth is necessary to win? 
The amount of growth required is unique to each case due to the different contextual 
and task environments. There is no magic number or percentage of population recruited 
that guarantees success. The variable that is common across cases is the process of growth, 
not the quantity. No revolution has ever succeeded where the government is increasing in 
mobilization numbers while the opposition is decreasing in its membership numbers. 
Castro won with two to 3,000 members whereas Batista even at the end had larger forces. 
The expectation of victory led to mass defections from Batista and a bandwagoning effect 
of support for Castro. 
Most revolutionary theorists assume a zero sum approach to internal war. If the 
regime loses something, the insurgents gain. Yet the environment is not zero sum. In 
geographic space, government presence and control are not universal. There are outlying 
areas with little or no presence from either the regime or counter regime organizations. 
Both sides seek to increase their support and control in these areas.57 
56 DeNardo, p. 43. 
57 Sam C. Sarkesian, The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional 
Conflicts, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 84. 
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In the human dimension, social movements to change the status quo generate 
countermovements to preserve the status quo. Over the duration of internal conflict, many 
participants are activated who were previously neutral.58 The increased polarization and 
mobilization of society over time create a culture of conflict. Development of this culture 
is simply the institutionalization of the greater mobilized content of society versus the 
previous neutrality. A zero sum focus only on the interaction between the regime and the 
insurgents overlooks the non zero sum relationship between the regime, insurgents and 
society. 
Efforts to predict victory have consistently failed. The conditions that breed success 
and failures vary with each case based on its unique contextual and task environment. Yet, 
while the environments change, the organizational characteristics of regimes and opposition 
organizations remain similar. The opposition seeks to grow and the regime seeks to 
eliminate or neutralize the opposition organization. Both sides measure their success in 
terms of the size and growth of the insurgent organization. This provides a measurable 
dependent variable that serves as a measure of relative success for both sides. 
There are four possible results of insurgent growth. First, the insurgents can grow 
continuously until the regime collapses such as in Mao's third stage. Second, the insurgents 
can be reduced to zero through internal disintegration or physical elimination. Third, 
insurgents can achieve stability within the system where they continue to exist within a 
fixed mobilizational potential. The fourth possible result is a negotiated solution. The 
difference between the third and fourth outcome is the presence of violence. A stable 
insurgent movement means that protracted war continues without end. Negotiations 
produce non zero sum solutions where both sides gain and lose. 
F. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY. 
1. Case Study Selection. 
The Malayan insurrection from 1948 to 1960 formed one of the major test beds for 
insurgency and counterinsurgency theorists. Malaya formed one of the few cases where 
58  Garner and Zald, pp. 121-4. 
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a regime successfully defeated an insurgency. Malaya forms a useful case study since both 
the government and many captured insurgents cooperated to write the history of the 
struggle. Both sides are in agreement on the major facts and processes that occurred. 
Northern Ireland forms the next case as it appears to contradict the British success 
in Malaya. The United Kingdom has proved incapable of defeating the IRA despite their 
previous experience in Malaya. Together, Northern Ireland and Malaya provide a robust 
examination of the organizational model. 
Algeria is the final case study. The current crisis in Algeria from 1989 to 1995 
forms an additional test of the organizational model. It does not involve the United 
Kingdom so that the model will not become only applicable to UK colonies. Algeria is 
primarily indigenous with little external involvement. Its isolated nature allows the 
insurgency process to be clearly examined without being tainted to any great extent by 
external actors. 
2. Case Study Analysis. 
The case studies will be examined through cross sectional and longitudinal analysis. 
The effectiveness of the organization will be examined at a specific point of time. The 
times chosen for this cross sectional approach are points in the struggle where the overall 
dynamism and munificence of the environment change and those specific periods where 
organizations conducted reassessments of their strategies. These reassessments lead to 
either long cycle changes of goals or structure or short cycle shifts in strategy and tactics. 
The longitudinal analysis examines the interaction of the regime, opposition and 
society over time. In the long cycle, the contextual environment changes. The cross 
sectional analysis reveals insight into the short cycle effectiveness of the competing 
organizations. The longitudinal analysis will examine the overall competence of the 
organizations. The case studies will be examined in the following format: 
a. Origins of Conflict. 
The contextual and task environments that shaped the conflict will be 
examined. The organizational development phase will be reviewed. The point of departure 
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into the dynamic model will be the initial decision to accomplish organizational goals 
through the use of force. 
b. Decision Points. 
Establish key decision points in the internal conflict. These decision points 
are self defined by the organizations. Organizations change routine decision making 
procedures when they conduct reassessments. For example, the IRA reassessment is the 
Ard Fleis which is a convention of the entire leadership and has occurred twice since 1970. 
The Briggs Plan in Malaya was a government sponsored reassessment of the conflict. 
c. Cross Sectional Analysis. 
This portion of the analysis examines several aspects of the organization at 
decision points. 
(1) The relationship between the environment and the organizational 
structure will be examined to determine what function they played in the nature of the 
organizational decision. 
(2) The environment will be analyzed to ascertain the levels of 
munificence, dynamism and complexity. 
(3) Mobilization potential will be measured as being high or low 
compared to the current mobilized membership of the organization versus the degree of 
popular support. 
(4) Mobilization space will be examined to see how much freedom 
the organization has to act. 
(5) The organizational structure will be examined as to its closed or 
open nature. 
(6)  Decisions made by the organization will be compared to its 
ability to implement the decision in the short and/or long cycle. 
(7)Determine the relative effectiveness and efficiency of the 
organization in the short cycle. 
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d. Longitudinal analysis. 
The long cycle effect on the organization, regime and society will be 
examined as to their effect on the contextual and task environment. The overall 
competence of the organization will be examined to see the cohesion, coordination, ability 
to test reality and adaptability of the organization. The strength of the organization over 
time will be examined as well as its relative efficiency. How much utility does it get from 
a given number of members? 
e. Variables. 
(1) Market Size. This represents the social strata the organization 
is seeking to recruit. This group represents a percentage of total population. The degree 
of support from this group varies over time and will be indirectly measured through an 
analysis of the contextual and task environment. 
(2) Mobilizational Space. This is the amount of legal and geographic 
space allowed the organization by the contextual environment and the regime. The location 
and degree of space will be examined over time. Mobilization space in rural areas is of 
little value if the market is in urban areas. 
(3) Presence. This is the location of organizational infrastructure at 
the level of village and local communities. The location of presence within the potential 
market and space is crucial to recruitment. A covert presence cannot recruit, it must have 
space to conduct organizational functions. 
(4) Closed and Open organizational structure. The characteristics 
of the organizational structure will be examined and compared to Table 2-1 to determine 
the degree to which it is closed or open. 
( 5 )  Examination of Organizational Decisions. Short cycle decisions 
use existing resources to achieve maximum efficiency. Short cycle decisions focus on 
current actions to achieve goals. Long cycle decisions seek to expand market size, space 
and presence to allow further organizational growth and development. Long cycle changes 
may involve changes to goals and structure whereas short cycle decisions always leave 
goals and structure constant. 
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(6) Measurement of Organizational Growth. The dependent variable 
is organizational growth of the opposition. This will be measured as best as possible from 
current government and opposition estimates. Cases were selected based on reasonably 
reliant data with a consensus from regime and opposition as to approximate numbers. In 
decentralized situations, even the opposition leadership were unsure of membership 
numbers. Data on growth trends have more consensus and are more reliable than exact 
quantity. Both sides normally are in agreement on whether opposition membership is 
growing or declining. 
(7) Adaptation. Adaptability is the ability of the organization to 
perceive and react to changes in its environment. The organization will be analyzed at 
its decision points to identify at what level the organization perceives its opportunities 
or constraints and at what level it takes corrective action. An adaptable organization 




111. THE MALAYAN INSURGENCY. 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
The insurgency in Malaya illustrates the failure of an insurgent organization to 
adapt to its environment and its defeat by the regime. Nevertheless, it took 12 years for the 
regime to consolidate control. The initial lack of competence exhibited by the regime 
exacerbated the situation. Malaya allows the process of the insurgency model and the 
abilities of the competing organizations to be clearly examined. 
B. CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT. 
1. Geography and History. 
Malaya is dominated by inhabitable mountains and jungle. In 1947,72% of the 
population lived along a 90 mile strip along the western coast.59 The Malaccan Straits are 
a natural choke point between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The strategic 
location of Malaya caused European powers to fight for control of the area so as to 
dominate trade. The Dutch and Portuguese had an early presence that was eliminated by 
the British in 18 18. The United Kingdom controlled the three major ports of Singapore, 
Malacca and Penang. These ports were called the Straits Settlements and became British 
Protectorates ruled by a British Governor. 
The economic success of the Straits Settlements led to the rapid introduction of a 
large Chinese population to the Settlements and the rest of Malaya. The native Malaya 
population was too small to support the British need for labor. The British brought in labor 
from southern China to serve as workers on the rubber plantations and tin mines and as 
merchants to support the economic boom. In 192 1 the Chinese population in Malaya was 
855,000. By 1947 the number was 1.8 million.60 The Chinese population was concentrated 
in the urban areas. The Chinese constituted 62% of the urban population and reached 80% 
5%. Ginsburg and C. F. Roberts, Malaya, (University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1958). p. 
48. 
601bid., p. 58. 
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in the port of Singapore. As numbers increased, the Chinese expanded from the Straits 
Settlements to the Malayan peninsula to work in the tin mines and rubber plantations and 
surrounding areas. 
2. Politics. 
In the 187Os, the wealth generated by the tin mines led to conflict. The Chinese 
kongsi communities fought each other over jobs while the Malay sultans fought to control 
the tin regions. The British intervened to control the situation and created the Federated 
Malay States. The Federated States retained sovereignty of the Malay sultans, but with 
more centralized control. State councils contained a British Resident, the Malay chiefs and 
leading Chinese businessmen. Perak, Selengor, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan formed the 
Federated States, while the other unfederated states retained the traditional decentralized 
Malay political structure. 
British policy led to a mutually profitable alliance with the Malay ruling class. 
They developed a modern extractive economy in western Malaya using immigrant labor. 
The British maintained the Malay rulers in political power and protected the traditional 
Malay society.61 As a result of importing immigrants, the Malays became a minority in 
their own country. The political power of the Malays did not reflect the economic power 
of the immigrants. 
During World War 11, Malaya was occupied by the Japanese. The Japanese used 
Malay collaborators to rule and used great repression against the Chinese community. After 
the war, the British Colonial Office developed 51 new political plan for Malaya. The 
Malayan Union formed a centralized government over the federated and unfederated states. 
This reduced the authority of the Malay rulers and was bitterly resented in the Malay 
community. The Malayan Union.was never fully implemented during its existence from 
April 1946 to February, 1948 due to Malay opposition. Singapore was omitted from the 
Union due to its large Chinese population. Finally, in February, 1948 the Federation of 
David J. Steinberg, ed., In Search of Southeast Asia, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 
p. 322. 
5 0  
__ . ... . . . 
Malaya was created ruled by a British High Commissioner and the Malay sultans. The 
Federation restored some of the rights of the Malays and offered concessions to the Chinese 
and Indian communities. 
3. Economics. 
The ethnic communities in Malaya worked in different occupations in separate 
areas. The Malays formed a peasant society based on rice agriculture. The Malays formed 
the army, police and administration of the states. The non elite Malay population remained 
rural and poor.62 The elite Malays filled the government positions not reserved for the 
British. 
The Chinese and Indian communities dominated the country's wealth and economic 
power. First, they provided the labor for the plantations and mines. Second, they formed 
the merchant and artisan class that supported the workers and became a thriving urban 
commercial enterprise . 
4. Social Factors. 
In 1948, the Malay, Chinese and Indian populations formed separate communities 
within Malayan society. They lived apart from each other, spoke different languages, 
worked at different occupations, followed separate religions and customs and had different 
political organizations. The Malays regarded themselves as citizens of Malaya, while many 
Chinese and Indians worked in Malaya to earn enough wealth to return to their native 
countries. In 1947 the estimated population of Malaya was 2.6 million Chinese, 2.5 million 
Malaya and 600,000 Indians. From 1947 to 1960 the population was assessed as about 6.3 
million, with 50% Malay, 37-8% Chinese, 10-1 1% Indian and 2% other.63 The changes 
between the 1947 estimate and the later estimate reflects emigration of some Chinese back 
to China and the higher birth rate of the Malays. 
62 Nena Vreeland, Area Handbook For Malaysia, (Washington: HQDA, 1982), p. 275. 
63 Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era, (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1993), p. 63. 
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a. Malays. 
The Malayans lived in a rice oriented peasant society. The majority of 
Malayans subsisted at minimum levels by growing rice. In 1913 and 1933, the Malays 
passed laws which granted themselves sole authority to grow rice. This prevented Chinese 
expansion into agriculture and encouraged the majority of the Chinese to live in urban 
areas. The British favored the Malays and relied on them to ensure stability and legitimacy 
of the British imposed political system. Urban Malays filled the administration, police, 
military and teaching positions. The Malay standard of living improved under the British. 
Their favorable political status enhanced their loyalty to the British throughout the 
Emergency. 
b. Chinese. 
The composition and dynamics of Chinese society provided both the origins 
and ultimate defeat of the insurgency. Malayan Chinese came from Southern China. The 
culture in this area is family oriented. Government provides little or no services to local 
communities. Chinese relied on their own family and local community to provide order 
and communal services. The extended family unit of the clan became the most important 
institution in their society. Entire villages are made up of clans. In the mountainous areas 
of Southern China, clan elements that are geographically separated from the main clan form 
a subclan. The subclan is empowered to take on the responsibilities of the primary clan. 
Subclans retain strong social and economic ties to the primary clan. Chinese communities 
in Malaya became subclans of their clans in mainland China. 
The clan structure explains the heterogeneity of Chinese society in Malaya. 
Different clans of Southern China were represented in the different clans in the Chinese in 
Malaya. The Malayan Chinese speak nine different, mutually incomprehensible dialects. 
The Chinese live in dialect groups of villages and neighborhoods. The six major dialects 
include Hakka, Fuchon, Cantonese, Hokkien, Tiechiu and Hailam.64 The dialect 
communities maintain links with their home region in China and others of their dialect in 
~ 
64 Vreeland, p. 100. 
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Malaya. These communities remained isolated fiom their other Chinese, Malay and Indian 
neighbors. 
The local Chinese community is further divided by the benevolent associations. 
There are over 3,000 corporate associations in Malaya based on family, occupation and 
dialect. Associations provide economic and social support to its members. A sub group 
of the benevolent associations are the secret societies, such as the Triad Brotherhood, Wa 
Kei and An Bin Hoey. The secret societies are more political and more involved in 
organized crime than the benevolent associations. 
The associations indicate the patronage basis of Chinese society. The associations 
provide credit and is the chief method in providing capital to Chinese entrepreneurs. 
Between 80 and 90% of all private employers remain Chinese as late as the 1 9 8 0 ~ . ~ ~  These 
employers tend to only employ Chinese of their own dialect group. The associations thus 
provide jobs, credit, kinship and other social ties for its members. 
The credit and economic roles of the associations led to business men becoming the 
clan leaders of the Chinese community. The business leaders exerted great control in the 
Chinese society through their political and economic domination.66 Local villages called 
kongsi elected their own leaders, who were normally the leader of the local clan and 
association. The larger businessmen formed the towkays who controlled a decentralized 
network of clans by control of patronage and credit. The government exerted little control 
in Chinese communities. As rival Chinese leaders struggled for power, the secret societies 
degenerated into criminal organizations that used coercion to control local populations. 
Secret societies became underground governments that fought to control the recruitment 
and immigration of Chinese laborers. Clan leaders exerted power in proportion to the 
numbers of people they controlled. 
WWII disrupted the traditional control of the clans. Chinese persecution forced the 
leaders to flee. It took years for the traditional power network to be reestablished. The 
65 Vreeland, p. 128. 
66 Vreeland, p. 128. 
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traditional patron-client relationships of the clans and associations were disrupted. Secret 
societies were also damaged by the Japanese. In the immediate years following the war, 
the towkays took years to reestablish their business and patronage networks.67 
c. Indians. 
Indians were brought into Malaya since they caused fewer control problems 
than the fractious Chinese. They served as middlemen and money lenders in the cities and 
provided some of the labor in the plantations and mines. Indian government officials 
monitored their working conditions and welfare. The Indians were fluent in English and 
familiar with British policies and administration from experience with the British 
government in India. The Indians were sympathetic to the BritisWMalay side throughout 
the conflict. 
C. ORIGINS OF CONFLICT. 
The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) developed within the Chinese community 
from 1922 until the start of the Emergency in 1948. This organization had little appeal 
outside of the Chinese community. Thus, the social movement's maximum potential was 
the total Chinese population of Malaya which numbered about 2.6 million and represented 
about 38% of the total population. Ethnic divisions in Malayan society allowed the MCP 
to be clearly examined within its Social Movement Industry (SMI) defined by the Chinese 
community. The competition between the MCP, the government, and organizations in the 
competing Malay and Indian SMIs form the task environment for the MCP. 
1. Organizational Development of the MCP. 
The Chinese Communist Party first sent an agent to Singapore in 1925. Initial 
efforts were under the supervision of the Kuomintang in mainland China until the 
Kuomintang-Communist split of 1927. These initial efforts in Singapore led to the 
foundation of the Malayan Communist Party in 1930. Police raids in 1931 nearly 
eliminated the incipient organization. During the 1930s the party enjoyed a marginal 
67 Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency.1948-60, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 52-3. 
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- . . . 
existence on urban labor action spurred by economic discontent caused by the world wide 
depression.68 The MCP failed to grow because it lacked both mobilization potential and 
space. "The Communists did not gain much ground, owing to their general unpopularity 
with the people and to efficient police action."69 
The MCP represented a threat to the existing Chinese society. It did not recognize 
the business and clan leaders of the Chinese community. The traditional leadership 
maintained control of the bulk of the 2.6 million Chinese. The MCP faced opposition from 
both the regime and preexisting organizations within the Chinese community. 
Membership of the MCP consisted of disaffected intellectuals, some radical teachers and 
some youth and labor activists. MCP members were primarily from the Hakka and Hailam 
clans and had little support in the other dialect groups.70 
2. World War 11. 
The Japanese invasion of China created a surge in Chinese preferences for anti 
Japanese organizations. The MCP had an estimated 12,000 members and 10,000 active 
sympathizers in 1933 .71 The imminent war with Japan led to regime toleration although 
struggles with the clans continued. Police pressure eased and the MCP was tolerated 
although their overall mobilization potential remained low. WWII led to the invasion and 
occupation of Malaya by Japan. The Japanese repressed the Chinese community and 
sought to kill all Chinese communists. Repression not only failed to eliminate the MCP, 
but helped to create a favorable situation for the MCP. Japanese actions removed the 
British government and disrupted the structure of Chinese society. Chinese business 
68 Frances L. Starner, ltCommunism in Malaysia: A Multifront Struggle", in Robert A. 
Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963, pp. 
221-255. p. 223. 
69 Edgar O'Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War. 1948-60, (Hamden,CT: Archon 
Books, 1966), p. 23. 
70 John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency. 1968-54, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 8. 
71 Coates, p. 9. O'Ballance, p. 24. 
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leaders were forced to flee. Japanese oppression and the economic pressures of war caused 
some 400,000 Chinese to leave the urban areas and become squatters along the jungle 
fringe. 
The war transformed the previously weak, urban organization into a stronger, rural 
movement. The MCP was forced out of the cities by the Japanese and was virtually wiped 
out in Singapore. Nevertheless, the war gave the MCP potential and space in the rural areas 
that they had never previously enjoyed. The MCP was the only organization in the rural 
areas due to the war. This allowed them to monopolize the mobilization potential and 
space available in the squatter villages. The MCP formed the Malayan People's Anti- 
Japanese Army (MPAJA) in 1942. 
As a guerrilla force, MPAJA was incompetent and repeatedly failed in their attacks. 
The Japanese responded harshly, capturing and killing many Chinese using indiscriminate 
terror. This increased the number of squatters as more Chinese fled the urban areas to 
avoid the Japanese. The Japanese retained control in the urban areas, while the MCP 
existed in the jungle. During the war, MPAJA killed a few hundred Japanese while killing 
2,542 Malayans.72 Most of the victims were Chinese opponents of the MCP. The primary 
focus of the MCP was to build their organization. 
The Malay community tolerated and in many cases cooperated with the Japanese. 
Their motivation was more anti-Chinese than ~ro-Japanese.~~ Malays joined the police and 
were used to hunt down the MCP and MPAJA. This increased communal tensions. Initial 
MCP reprisals at the end of the war further increased feelings of hostility between the 
Chinese and Malay ethnic groups. 
3. Post War Period - 1946-1948. 
The end of the war left the MCP the only established organization in the country. 
The MCP and MPAJA enjoyed a fairly stable environment in the jungle for the last two 
72 J. Bowyer Bell, On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1976), p. 8 1. 
73 O'Ballance, p. 42. 
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years of war. The MCP retained a highly selective organization structure with party 
membership restricted with long initiation periods and many tests of commitment. This 
structure worked well during the occupation since it was survivable and Japanese 
oppression drove new recruits into the organization. The relative lack of dynamism in the 
nevironment from 1942-5 favored the actions of a mechanistic, selective organization. 
The end of the war changed the dynamism of the environment. The Japanese 
government ended, and a badly fractured British government returned. The MCP had a 
brief opportunity to seize power before the British return. They hesitated, which is not 
unusual for a selective organization facing a changing environment. "Lai Teck knew that 
Communist plans for a coup d'etat, if ever there had been one, had passed by."74 The 
British reoccupied Malaya before the MCP could react. 
The MCP faced a crucial decision of what to do after the war. It appeared too late 
for a seizure of power. The environment was unstable and dynamic. The MCP chose to 
become an open political party and to disband MPAJA. Yet, the selective organization of 
the MCP remained. The MCP chose to stay selective in its inner core and use front 
organizations on the periphery to mobilize the Chinese. The MPAJA Old Comrades 
organization provided a mobilization fiamework if the MCP decided to recreate its army. 
The New Democratic Youth League served to recruit students and a variety of trade 
organizations recruited laborers.75 
Post war Malaya went through economic and political turmoil from 1946 to 1948. 
The British reestablished their own administration and then proposed the 1946 constitution. 
This caused widespread resentment among the Malays and led to the creation of Malay 
political organizations to preserve the Malay political status quo. The economy was under 
severe pressure immediately after the war, which led to widespread labor unrest. 
The MCP faced open political space and munificent mobilization potential for the 
first time in its existence. They were a legal political party. The Chinese clans and 
74 O'Ballance, p. 64. 
75 Coates, p. 13. 
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business community were in disarray following the war. The war gave the MCP presence 
in rural areas. Labor troubles allowed the MCP to establish an extensive presence in the 
labor movement. Facing no opposition within the SMI, and favorable potential, space and 
presence the MCP grew rapidly. 
The MCP strategy of power through the political process ultimately failed. The 
explanation involves MCP mistakes in the task environment and the failure to adapt to 
gradual changes in the contextual environment. In the task environment, the MCP's 
selective organization prevented growth as a mobilizational organization. The MCP effort 
to dominate and manipulate the multiracial Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action led to the 
collapse of multi racial efforts in 1947.76 This eliminated the opportunity to take advantage 
of the massive Malay discontent caused by the British imposed Malayan Union of 1946. 
The Behavior of the MCP contributed to the mobilization of a Malayan counter movement. 
The MCP also lost control of the labor union due to its selective structure and 
failure to adapt to changes in the contextual environment. The MCP controlled 214 of 277 
labor unions in 1947. The improving economy alleviated most of the grievances of the 
laborers. The MCP abuse of labor union funds and activities for its own political ends led 
to widespread re~entment.~~ In the task environment, the MCP effort to use labor agitation 
to disrupt the government led to a government counteraction. The British administration 
enacted legislation to eliminate the MCP space in the unions. Union membership was 
alienated by the MCP's actions and supported this effort. 
MCP failure in 1946 to 1948 is crucial to understanding their later failure in the 
rebellion. Its effort to establish a broad political effort failed due to its intransigence with 
other organizations. The MCP turned to its advantage in the labor unions. This effort 
failed due to the contextual elimination of labor grievances and the counteraction to close 
this space by the regime. Use of terror alienated supporters and inflamed a Malay 
76 Coates, p. 14. 
77 John Gullick, Ma1aysia:Economic Expansion and National Unity, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1981), p.86. Coates, p. 14. 
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countermovement. From October, 1945 until December, 1947 the MCP killed or abducted 
19 1 people.78 It faced a situation where its numbers and power would inevitably wane. Its 
actions alienated its potential Chinese supporters and the British, Malay and Indian 
communities. 
D. THE EMERGENCY. 
1.1948: The Decision to Start an Insurgency. 
The contextual environment offered advantages and disadvantages for the MCP. 
The government administration did not reestablish nationwide presence following the war. 
Political turmoil caused by the shift from the Malayan Union to the Federation of Malaya 
inflamed all three ethnic groups against the British and each other. The economy had not 
yet recovered from the Japanese occ~pat ion.~~ The Chinese community was still in flux. 
There were few Chinese in the government administration, police or army. Chinese 
business elites tried to reestablish their control of the urban areas. Meanwhile, the MCP 
retained presence among the 500,000 Chinese squatters and faced no other organizational 
rivals in this community. 
The MCP drew its support from youth, labor and squatters. Members of the MCP 
came from the Hakka and Hailam clans, representing only two of the five largest dialect 
groups. Within the class structure of the Chinese community, the business and middle 
classes supported the government, the urban and rural labor were coopted or coerced in the 
labor movement leaving only the squatters and disaffected intellectuals as reliable 
supporters of the party. The MCP represented the bottom of Chinese society. It challenged 
the government and the traditional clan leadership of the Chinese ethnic group. Systems 
78 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, 
(New York: Praeger Publishing, 1966), pp. 26-7. 
79 Komer, p. 6. 
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theory predicts balancing behavior against the MCP from within the Chinese community, 
from the Malay community and from the British-Malay government." 
The British faced a bleak situation. The Malayan Union led to mobilization of the 
Malays around a new organization called the United Malays National Organization 
(UNMO). The decision to placate the Malays anger with the 1946 constitution led to the 
creation of the Federation of Malaya in February, 1948. The move to the Federation 
inflamed the Chinese and Indian communities because it lowered their gains from the 
Union and left the issue of citizenship unresolved. Immigrants feared that if the British 
handed over Malaya to the Malays they would lose all of their economic and political 
power. British actions led to dynamic movements and countermovements. This created 
an opportunity for the MCP. 
Conditions in the task environment favored the MCP. Government administration, 
police and army organizations were in disarray and not prepared to face an insurgency. The 
British faced severe economic problems at home and could not afford the costs of a war. 
The Malay UNMO had just been established and was still building its organization. 
Chinese clans and business leaders were still consolidating their position and feared to risk 
retaliation from the MCP. A window of opportunity opened for the MCP. The Chinese 
commercial classes were forming new organizations and fighting the MCP for control and 
presence in the urban areas.81 
MPABA contained one Malay regiment in Pahang. This unit attrited away during 1949 to 
1950. The Malays and Indians in MPABA were treated poorly so that few remained and no new 
recruits joined from the immigrant communities. The MCP remained a Chinese organization 
within the Chinese SMI. 
The Kuomintang were reformed in 1946 supported by the paramilitary San Min Chu I 
Youth Corps. Clashes between the MCP and KMT continued through 1946-8. After the MCP 
fled the cities, the KMT and secret societies consolidated the urban areas and prevented any 
MCP return. See Michael Stenson, "The Ethnic and Urban Bases of Communist Revolt in 
Malaya", in John W. Lewis, ed., Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 125-150. p.139. 
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The MCP retained a selective organizational structure. It used a Federation level 
central committee, three regional bureaus, ten state committees and fifty district 
committees.82 The party controlled both the political and military leadership positions. The 
MPAJA was resurrected as the Malayan People's Anti- British Army, later renamed the 
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). It was organized into regiments supporting the 
state committees. An auxiliary organization called the Min Yuen maintained presence in 
the squatter villages. The Min Yuen provided recruits, logistics and information to the 
MCP and MRLA. In 1948, the MCP contained about 3,000 members. The new 
MPAJA/MRLA had about 3,000 guerrillas and the satellite and front organizations 
contained 50,000 active supporters. 
The MCP protected its selective structure by using its hierarchy of organizations to 
screen out less committed members. The Min Yuen served at the local level using contact 
nets to recruit members. Following recruitment, the MRLA served as the next point to 
indoctrinate and test members. Party membership included only those passing an extended 
testing and vetting process. The associational base of recruitment in the villages changed 
the urban nature of the MCP. Illiterate peasants became the new members of the MRLA 
as the old student and labor networks dissolved. An estimated 70% of the MRLA came 
from the squatters and rural laborers. The leadership of the MCP remained the urban 
disaffected intellectuals from the Hakka and Hailam clans. 
The MCP decision to start an insurgency indicates the organizational problems that 
plagued the MCP. In 1947 the MCP leader, Lai Teck, stole the party treasury and fled the 
organization. Chin Peng became the new leader he was only 26 years old, ambitious and 
inexperienced. The new leadership favored armed revolt as a means of consolidating their 
own power.83 The new leadership of the MCP was young, highly centralized, insular and 
intolerant of alternative views after Lai Teck's defection. The MCP had increased its 
82 Komer, p. 7. 
83St~bbs, p.58. 
61 
strength during the war, its efforts to use peaceful agitation failed. Success of the 
Communist guerrilla war in China increased their expectations of victory in Malaya. 
The MCP decided to start an armed insurgency during a Central Executive 
Committee meeting from March 17-21, 194Kg4 The plan was naive and beyond the 
capabilities of the organization. The MCP adopted a three month plan for victory. In 
April, widespread labor unrest would destabilize the government. In May, large political 
demonstrations would provide momentum for the MCP against the government and would 
shift expectations in favor of an MCP victory. In June, an armed insurrection would sweep 
the party into power.85 
The armed insurrection itself would follow four stages. The first stage would 
consist of guerrilla attacks to chase European planters and government and police agents 
out of the countryside. In the second stage, the MCP would establish its own presence in 
the rural areas and establish liberated areas. The third stage would expand the rural bases 
and seize local villages and small towns. The final stage would see an armed attack against 
the cities to drive out the remaining British presence.86 
The MCP anticipated no counter reaction. They counted on the fall ofMalaya with 
virtually no British or Malay reaction. The MCP had not reactivated MPAJA since 1945. 
It also lacked organization and training for conducting an insurgency. The MPAJA tactical 
performance in WWII had been extremely poor. The MCP plan reflected a rural focus for 
an urban based organization. The MCP expected no action to be taken against its overt 
labor activists. The MCP expected that it could raRidly create a new organization structure, 
expand its presence and conduct operations. The MCP plan expected that immediate action 
would overcome the need for extensive organizational preparation. The MCP lacked 
84 Stubbs, p. 60. 
85 O'Ballance, p. 78. 
86 Coates, pp. 49-50. O'Ballance, p. 78. Komer, p. 9. Thompson, p. 65. 
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logistics for insurgency, had poor communications and relied on jungle bases isolated from 
contact with the p~pulation.'~ 
2. Systemic Interaction 1948-51. 
a. Initial Actions in 1948. 
The MCP started interaction in the task environment with a rising tide of 
violence. 107 terrorist attacks occurred between January and June of 1 948.88 Insurgents 
attacked both regime forces and Chinese clan members who opposed the MCP. The 
government reacted by outlawing the MCP and closing political space. The MCP was 
caught by surprise. The communist labor effort evaporated. The MCP activists were 
arrested or fled to the jungle. The preferences of the urban workers were clearly revealed 
as they went back to work and ignored the plight of the MCP. The MCP front 
organizational structure of meant that only a few labor activists were party members. 
Urban presence of the MCP was driven underground or eliminated. The MCP never 
regained any significant presence in the urban areas. 
The urban political organization of the MCP was unprepared to function as a rural 
military organization. Their communications system that worked well in the cities proved 
useless in the jungle. Without communications, central control rapidly collapsed in an 
organizational structure that placed a premium on central command and control. The MCP, 
MRLA and Min Yuen were poorly coordinated at national, regional and district levels. 
Militarily, the combat units tended to operate in large units of up to 300 and focused on 
creating base areas when they should have conducted small guerrilla and propaganda 
operations. Further, the shift to rural insurgency caused the decline of MCP urban presence 
and forced the organization to move from the Chinese dominated urban areas to the Malay 
dominated rural areas.89 
87 Coates, p. 50. 
88 Thompson, p. 27. 
89 Stenson, p. 146. 
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The MCP insurgency led to both regime and societal reactions. The regime lacked 
organizational manpower and presence. Its plan focused on holding actions with an 
emphasis on reorganizing and preparing the organizational structure to handle the 
insurgency. Therefore, the insurgents relied on a strategy of current actions, while the 
regime chose a strategy of organizing for future action. Malay and Indian groups felt 
equally threatened by the Chinese based insurgency and both groups supported the 
government. Malays mobilized themselves through UNMO while the regime mobilized 
many police, administrators and soldiers from Malays. 
The regime declared a State of Emergency on 18 June 1948. This closed the legal 
space of the MCP and increased government power. Initial government reaction reflected 
an organization not prepared for conflict. This response was ill conceived and poorly 
im~lemented.~~ Government authorities believed that they could crush the MCP though 
police and military methods. Excessive government use of force alienated the Chinese 
community and increased sympathy for the MCP. The government regarded all armed 
Chinese as bandits including the MPAJA, secret societies and Kuomintang elements who 
supported the Chinese business leaders. Excessive force included the burning of entire 
villages such as the destruction of 62 homes in Pulai in November 1 94fL9' 
While the short cycle actions of the government produced counterproductive effects, 
the long cycle organizational effort eventually produced favorable results. The police and 
military numbered about 10,000 each in 1947. Within two years, the size of the police had 
tripled through the recruitment of Malays. The reorganization of the administration, army, 
police and intelligence services would not be effective until 1950. In the short run, the 
reorganization increased the turbulence and decreased the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the government. However, in the long run, these efforts created a revitalized and efficient 
organization. Its effectiveness still depended on how it would be used. 
Stubbs, p. 66. 
91 Stubbs, p. 73. 
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b. Tactical Adjustments in 1949. 
In 1949, short cycle tactical adjustments occurred on both sides. Initial 
MCP efforts resulted in the loss of their urban organization. The MCP was forced to 
reorganize as a rural guerrilla army. This led to a dropoff in activity levels which the 
government incorrectly percieved as a prelude to vict01-y.~~ The MCP realized that its three 
month victory plan had failed. The organization kept the plan for rural insurgency, but 
adjusted tactics for a protracted guerrilla and terrorist campaign. This effort signalled the 
failure of a Mao phase I1 campaign and the shift to a Phase I plan of violence to disrupt the 
g~vernment .~~ 
The MCP mobilization potential declined to 500,000 Chinese squatters since the 
collapse of their urban networks. Two million Chinese in the urban areas remained neutral. 
The MCP use of violence against Chinese to coerce support meant that the squatters were 
trapped between government and MCP violence. The MCP had an organizational presence 
advantage in the villages with the Min Yuen while the government lacked presence in the 
Chinese villages. This allowed the MCP to discriminately identify and kill informers, 
while government efforts were indiscriminate. Within the squatter community, the MCP 
retained space and presence although potential was declining. The lack of any other 
organization within the squatter communities guaranteed the continued existence of the 
MCP. Tommunist influence can exist largely because of the absence of civil 
administration and government control in areas ~oncerned."~~ 
92 Some analysts believe that vigorous regime action could have ended the insurgency in 
1949. This ignores the fact that both sides were in a reorganization phase. Neither side was 
capable of efficient of effective action in 1949. For a typical view that the British should have 
finished the war in 1949, see Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs, (New York, Bantom 
Books, 1971), p. 69. 
93 Sarkesian, p. 68. The MCP resolution of June, 1949 emphasized the effort to create rural 
base areas and drive the government back into the cities. The party realized that it faced strong 
Malay opposition but this led to no change in the political or military plan. See Coates pp. 58-63. 
94 Sarkesian, p. 70. 
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The government continued efforts to organize. Government reorganization and 
integration of political and military strategy appeared ineffective and led to demands for 
more force from the European planters and Malays. In the long cycle, government patience 
and persistence proved crucial. 
c. The Briggs Plan 1950-1952. 
LTG Sir Harold Briggs was assigned from the retired list as the Director of 
Operations under the High Commissioner in 1950. He developed the Briggs plan which 
was a combined civil-military scheme that reorganized the government administration, 
police and army. It created an integrated structure between the administration, police and 
army from national to state to district levels. The war was made a police responsibility 
supported by the army. 
The plan took advantage of the New Village concept which called for resettlement 
of the squatters into villages under government control. This created government presence 
and isolated the guerrillas from their support base. The concept legalized squatter land 
ownership. The Malay sultans were reluctant to donate land but over time land was 
provided following negotiations. 
The resettlement plan changed the contextual environment. Urbanization of the 
squatters living in villages eliminated the potential, space and presence of the insurgents. 
This strategy involved risk since the initial settlements had organizational problems and 
could potentially have alienate the squatters from the government. A fortuitous change in 
the contextual environment proved decisive. The Korean War increased the world wide 
price for rubber and tin. For the regime, this provided the funding to pay for the program. 
The squatters experienced rising wages which reduced economic disruption caused by 
re~ettlement.~~ 
The reforms under Briggs improved the efficiency of the government and especially 
its ability to apply force discriminately. Expansion of police presence in the local villages 
increased government knowledge of insurgent activities. This improved targeting of the 
95 Coates, p. 93. 
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insurgents without negative side effects against Chinese neutrals caused by excessive force. 
However, increased government efficiency did not increase effectiveness. The political 
grievances of the Chinese remained unaddressed leaving mobilization potential intact. If 
the government eased pressure on the insurgents, the insurgents would grow. 
d. MCP Reassessment of 1951. 
The impact of the Briggs plan, MCP failure to defeat the security forces and 
establish base areas and terrorism against the Chinese clearly revealed the failure of the 
MCP plan and waning support. Expectations of victory were decreasing and momentum 
of the insurgency slowed. This led to internal problems within the MCP and Chin Peng 
suppressed a power struggle within the MCP in 1 950.96 The momentum of the insurgency 
had slowed. 
In September, 1951, the MCP conducted a reassessment of their strategy and 
operations. The MCP Central Executive Committee met in the jungle. The result of the 
meeting was a new directive issued on 1 October, 1951.97 Nearly 100 pages long, it 
outlined seven directives and provided a thorough analysis of the current situation from the 
perspective of the MCP. The party acknowledged problems in logistics and use of 
excessive terror against the population. It decided to shift strategy from a military struggle 
to an effort to rebuild Min Yuen logistic and support infrastructure. Previously, the Min 
Yuen existed to support the MRLA, now that situation was reversed.98 The army 
reorganized, eliminating regiments, battalions and companies. Platoon sized forces would 
support activities at the local district level. 
96 O'Ballance, p. 1 1 1. Coates, pp. 63-4. Senior party officials Lam Swee, Lim Tatt, Siew Lau 
and Lau Siew objected to the autocratic nature of the Central Committee. The Central Committee 
appointed themselves and tolerated no questioning of their authority. The objectors questioned 
the failed military strategy and excessive violence against Chinese. All were purged or shot. 
97 Coates, pp. 65-69. Stubbs, pp. 148-1 5 1. 
98 Stubbs, p. 149. 
67 
Party directives included an effort to increase mobilization potential. Violence and 
sabotage was to be restricted if it adversely affected the local population. Efforts were 
made to recruit Indians and Malays. The directives called for reduction of overt racism and 
increased political activity in the towns. Secret society members were targeted for 
recruitment efforts. This effort was to be strictly limited to individuals. The MCP feared 
that coalitions threatened central control.99 This fear doomed efforts of the leadership to 
expand potential. The MCP placed security concerns over growth. Efforts to expand into 
the towns and to recruit Malays, Indians and Triad members were futile and increased the 
determination of the other communities to oppose the MCP. 
It took up to 18 months for the October Directives to reach outlying units. The 
communication problems meant that the MCP had no ability to maintain its centralized 
command procedures. The organizational structure encouraged a continuance of sustained 
violence. The military organization was incapable of carrying out political agitation. Some 
units were forced to return to coercion against the Chinese. In the absence of coercion, 
many squatters stopped supporting the MCP. The MCP failed to address its organizational 
problem and the contextual problem of trying to operate in the Malay dominated rural area 
or the jungle. 
The MCP directives included many words on a desire to expand potential and space. 
The actual impact of the directives made the organization more selective and more 
survivable. Shifting to smaller units and jungle bases made the MCP and MRLA harder 
to find. Even though the declared aim was to use mobilizational means, the organizational 
changes made the organization more selective. The MCP increased efficiency, but 
effectiveness decreased. The new efforts simply increased the rate of decline. 
99 The MCP feared any coalition would dilute their control and could lead to the organization 
being coopted by the other coalition members. One document summarized the MCP view on the 
Triads: "Secret Societies are organizations of robbers ... they are capable of being utilized by the 
British, the Kuomintang or the revolution ... we should penetrate them by political methods, and 
persuade their members to join the revolution." Cited in Wilfred Blythe, The Impact of Secret 
Societies in Malaya, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 423. 
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e. Templer Reorganizes the Regime, 1952-1954. 
The Briggs plan led to some improvements but most of its directives were 
not implemented when Briggs left Malaya at the end of 1951. After the High 
Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney was killed in an ambush in October, 1951 the British 
needed to replace both the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations. On 15 
January, 1952, Sir Gerald Templer was appointed High Commissioner. He decided to 
assumed the duties of the Director of Operations as well. One man now controlled both the 
civil and military effort in Malaya. Templer used his authority to fully implement the 
Briggs plan. Templer's leadership was decisive in ending the Emergency. 
4. The Counter Mobilization of the Chinese. 
Previously, the British efforts focused on recruiting Malays to oppose the MCP. 
The majority of the Chinese community remained neutral. The 500,000 squatters were 
placed in the New Villages, guarded by Malays. The 2 million Chinese in the urban areas 
remained out of the conflict. Templer led the effort to offer the immigrant communities 
citizenship and a role in the government.loO Previous efforts to recruit Chinese in the 
administration, army and police had failed. By changing the political rights of the Chinese, 
he gave the Chinese positive incentives to take an active role. The key factor in eliminating 
the mobilization potential of the MCP was this countennobilization effort. New 
organizations created presence and space in the Chinese community. The political and 
economic changes in Malaya created the potential that allowed the recruitment of the 
Chinese. 
The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was founded by Tan Cheng Lock in 
February, 1949. Its membership increased to about 100,000 in its first year. The MCA, 
founded and led by the Chinese business leaders, recruited through the existing clan and 
benevolent association social networks. The MCA used the growing wealth of the Chinese 
upper and middle classes to support the New Village program. Before 1952, the MCA 
loo On September 14, 1952, 1.2 million Chinese and 180,000 Indians became Malayan 
citizens. Barber, p. 178. 
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"was very much a businessman's pressure group rather than a mass party. But it did 
provide a means by which moderate Chinese activists could participate in the evolving 
political process."1o' 
The MCA from 1949 to 1952 "was a group of leaders in search of followers."lo2 
The urban business community provided the leaders and membership. This resulted in 
little organizational presence in the rural areas. The government failed to support the 
MCA. The government wanted immediate, measurable short cycle results of the MCA's 
effectiveness against the MCP before they would give more political power to the MCA. 
The MCA needed power in the short cycle which would increase Chinese expectations and 
allow growth. The government emphasis on short cycle results prevebted a potential long 
cycle gain. 
The MCA was caught in a vicious circle. It could not mobilize Chinese 
greassroots support until the government gave its leaders some powers, yet 
the government was unwilling to hand over these powers until the MCA 
had demonstrated that it fully represented the Chinese community. lo3 
The political changes in 1952 increased the mobilization potential for the MCA and 
led to massive growth. Government promises to grant independence was followed by local 
and state elections. These elections demonstrated that power was avaliable in the political 
process. The success of the MCA in these elections led to a rapid spiral of growth. The 
MCA created local presence in the New Villages and won seats on the village councils. 
MCA welfare programs provided tangible benefits that increased the selective incentives 
supporting the MCA recruiting drive. The MCA had between 160-200,000 members at the 
end of 195 1 and was growing rapidly.Io4 
Io1 Gullick, p. 93. 
Io2 Stubbs, p. 203. 
Io3 Stubbs, p. 205. 
Io4 Stubbs, p. 205. 
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5. The Creation of the Alliance Party. 
Efforts to form a multiethnic political party from 1948 to 1952 failed due to deep 
social, language and cultural barriers. In 1952, the government cooperated with the leading 
Malay and Chinese leaders to form an Alliance Party. Each ethnic group formed its own 
political party. The Malay UNMO, the Chinese MCA and the new Malayan Indian 
Congress each mobilized support within their ethnic communities. The three organizations 
then formed a power sharing arrangement so that the individual rights of each ethnic group 
was represented by its own organization. This solution proved very popular and the 
Alliance party swept the local elections. Victory in the local elections increased the 
expectations that the Alliance Party could be successful and that the new government could 
protect the concerns of the ethnic communities. The rapid increase in political mobilization 
eroded the remaining potential support for the MCP. 
6. The Expansion of Regime Forces. 
The administration, police and army forces all grew rapidly from 1948 to 1952. By 
1952, the turbulence caused by the rapid organizational changes subsided. The new forces 
were trained, organized and functioning efficiently. Growth plateaued and the police and 
army hit their peak strength in 1952-3. 
The police forces experienced massive growth. From 9,000 members in 1948, the 
police and police auxiliary peaked under Templer. In 1952, the police had 26,154 regulars 
and 99,000 auxiliaries. There were 39,870 Special Constables also reinforcing the police.105 
The nationwide registration plan of 1948 created the information base for a highly effective 
Special Branch. Increased organizational presence and structural changes gave the regime 
a massive intelligence advantage. The police used checklists to account for each dead and 
captured guerrilla by name. Virtually, the entire MCP and MRLA membership had been 
identified. 
The army also grew from 10 battalions in 1948 to 19 battalions in 1950. Total 
numbers increased from 10,000 in 1948 to a peak strength of 55,000 in 1953. This peak 
' 0 5  Coates, p. 123. 
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includes 25,000 from the United Kingdom and 10,000 Ghurkas.lo6 Battalions reorganized 
and retrained to support company level operations. The battalions worked for the local 
district and state war executive committies. Operational responsibilities remained below 
the division level. 
The Home Guard program armed and equipped villagers to defend their own 
communities. From 1948 to 1952 this remained primarily a Malay program and the Malay 
Home Guard expanded to 100,000 members guarding 2,000 villages. Templer decided to 
mobilize and arm Chinese Home Guards in 1952. By the end of the year 50,000 Chinese 
protected the New Villages.lo7 
The administration was also reorganized. Traditionally, the Malayan 
Administrative Service was only open to the British and Malays. In 1953, Templer 
convinced the Malay sultans to open the service to all ethnic groups. Local Chinese were 
recruited as Chinese Affairs Officers but the economic boom caused by the Korean War 
made it difficult to recruit Chinese.lo8 Openings in the private sector created better 
opportunities than those opened in the public sector. The expansion of government 
presence from national to village level was not as efficient as the police and military 
expansion. Problems with training, quality control and corruption meant constant effort 
to improve the system. Nevertheless, the expansion did increase government presence and 
control, and allowed government programs to reach villages. This increased the 
expectations and selective incentives available to the regime to recruit for the 
administration and Home Guard and to favorably influence local preferences. 
Growth of government forces expanded government presence to every village. The 
village police post became the decisive tactical element in Malaya. lo9 The army performed 
lo6 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows,2nd edition,(New York: William Morrow, 1994), p. 
566. 
lo7 Stubbs, p. 158. 
lo8 Stubbs, p. 162. 
lo9 Asprey, p. 570. 
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duties as an area reinforcement to protect the villages in a district. Templer deferred 
occupation of newly constructed New Villages until a functional police post was 
established. The police post, reinforced by the local Home Guard, guaranteed long term 
presence of the government. Police units gathered information on the local population that 
led to the elimination of local MCP presence. Intelligence is a function of established, 
permanent and secure local presence."' The battle for presence was also the battle to close 
off the mobilization space of the MCP. The regime won a decisive victory in this effort 
during Templer's rule. 
7. Elections. 
Local elections were held in 1952. The success of the Alliance party was due to the 
growing organizational capabilities of the political parties. UNMO was led by Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, a Malayan prince, used the existing kampong social leaders as his contact 
nets for recruitment. The MCA was reorganized by Tan Cheng Lock in 1952 and 
established presence and contact nets in the New villages to adding to the preexisting 
towkay nets in the cities. Initial electoral success increased the prestige and expectations 
of future victory for both UNMO and the MCA.'" "The MCA leaders were able to convert 
their new political power into a network of relationships which linked them, via state-level 
leaders, to local Chinese community leaders."' l 2  
The Alliance party harnessed the tendency of mobilization in one ethnic group to 
mobilize the other groups in a positive fashion. Balancing behavior between the ethnic 
groups reinforced the systemic behavior that increased the numbers and power of the 
Alliance party. The Alliance party provided a clever method for taking advantage of the 
systemic behavior of the contextual environment. 
'lo Asprey, p. 571. 
Steiberg, p. 368. 
Stubbs, p. 212. 
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8. Command and Control. 
Templer fully implemented an integrated organizational plan. As a result, the 
efforts of the administration, police and army were controlled from the Federal War 
Council led by the High Commisioner. Each state had a State War Executive Committee 
(SWEC) consisting of the local political leader, a British advisor, and the senior police and 
military commander for the state. Each district had a War Executive Committee consisting 
of the District Office and the senior police and military officers in the distri~t."~ 
The system established by LTG Briggs, was ineffective due to bureaucratic rivalries 
and unclear command authority. Templer served as both High Commissioner and Director 
of Operations. He was personally responsible for the governments ability to overcome 
organizational inertia and made the new procedures work. Templer had two deputies 
working under him: the Deputy High Commisioner who supervised the civilian and 
political operations; and the Deputy Director of Operations who supervised the military 
operations. 
9. The Defeat of the MCP, 1952 - 1954. 
The peak of the MCP insurgency came in 1952. After 1952, MCP numbers, 
organizational presence and operations steadily declined. Interaction of the MCP October 
Directives of 195 1 with regime actions under Briggs and Templer eliminated the potential 
and space of the MCP. The decline phase of the MCP illustrate that once created, 
organizational factors preserve the organization structure, even in a highly unfavorable 
environment. The selective organization of the MCP and MRLA experienced little 
organizational growth, but demonstrated a tremendous ability to survive in an increasingly 
insecure environment. 
After 1949, the MRLA simply reacted to British pressure while the MCP abandoned 
efforts to grow and focused on s~rvival."~ From 1952 - 1954, the regime defeated the 
MCP insurgency. The guerrillas suffered heavy casualties and the casualty rates exceeded 
1 1 3  Sarkesian, p. 144. Komer, p. 27. 
' 1 4  Bell, p. 87. 
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the flow of new recruits. MRLA actions steadily decreased from 500 terror incidents a 
month in 1951 to less than 100 by 1953.*15 
The regime shifted from its defensive strategy during its reorganization from 1949- 
1951 to the strategic offensive in 1952. It isolated the guerrillas from the squatter 
communities and relentlessly tracked them down in the jungle. The government designated 
"white areas" as regions where the guerrilla presence was eliminated. In the white areas 
the government restored many of the suspended laws under the Emergency Regulations as 
a visible sign that living conditions would improve when the war ended. 
The MCP engaged in a short cycle struggle for survival. Isolation from the villages 
led to starvation. The MCP and MRLA attempted to start gardens in the jungle. MCP 
forces attempted to create new potential and space with the aborigines in the mountains. 
The British followed and creating bases and expanding organizational presence in the 
aborigine communities. The regime political and military effort chased the MCP away 
from the aborigines and deeper into the jungle. Eventually, the MCP leadership fled over 
the Thai border. Elimination of the MCP threat came in 1954. 
E. THE END OF THE EMERGENCY: 1955-1960. 
1. The Baling Negotiations. 
In 1955, the MCP was in a critical situation. The MRLA strength fell from a peak 
of 8,000 in 1951 to 3,000 in mid 1954.'16 The politburo fled Malaya in 1953 to hide in 
Thailand. MCP presence in the squatter communities was eliminated following successful 
establishment of the New Villages. A major task of local units was simply preventing 
desertion. These factors led to a strategic reassessment and reorganization of the MCP. 
Chin Peng offered to negotiate an end to the Emergency. One Malay, Musa Bin Ahmad, 
115 Komer, p. 20. 
'16 O'Ballance, p. 144. 
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and one Indian, Balm, were added to the ten man MCP Central Committee to improve the 
MCP's image with the other communities.' l7 
The government met with Chin Peng and the MCP on 28 and 29 December, 1955. 
The Alliance government had won the recent elections and Tunku Abdul Rahman was the 
Chief Minister of the government as well as head of UNMO. He and Tan Cheng Lock, 
head of the MCA, met with Chin Peng. The MCP ignored their current situation and 
demanded a return to 1946 and refused the offer of a government amnesty. Chin Peng 
wanted the MCP declared a legal political party with the right to participate in elections. 
They would lay down their arms but would not agree to be held accountable for their 
actions during the rebellion. The MCP remained inflexible, demanding concessions as if 
they were in a position of strength. Chin Peng was ignored, and the MCP returned to the 
jungle to starve. 
2. Independence. 
The Alliance Party victory in the 1955 elections was part of the transition to 
independence. The formation of the Alliance government under the Tunku eliminated any 
hope of MCP success. 
Malaya became independent on 31 August, 1957. The British handed over 
responsibility for the insurgency campaign over to the new government gradually from 
1956 through 1957. In a state of collapse since the Baling talks the MCP fell to an 
estimated 1,500 members. The government formally ended the Emergency in July 1960. 
MCP remnants remained in the jungles on the Thai-Malay border until the 1990s. A 
broken reed since the Baling Talks, independence removed any remaining possibility of 
MCP success. A series of mass desertions after independence reduced the MCP to about 
500 survivors hiding in the jungles along the border along with a remant in Sarawak. 
O'Ballance, p. 153. 
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F. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES. 
1. Contextual Environment changes. 
Political and economic changes reduced the political and economic grievances of 
the Malayan population. In 1948, the Malays were politically strong and economically 
weak while the Chinese were the opposite. The economic boom of the 1950s and the move 
to independence allowed both communites to realize political and economic gains. Rather 
than a zero sum situation, everyone gained by cooperating in the move to independence and 
sharing the wealth of the Korean war economic boom. 
a. Political Changes. 
The 1951 decision to open the political process and the many political 
changes under Templer in 1952 permanently changed the political environment. An open 
political environment provided an advantage for mobilizational organizations like UNMO 
and the MCP and put the selective, underground MCP at a severe disadvantage. The 
movement and countermovement dynamics of the insurgency made many previously 
neutral members of all ethnic groups politically active. Political parties captured this 
mobilization potential through the space offered by the new political system. 
b. Economic Changes. 
The Korean War led to a massive change in Malayan society. Prices of 
rubber and tin both increased after the war started in June, 1950. The government received 
a massive and fortuitous increase in revenues from export duties and taxes. Expecting to 
receive revenues of $273.7 million in 1950, the Malyan government received $443.4 
million. This turned the 1949 government deficit of $13.4 million into a 1950 surplus of 
$289.9 million.'18 The government paid for the war out of this surplus. The restructured 
military forces, the resettlement plan and other initiatives all gained from this surplus. 
Rubber prices remained high from 1950 to 1960.'l9 
118 Stubbs, p. 109. 
119 Stubbs, p. 232. 
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The economic boom also provided gains for all of society. Urban areas 
experienced a general rise in wages and an increase in the local economy. Many Malays 
entered the tin and rubber work force which reduced the nature and power of the formerly 
Chinese dominated unions. The resettlement program led to unemployment and economic 
hardship in the New Villages that was offset by the rising demand for labor. Wages 
doubled for unskilled labor and went even higher for skilled miners and rubber tappers. 
The economic boom led to increased standards of living for all sectors of society. This 
unexpected boom greatly benefitted the government since its programs built off of the 
success of the new wealth.120 
c. Social changes. 
The economic boom and the government resettlement program led to the 
urbanization of Malaya. The number of Chinese living in urban areas of 1,000 or more 
increased from 43% in 1947 to 73% in 1957. Economic opportunities increased for all 
ethnic groups and many Malays joined the wage economy. The areas which recieved the 
least economic benefit from the boom were Perak, Kedah, Johore and Pahang. These areas 
supported MCP groups far longer than the rest of Malaya.I2' 
2. External Factors. 
Britain was constrained by a severe economic crisis following WWII. The United 
Kingdom greatly valued the economic wealth from Malaya, but lacked the resources to 
resolve the situation. The British relied on the internal economic and manpower resources 
of Malaya to resolve the crisis. The peak commitment of 25,000 British troops bares 
comparison with the 550,000 US troops deployed to Vietnam. The British were forced to 
be flexible and adaptive due to their constrined circumstances. 
An economic boom does not necessarily help the government. In Vietnam, the Viet Cong 
benefitted enormously from the economic benefits that accompanied the American deployment. 
In Malaya, the MCP attacked rubber trees and acts of economic sabotage angered workers and 
led to the government being the protectors and thus beneficiary of the boom. 
12' Stubbs, p. 234. 
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Mao's victory in China proved a key contextual variable for both sides in Malaya. 
For the MCP, it inspired them to attempt their own revolution. For the Chinese community 
as a whole, it removed the previous trend of the immigrants returning to China after 
accumulating wealth in Malaya. The Chinese business class was cut off and had to look 
for a local alternative. The granting of Malayan citizenship in 195 1 proved a powerful 
incentive that led to Chinese support for the MCA and the government. 
3. Task Environment Changes. 
a. Counter regime. 
During WWII the MCP established presence, potential and space in the rural 
squatter community. The MCP abandoned its advantage with the squatters and returned 
to the cities after the war. During the Emergency, the MCP returned to the squatters until 
the government forced them to leave with the resttlement program. 
The MCP's organizational structure throughout its existence remained selective. 
Chin Peng remained the leader from Lai Tek's defection through the 1990s. The initial 
student Hakka and Hailam leadership never changed due to high initiation costs. The MCP 
retained high commitment at the cost of being incapable of changing goals or structure. 
The MCP relied on a very narrow support base in a segment of the Chinese 
community. Their selective nature and poor decision making prevented this base from 
expanding. Believing that they could win in the short cycle, the MCP failed to show the 
ability to perceive or make a long cycle decision. 
b. Regime. 
The regime displayed far more flexibility and adaptability than the MCP. 
Starting poorly, not truly inderstanding the nature of the MCP threat, the regime focused 
on improving the efficiency and number of their forces from 1948 to 195 1. The regime 
offered no political concessions and attempted to win the struggle through its existing 
organizational structure. Implementation of the Briggs plan addressed the efficiency of the 
government's forces and addresses issues such as isolating the guerrillas to decrease the 
efficiency of the opposition. It did not address the political, economic and social origins 
of the MCP. 
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Templer put in place a long cycle, mobilizational program that increased the 
efficiency of the government's forces while also increasing ,the effectiveness of the 
campaign. The political changes removed the political base of Chinese grievances and 
allowed the MCA to wage a countermobilization battle against the MCP. 
c. Society. 
Society underwent a comprehensive movement and countermovement 
process. Chinese mobilization led to Malay mobilization in UNMO. UNMO's cooperation 
with the regime led to Malay recruitment in the administration, police and army. Indians 
also mobilized in a variety of non cohesive organizations that finally crystallized in MIC. 
Chinese society formed the true basis of the conflict. The MCP formed in the 
marginalized intellectual class that was a byproduct of the growth of the Chinese middle 
class in the 1920s and 1930s. Jobs in the Chinese community were based on clans. The 
Hakka and Hailam students were denied jobs in the private sector due to clan and in the 
public sector due to race. MCP alliance with the squatters resulted fiom the circumstances 
of war rather than a plan. The MCP and squatters were the economic and political losers 
of the Chinese society. The MCP rebellion challenged the existing Chinese society as 
much as it did the regime. Movements generated counter movements, inevitably the clans 
and secret societies fought back. 
The Chinese countermovement did not gain momentum until 1952. Even then, only 
25% of all eligible Chinese voted in elections. During the 1955 Baling negotiations, crowds 
of Chinese went to movie theaters to see newsreels of Chin Peng. This indicated that 
continuing sympathy and preferences for the MCP existed in part of the Chinese 
community. The collapse of MCP presence for the MCP and their lack of a mobilizational 
structure meant that the MCP could not convert this preference into mobilization. The 
MCA succeeded because there was no competition against them within the Chinese 
community. Presence, space and selective incentives allowed the MCA to succeed. 
G. ANALYSIS. 
Table 3 - 1 illustrates the relationship between the environment, organizational 
structure. The designations of potential, space and presence were developed in the strategic 
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:lationship between environment, organizational structure and growth. 
interaction section. Outcome is the historical growth that did or did not occur for the 
organization. The MCP is examined in its relationship to the Chinese community. The 
GOM is examined in its relationship with the Chinese and Malay communities. 
The MCP retained a selective organizational structure throughout the insurgency. 
Table 3-1 depicts the nature of the relationship between the GOM and the SMIs. The 
regime was selective in respect to both the Malay and Chinese communities from the end 
of WWII until 1948. The major decisions on the new constitions and political future of 
Malaya were made by the United Kingdom with no consultation with either SMI. This led 
to both communities mobilizing in opposition to UK actions. After the start of the 
insurgency, the mutual threat allied the Malayan SMI with the regime against the MCP. 
The major Malay organizations such as UNMO cooperated with the regime. Malays 
mobilized and joined the administration, police and security forces of the regime. Thus, 
from 1948 to 1952, the regime used a mobilizational structure towards the Malays and a 
selective nature towards the Chinese. Efforts to recruit Chinese showed poor results until 
the political reforms instituted by Templer. This led to the rapid mobilization of the 
Chinese SMI by the Malayan Chinese Association. 
1. Growth. 
Table 3- 1 shows the relationship between mobilization potential and space, 
presence, organizational structure and outcome. Growth is not possible without 
mobilization potential. With potential supporters, the organization needs space and 
presence to convert sympathizers into active supporters. The MCP illustrates the 
importance of space. Fron 1946-48, the MCP presence and support base was in the cities. 
Onset of the Emergency forced them into the rural areas. The resettlement program pushed 
them out of the squatter villages. The MCP shifted to the aborigine. Government efforts 
pushed them out of the aborigine areas and the MCP fled into the jungle. The jungle 
allowed them the geographic space to exist for the next forty years. With no contact in the 
potential support base, the MCP withered into a marginal criminal gang. 
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The regime demonstrated the role of presence. Presence requires more than 
physical occupation. The regime put Malay police into the Chinese villages with no real 
effect. It recruited Chinese speaking Malays and Europeans to establish contact with local 
social networks. Police posts in the villages led to local Home Guard membership and then 
local village councils. Only after local villagers were in government organizations did 
presence become effective. Presence was effective when the social networks served as 
contact nets to recruit new supporters. Contact nets served as an intelligence gathering 
system that fed information on communist sympathizers and members to the police. Social 
networks reinforced systemic effects. As government information improved, the 
government's ability to reward supporters and punish opponents also improved. 
2. Organizational Factors. 
a. Chinese Mobilization. 
Table 3-2 shows the total mobilized support for the MCP and the MCA. 
The MCP numbers represent peak strength in 1952 and the MCA in 1955. For the entire 
Emergency, an estimated 12,000 Chinese served in the MRLA with 6,7 10 killed, 1,287 
captured, 2,702 surrendered, 1,000 deserted or died of sickness or internal liquidations and 
500 survivors stayed in the jungle.lZ2 The regime mobilized far more Chinese than the 
MCP after 1952. Creating a counter organization like the MCA proved an effective way 
to deny potential and space to the MCP. 
b. Organizational Structure. 
The MCP remained a selective organization throughout its existence. The 
unchanging nature of the MCP serves as a useful contrast with the changing nature of the 
government. From 1946-48, the regime organization was selective for both Malays and 
Chinese. From 1948-5 1, the regime recruited many Malays into organizations. The regime 
used both selective organizations such as the security forces and mobilizational 
organizations such as UNMO. The Chinese were still excluded. Success within the Malay 
population was due to the 1948 constitution that restored many rights to the Malays and 
Iz2 O'Ballance, p. 164. 
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promised them increased economic and political power. Thus, the regime was inclusive 
to the Malays and exclusive to the Chinese. After 1952, the government became inclusive 
to the Chinese as well through a series of political changes. The regime mobilized the 
Chinese into the selective security forces and the mobilizational political party MCA. 
The regime used a combination of both selective and mobilizational structures in 
its organizational struggle. Using selective organizations alone led to minimum 
recruitment and Chinese resentment. The Chinese resented the coercive nature of the 
selective organizations and this increased support for the MCP. Mobilizational 
organizations proved to be decisive. It was only after the regime changed the space and 
potential available to mobilizational organizations that the regime successfully conducted 
a mass mobilization in its selective security forces. 
GOVERNMENTOFMALAYA MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY 
h Y  250 Party 3,000 
Police 2500 MRLA 8,000 
MCA 250,000 Min Yuen 
Administration 13,000 
New Villages 500,000 
New Unions 16% Chinese 
50,000 
Table 3-2. Mobilization of the Chinese Community. 
Plagued by the characteristics of a selective organization, the MCP sought new 
ways to improve efficiency. This led to a focus on short term results. The MCP used high 
initiation costs to increase commitment at the cost of being incapable of changing goals or 
structure. Short cycle focus resulted in a long cycle defeat. 
The regime also focused on efficiency and short cycle results from 1948-1 95 1. 
During this time, the regime was dominated by selective organizations and exhibited many 
of the faults of the MCP. Under the surface, the regime conducted extensive organizational 
a 4  
preparation. The regime's shift to mobilizational methods would not have been as 
successful without the organization preparation. WWII served as a similar organizational 
development phase for the MCP. In each case, it took two to three years for new 
organizational structures to settle in and become effective. 
3. Organizational Decision Making. 
The MCP failed to make a long cycle decisions during the Emergency. It remained 
fixated on short term results. The 1948 plan for a protracted insurgency campaign to be 
concluded in three months is a shining example of an organization unable to test reality. 
The MCP did not understand their own capablities, nor those of their opponents. After 
June, 1948 the initiative was lost and the MCP was forced to react to government actions. 
Unlike the MCP, the government demonstrated the ability to learn and adapt during 
the campaign. It was characterized by disorganization and incompetence following WWII. 
This contributed to the start of the crisis. After a year of initial efforts to react to and 
identify the MCP threat, the regime developed new methods and organizations. The 
defensive strategy from 1948-51 provided time to reorganize and make long cycle 
preparations. This preparation period proved decisive in defeating the MCP from 1952-54. 
The MCP recruited its largest number of organized supporters in the post war 1946 
to 1948 period. Peak effectiveness of the MCP was in the 1948 to 1951 period. It lost 
many marginal supporters in the unions, but those who stayed in the MCP, MRLA and 
Min Yuen were highly committed and participated in the political violence. This shows 
that numbers and quality matter. The highest n q b e r  of violent acts occurred in 1952 as 
the total membership of the organization peaked and began declining. Membership surged 
from 1948 to 195 1 indicating that the MRLA activated sympathizers into members. Acts 
of violence peaked after the membership was falling in 1952. This reflects the increased 
efficiency of the MRLA in getting maximum action from existing membership. It also 
demonstrates the effect the violence had on alienating the Chinese support base. The 
MRLA success in the short cycle had a long term negative effect that the MCP never 
overcame. 
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4. Summary. 
The Malayan Emergency illustrates the process model. Systemic behavior led to 
the mobilization of both the Malay and Chinese communities in 1946. The MCP lost due 
to consistent short cycle behavior. Throwing away its initial advantage in its urban 
presence, the MCP waged a rural campaign for which it was ill prepared. The MCP 
demonstrated how to lose an insurgency. It also illustrates the tremendous survivability of 
a selective organization. Never eliminated, the MCP was simply moved away from its 
mobilization potential so that no new recruits or support developed and they withered away. 
The regime successfully adapted both its actions and its structure to the 
environment. It was able to think and act more effectively than the MCP in both the 
contextual and task environments. Regime reorganization of the existing political and 
military organizations, created new political organizations such as the Alliance party, which 
successfully mobilized the Malay, Indian and Chinese communities. These organizations 
eliminated the organizational presence and countered actions of the MCP. 
a. Hypothesis 1. 
The first hypothesis focuses on the interaction of the environment, 
organizational structure and organizational action. The MCP was nonreactive to the 
contextual environment. It believed that popular support would follow organizational 
action without investing time and effort in organization. The MCP focused their operations 
on the task environment. The MCP operated in a non munificent environment with an 
organizational structure lacking the capability to grow. Organizational actions of the MCP 
made the environment even less munificent by causing a regime and Malay counter 
mobilization and alienating the Chinese community. 
b. Hypothesis 2. 
The role of mobilization potential, space and presence has been examined. 
The evidence supports a conclusion that all three are necessary conditions for growth. 
However, the three variables are not sufficient to cause growth. Organizations must take 
action to grow. Regime efforts failed to mobilize and organize the Chinese until Templer's 
political reforms. His reforms changed the contextual environment for the MCA. The 
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MCA had already developed an organizational infrastructure and presence in the previous 
two years. The new environment and a massive mobilizational effort by the MCA led to 
a mass Chinese mobilization. The short and long cycle actions of hypothesis one convert 
the potential mobilization of mobilization potential, space and presence into actual numbers 
and organizational growth. 
c. Hypothesis 3. 
Adaptation was the crucial factor in the defeat of the MCP. This case 
provides a unique opportunity to hold one side constant while the other seeks to adapt. The 
MCP retained the same organizational structure, goals, leadership and methods throughout 
the insurgency. No strategic changes occurred, just some tactical adjustments in 1949 and 
195 1. The regime improved existing organizations, created new organizations and 
counteracted the actions of the MCP. It succeeded, but it took time. 
The regime reorganized the administration, police and army under the Briggs plan. 
Initial reforms took place from 1949 to 195 1 and were fully implemented by Templer from 
1952 to 1954. Templer created the new government infrastructure for independence in a 
gradual process that went from the prepartion period of 1952 to 1954, the election period 
of 1954 to 1955 and the final transistion from 1955 to 1957. It is significant that this steady 
process of adaptation and change by the regime was parralled by the steady decline of the 
MCP. The organizational growth and development of the regime had an interactive effect 
worth the environment. The contextual and task environments became more munificent 
towards the regime and less for the MCP. At the action level, the regime never destroyed 
the MCP, they simply isolated the MCP in the contextual and task environment. 
87 
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IV. NORTHERN IRELAND. 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
The insurgency in Northern Ireland represents a contrast to the British insurgency 
in Malaya. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) sustained itself with a strength 
of about 1,000 active members for 26 years. In the Malayan case, the MCP/MRT.,A was 
marginalized in Malaya despite a larger membership of 8,000 at peak strength and despite 
surviving for 45 years (1948-1993). This case study examines the situation in Northern 
Ireland to determine the organizational growth and staying power of the Provisional IRA 
and its relationship to the Catholic population in Northern Ireland. 
B. CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT. 
1. Geography and History. 
Northern Ireland contains 1.5 million people in an area the size of Connecticut. It 
consists of six counties in the old province of Ulster. The Republic of Ireland contains 26 
counties and the other three traditional provinces of Ireland: Connaught, Leinster and 
Munster. Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom with the same status as Scotland 
and Wales. It has 17 members in Parliament. The population is about 950,000 Protestant 
and 600,000 Catholic. 
The British conquered Ireland in the 12th century. In the 1600s, the British 
confiscated all the land in Ulster and established Scottish and British settlements. The 
Protestant majority in the North continues up to the present. In 19 16, a Catholic rebellion 
was crushed. In the aftermath a new struggle ensued that led to the partition of Ireland in 
1920. A guerrilla war from 1919 to 1921 under the Irish Republican Army led to the 
southern 26 counties becoming separated from Great Britain on 6 December, 192 1. 
The Irish Free State was established in 1922. The IRA refused to recognize the Free 
State. The IRA would only recognize a united Ireland. This led to a civil war in the south 
where the IRA attempted to overthrow the Catholic Free State. The IRA was defeated by 
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1923 and became a fringe element in the south. The Free State became the Republic of 
Ireland in 1948. The IRA remnants resorted to terrorism against the Republic and was 
defeated. 
Northern Ireland followed a different path. The British set up a local government 
at Stormont while Protestants monopolized political and economic power. The Republic 
of Ireland continued to claim Ulster as its territory, but lacked the power to do anything 
about it. The situation stagnated until the 1960s. 
2. Politics. 
With Protestants dominating the political system, Catholic opinons suffered from 
a lack of local representation. The provincial assembly at Stormont ran local affairs with 
little interference fkom Parliament. Both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland 
treated Northern Ireland as a backwater of little re1e~ance.I~~ Protestants gerrymandered 
districts so that Catholics remained in the minority on local councils, even when they 
constituted the majority of the population. These local councils allocated housing and jobs. 
Under representation in these local councils increased Catholic  grievance^.'^^ Dungannon 
was 53% Catholic, yet the local council had 14 Unionists and 7 Catholics. From 1945 to 
1968, the council allocated 71% of the government housing to Protestants and 29% to 
Catholics. 125 
The Protestants also used the legal system to suppress the Catholics. The Special 
Powers Act of 1922 allowed arrests, searches without warrants, censorship and other acts 
which violated the rights of Catholics. The Royal Ulster Constabulary and an auxiliary 
police force called the B Specials reinforced Protestant power and control. The police and 
judiciary were all Protestant.'26 
123 J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 5. 
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3. Economics. 
Economic grievances was the basis of widespread Catholic resentment in Northern 
Ireland. Unemployment rates for Catholics was twice that of the Protestants. In 1971, 
17.3% of Catholic males were unemployed, compared to 6.6% among Protestant~.'~~ The 
Catholics faced a severe housing shortage. Many chose to emigrate fiom Northern Ireland. 
In the 1960s, new laws in America restricted emigration. The Catholic population increased 
relative to that of the Protestants, but the Protestants prevented Catholic expansion into new 
areas. This led to crowded Catholic slums located beside new Protestant housing 
developments. 
Despite discrimination, a Catholic middle class developed after WWII. This group 
started a Campaign for Social Justice in 1964 that became the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) in 1967. NICRA unified the local associations in the Catholic 
neighborhoods seeking better housing. It went beyond the initial demands for better living 
conditions by demanding an end to gerrymandering and equal voting rights. NICRA 
demonstrations mobilized Catholics using the housing issue. 
4. Social Factors. 
The Protestants and Catholics formed separate communities in Northern Ireland. 
Differences in the two communities was not religion nor was it ethnic. Being labelled 
Catholic or Protestant conferred different political and economic rights on the individual, 
whether desired or not. In the forty years between partition and the formation of NICRA, 
the two communities developed different social norms to reinforce their separate identities. 
Divided, the two communities worked in different jobs, attended different schools 
and churches and interacted in separate social networks. The Protestant Orange Order 
formed part of an extensive network of associations that tied all the varying Protestant 
social classes together . Catholics used a rich grouping of associations to reinforce their 
127 Benjamin Kline, "Northern Ireland: A Prolonged Conflict", in Karl P. Magyar and 
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identity. "Neighborhoods were segregated. Businesses, clubs, pubs, games, churches, 
hospitals, schools, all the institutions and arenas of society existed for either tradition but 
rarely for both."l** 
5. Contextual Dynamics. 
The contextual environment in Northern Ireland was in a transition after WWII. 
The Catholic population increased in size and wealth relative to the Protestant population. 
Catholic urbanization led to the development of a middle class and increased education and 
wages in within their community. Rural farmers also benefitted from better economic 
conditions. The Protestant population grew poorer due to decline in shipbuilding, textiles 
and other heavy industries. Economic disparity between the two communities narrowed 
while political inequity remained the same. These gradual changes produced long term 
political implications. lZ9 
C. THE TASK ENVIRONMENT. 
From the 1920s through the 1960s, Ireland enjoyed a stable task environment. 
Local government was dominated by the Protestant Unionist party. The Orange Order and 
other Protestant organizations supported the status quo. No single organization represented 
the entire Catholic community. Increasing levels of dynamism in the environment from 
1966 to 1968 mobilized many Catholics and Protestants who were previously politically 
inactive. This dynamism produced new organizational challenges within the Protestant 
community and new organizations within the Catholic community. 
1. Origins of Conflict. 
NICRA was formally founded on 29 January, 1967, by a broad grouping of political 
activists in the Catholic c0mm~nifY.l~~ It conducted a protest march with 2,500 people on 
24 August, 1968. On 5 October, a second march was met with a baton charge from the 
~ ~~ 
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police and fighting with Protestant counter demonstrators. 13' This riot led to rapid 
escalation and mobilization on both sides increasing the dynamism of the environment. 
On 12 August, 1969, the Protestants conducted their yearly Apprentice Boys parade 
in Derry. A Protestant mob attacked Catholic neighborhoods and rioting rapidly spread to 
Belfast. Casualties mounted as Protestant mobs burned Catholic homes. Stormont was 
unable to control the situation. The British Army intervened to restore order on 14 August, 
1969. 
The shift to violence surprised all of the organizations in the regime, counter regime 
and society. A stable, peaceful environment from 1922 to 1968, Northern Ireland was 
transformed into a dynamic, violent environment in 1969. Violence caused major 
preference shifts in both the Protestant and Catholic communities. At the local level, many 
people self mobilized in local groups without any organizational action. In 1969, Northern 
Ireland resembled a spontaneous reaction. The mobilization was initiated by the actions 
of NICRA and the organized response of the Protestants and the regime's police. However, 
organizations on all sides failed to anticipate the massive popular response. The events of 
1969 to 1972 offer an opportunity to compare the revolution as an event theory against the 
organization theory of revolutions. 
2. Regime. 
The regime's situation was complicated and non cohesive. The Stormont 
government was the local government of Northern Ireland. Yet, Northern Ireland is part 
of the United Kingdom and the British government is the national government of the 
territory. Britain regarded Northern Ireland as a backwater and allowed Stormont 
considerable autonomy. The crisis led to a major shift in the attention the UK gave to 
Northern Ireland. Stormont resisted these encroachments on their traditional power. This 
tension led the UK to dissolve Stormont and establishing direct rule on 18 April, 1972. 
From 1969 to 1972, tension between the UK and Stormont resulted in an unstable and 
13' Robert W. White, Provisional Irish Republicans: An Oral and Interpretive History, 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), p. 66. 
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incompetent regime during a period of turmoil that required strong leadership. From an 
organizational standpoint, structural weakness of the regime prevented long term analysis 
and led to reactive short cycle decisions to local events. 
The UK placed pressure on Stormont from above while the Protestant community 
pressured it from below. Protestants dominated the administration and police forces. 
Unionist associations that represented the Protestant community exerted considerable 
pressure on Stormont to preserve the status quo. The Protestant perspective was reflected 
both within the regime from its Protestant membership and from outside the regime from 
Unionist political pressure. 
3. Counter Regime. 
The Catholic community formed the social movement that opposed the regime. 
Mobilization potential for the opposition included all Catholics, especially those who 
suffered in the sectarian violence and house burnings in 1969. However, once the situation 
stabilized, internal cleavages within the Catholic community surfaced. Catholics were 
internally divided by region and class. Existing social networks proved important in 
shaping organizations. Organizational competition within the Catholic community 
occurred between the emerging middle class organizations of NICRA and remnants of the 
old IRA. 
a. NICRA. 
This organization represented a coalition of a variety of Catholic 
organizations representing the Catholic urban middle class and students. The Campaign 
for Social Justice, Northern Ireland Labour Party, Republican Labour Party and a collection 
of activists came together in January, 1967 to become NICRA.13* As a coalition, the intent 
was to combine competing factions to conduct joint demonstrations. NICRA lacked strong, 
central leadership and its organizational structure was underdeveloped. 
The segregation of Catholic housing areas meant that each separate neighborhood 
contained different local associations. Separation impeded coordination with the other 
132 Bell, 1993, p. 55. Bell, The Secret Army, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), p. 156. 
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groups in different areas. The crisis of 1969 produced two effects. At the local level, it 
forced all Catholics in a given neighborhood to unite for self protection. At the national 
level, strengthened local groups eliminated central control causing a power vacuum to 
develop. Under pressure, NICRA dissolved back into its local associational base. 
Over time, a new organization emerged from NICRA. A political party called the 
Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) formed in August 1970.133 Its development 
was not smooth. A radical left-wing student group called People's Democracy and the old 
NICRA opposed the SDLP. Rivalries and confusion prevented effective community-wide 
collective action by NICRA in 1969 and 1970. 
Middle class associations that formed NICRA were a new development in the 
political and social structure of Northern Ireland. The newness of the organization caused 
the organization to break up under pressure. Lack of time prevented reorganization in the 
increasingly dynamic and violent environment. 
b. IRA. 
The IRA was organizationally unprepared for the crisis in Northern Ireland. 
It was primarily a southern organization based in Belfast. After defeat in the civil war in 
1923, the IRA became a fringe group in the Republic of Ireland. An attempted bombing 
campaign from 1958 to 1962 failed for lack of popular support on either side of the 
border. 134 
Development of an Irish middle class produced several new university-educated 
intellectuals who hoped to use Marxist-Leninist methods of political agitation. This was 
a clear break from the Republican tradition of military force alone. Leaders such as Roy 
Johnson, Tony Coughlin, Peader O'Donnell and Mairtin 0 Caidhain sought to change the 
policy and structure of the IRA. Their answer to the crisis in the north called for an Army 
133 White, p. 83. Bell, 1993, p. 182. Coogan, p. 272. 
134 Sean Cronin, Chief of Staff of the IRA, attributed the failure of the campaign to the 
lack of popular support and the lack of an organization to mobilize support for the cause. 
Action alone failed to overcome organizational weakness. See White, p. 48. 
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Convention in late 1969. The Dublin General Headquarters planned to conduct a vote to 
end the principle of abstentation and allow the IRA to become a legal political party.'35 
The situation in Northern Ireland was very different. The Belfast Brigade of the 
IRA had about 15 members in 1966. By December, 1969, it increased to about 26 
members.136 The whole organization in the north consisted of about 100 members, many 
were inactive after the 1962 campaign. The IRA represented a small group of traditional 
Republican families from the urban and rural working classes. They had a narrow 
recruitment base, common social background and were an insular, tradition-bound, 
conspiratorial clan.137 Their social backgrounds were very differed greatly from the new 
middle class intellectuals in Dublin. 
Tensions between the north and south caused a split in the IRA during the 
December, 1969 Army Convention. The Provisional IRA represented the traditional 
organizational structure and strategy of victory through violence. In contrast to the original 
IRA which sought to find a new approach of political agitation. The split was a total one, 
in that northerners and southerners ended up in each of the new organizations. The impact 
of the split was organizational confusion and with some violence between the two 
organizations from 1969 to 1972. Eventually, the original IRA renounced the use of 
violence and became a Worker's Party hoping to unite Protestant and Catholic workers 
against both the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland governments. The original IRA 
became a marginal mobilizational organization with no supporters and disappeared as an 
organization by the 1990s. 
The Provisional IRA retained a military structure consising of the Army Council, 
brigades, battalions and companies. They were not a factor in the events of 1969. They 
lacked members, weapons and funds. From 1969 to 1972, they grew rapidly to an 
135 Kline, p. 427-8. Bell, 1974,344-347. Bell, 1993, pp. 140-145. 
136 Bell, 1993, p. 140. White, p. 63. 
137 White, pp. 13 1-2. 
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estimated 1,500 to 2,000 members.138 PIRA had a selective organizational structure, but 
operated in the open. All government presence in Catholic areas eliminated by the August, 
1969 riots. The Catholics established No Go areas and the PIRA established offices and 
openly recruited. 
c. Organizational Dynamics. 
The contextual and task environment favored the growth of the PIRA 
compared to its rivals for support within the Catholic community. The only regime 
presence in the Catholic areas was the British Army. The Protestant police were withdrew 
because their partisan activities further inflamed the violence. Inevitably the Army shifted 
from protecting the Catholics to fighting the Catholics. Traditional Catholic enmity 
towards the British was one factor. Lack of an alternative political organization was 
another. The army offered no political solution, and its efforts to stop the riots led to 
clashes with both Protestants and Catholics. There was no government organization within 
the Catholic community and no social networks for the government to use to create 
permanent organizational presence. 
Both NICRA and PIRA were in organizational confusion in 1969 and 1970. Mob 
attacks on the Catholic community led to the creation of Citizen Defense Committees. The 
need for self defense was the immediate demand of the local communities. Initially, neither 
PIRA nor NICRA could provide this defense. NICRA and the newly organized SDLP both 
sought a non violent solution. The PIRA had no weapons and was flooded with recruits. 
The local communities were on their own. 
Over time, this situation favored PIRA. The PIRA met violence with violence and 
promised immediate action while the SDLP tried to organize for future operations. The 
PIRA managed to coopt the Citizen Defense Committees by promising to defend local 
communities. The Central Citizens Defence Committee initially represented all the 
different Catholic factions, but then split over whether or not to support the PIRA.'39 PIRA 
138 White, p. 63. 
139 Coogan, p. 28 1. 
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filled this political space while the SDLP was still organized. The violence and uncertainty 
of the time favored the PIRA, which offered short cycle solutions over the long cycle 
efforts of the SDLP. 
4. Society. 
Society in Northern Ireland became so polarized by 1969 that there was no middle 
ground. The Catholics represented one social movement industry and the Protestants 
another. Over the years efforts were made to form cross sectional organizations. The 
Alliance party has maintained a steady support base of 9-10% from 1972 to 1995. 
However, these efforts never played a major role. The sectarian divide remained too deep. 
On the other hand, ethnic differences did not cause civil war. Troubles began with 
the NICRA demands for reform, not revolution. The Catholic community sought to reform 
the system, not leave it. Long term objectives of the PIRA have little popular support. The 
bulk of both the Protestant and Catholic communities have preferences for a compromise 
solution.140 The problem is that neither the Protestant nor Catholic communities are 
represented by a single organization. Both sides have a variety of organizations of both 
extremists and moderates. The organizational competition within the communities has 
prevented a compromise between the British government and the Catholic and Protestant 
communities. 
D. INTERACTION. 
The conflict in Northern Ireland went through several distinct phases. From 1969 
to 1972, all sides reorganed and short cycle violence in the task environment dominated the 
conflict. From 1972-1975, British security forces nearly crushed the PIRA. From 1976 to 
198 1, the PIRA recovered and reorganized while the British sought a political solution. 
From 1981 to 1986, the PIRA shifted to a political organization and participated in 
elections. It was only from 1986 to 1995, that negotiations towards a compromise between 
organizations representing the different views in the Catholic community were possible. 
140 Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, Northern Ireland: The Choice, (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1994. pp. 62-6. 
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Organizational changes in Northern Ireland best explain success or failure of the various 
strategies attempted by competing organizations. 
1. 1969 -1972. 
The situation in Northern Ireland was dominated by short cycle events from the 
introduction of British troops in August, 1969, until the end of the Stormont regime in 
1972. The regime, Protestant, and Catholic organizations all reacted to the events on the 
streets. No genuine effort was made to develop a long term solution while rioting and 
violence continued. The regime sought to end the instability while PIRA wanted to 
increase it. 
The British blundered badly during this period. Organizing activities of PIRA and 
NICRA gave the British Army the initiative. The regime contained many Protestants but 
few Catholics. Consequently, the government did not have presence in Catholic areas. 
This left the government with little idea of the true situation within the Catholic 
community. Government authorities assumed that the PIRA provided leadership for the 
Catholics and ignoring the NICRA leadership. No political solutions were offered. Only 
military actions were taken by the army to stop the violence. These actions were perceived 
as hostile to the Catholic community. 
a. UK Actions Alienate Catholics. 
In 1970, the army conducted mass sweeps and searches for arms. With no 
presence and no information, these random searches treated all Catholics as suspects. The 
army used tear gas to support their operations. A series of riots in Belfast from 27 June to 
5 July, 1970, increased local Catholics animosity toward the army.14' The rise in local 
opposition to British presence led to an increase in British efforts to suppress it. PIRA 
responded to British activities with a bombing campaign totalling 134 bombs between 
April and June, 1971. It kept the campaign a secret from its followers since the most 
Catholics did not desire an increase in violence. 
141 J. Bowyer Bell, The Gun in Politics, (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1991), 
p. 141. 
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Escalation of violence between the army and PIRA continued until August 9, 197 1, 
when the British announced an internment policy. The British swept Catholic 
neighborhoods and arrested local leaders and activists. With no idea who was actually in 
the PIRA the Army arrested many innocent individuals. The partisan nature of this policy 
was demonstrated by the fact that only a few Protestants were detained. Internment 
removed neutrality and free riding behavior among the Catholics. Whether they 
participated or not, British attacks and CS gas would seek them out. 
Bloody Sunday occurred on 30 January, 1972. Army troops shot and killed 13 
unarmed Catholic protesters. The steady escalation of violence by the army and the 
continual police and military targeting of the entire Catholic community created an 
insurgency where none had previously existed. The SDLP and all other Catholic 
associations rallied around PIRA in defense of their own lives. There had existed a very 
real opportunity to separate the PIRA from the rest of the Catholic community. The 
preferences of the Catholics was on reform and not revolution. The escalation of violence 
had a reinforcing effect of increasing the scale and intensity of violence which precluded 
a moderate alternative. 
b. Catholic Response. 
The onset of violence broke the weak national links of NICRA. The 
Catholic community separated into local associations. 
They included tenants associations, the Belfast Central Citizens Defense 
Committee, the Committee for Truth, the Minority Rights Association, the 
Association for Legal Justice, the Northern Resistance Movement, and the 
Anti-Internment League. 142 
Over time, the SDLP reformed and consolidated the original position of NICRA. In the 
interim, lack of an established organizational structure within the Catholic community 
caused short cycle drift. There was an absence of central control and the community lacked 
an organizational responses to UK actions. 
142 Maurice Tugwell, "Politics and Propaganda of the Provisional IRA" in Terrorism, 
Vol. 5,No. 1-2, 1981, pp. 13-40. p. 21. 
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The Provisional IRA had an established organizational structure. It grew rapidly 
despite their historic insular and selective nature. PIRA had no established organizational 
competition within the Catholic community. Several self defense committees claimed to 
be part of the IRA without contact with the organization. PIRA was overwhelmed with the 
task of consolidating control from December, 1969 to January, 1972. 
Once PIRA had reorganized, it returned to its primary organizational goal to remove 
the British with short cycle violence.'43 The bombing campaign of 1972 is the logical 
outcome of the PIRA organizational structure and goals. In the short cycle, this led to the 
fall of Stormont and PIRA success. In the long cycle, it caused a highly effective British 
counter reaction and a loss of support in the Catholic community. 
c. British Army Miscalculation. 
The major shortcoming of the army was preoccupation with the PIRA. 
Focusing on eliminating the PIRA , Army actions affected the entire Catholic community. 
Since the task environment is a triangular relationship between the regime, opposition and 
society. Army efforts to isolate operations in two dimensions between the regime and 
PIRA failed, and produced unanticipated effects in the entire Catholic population. The 
British interpreted the increase in violence manifested in the PIRA bombing campaign, 
mass mobilization of Catholics in self defense committees and the growth of the SDLP as 
indicators of a mass PIRA insurrection. This assumption became a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
2.1972 to 1975. UK Crushes PIRA. 
The rising tide of violence forced the British to reassess the situation. On 25 March, 
1972, the British eliminated the Stormont regime and established direct rule. The British 
attempted to negotiate a political solution. However, they continued to perceive the true 
situation. Their misperception of reality was demonstrated by their unwillingness to 
143 Tugwell cites PIRA defector Mary McGuire as saying that the IRA Army Council 
believed that the British would withdraw once they lost 36 soldiers killed. The UK 
withdrew from Aden after 36 deaths. PIRA believed that once the cost of Northern Ireland 
became too high, the UK would leave. PIRA ignored the likely Protestant reaction to 
British withdrawal. See Tugwell, p. 15. 
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negotiate with the SDLP and Catholic middle class leaders. The July negotiations failed 
when PIRA demanded unconditional surrender from the United Kingdom. The Provos 
were trapped in their short cycle view of events and were not capable of exploiting the 
opportunity presented in the negotiations. 
a. UK Restores Order, Offers Long Cycle Reforms. 
The British response focused on elimination of the No Go areas with 
Operation Motorman on 30 July, 1972. The PIRA enjoyed high potential, open space and 
an increased presence in which to entrench themselves in the Catholic urban areas since 
July, 1971. It reached the peak strength of their existence in this munificent environment. 
Elimination of the open space represented by the No Go areas started a process that 
eventually broke the Provos. The British combined negotiations with force toisolate the 
PIRA fiom the general Catholic population. 
Politically, the British took action to solve some of the Catholic grievances. 
Elimination of Stormont was very popular with Catholics. In December, 1973, an effort 
was made to form a power sharing arrangement with the SDLP and the Alliance party. 
This effort led to a Protestant counter reaction demonstrated by a Protestant general strike 
that succeeded in stopping the Sunningdale effort. The shift in British efforts fiom favoring 
the Protestants to trying to solve the Catholic grievances helped restore the status quo. 
Violence and rioting decreased and popular support for moderates increased. 
Militarily, the British reoccupied the Catholic neighborhoods and placed a new 
emphasis on selective targeting. No more wholesale attacks on Catholics were to occur. 
The UK security forces focused on combining good intelligence with selective actions to 
arrest those guilty of crimes with a minimal impact on bystanders. The effect of the new 
strategy was dramatic. 
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By late 1974, the army intelligence system had built up an impressive bank 
of detailed intelligence on over 40% of the population of the Province ... By 
December, 1974 the Belfast Brigade was in such weak strength that it 
compromised only fifteen or so active bombers and marksmen, mostly boys 
aged between 14 and 17.144 
The rest of the PIRA was in jail. 
b. PIRA Escalates Violence. 
The PIRA response after the fall of Stormont was to increase the level of 
violence. Indiscriminate bombings and terror alienated Catholics and helped British 
intelligence efforts. By the end of 1974, PIRA was defeated and most members were in 
jail. In January, 1975, PIRA agreed to a truce offered by the regime. PIRA had no real 
option since they lacked popular support and their open organization proved very easy for 
the regime to penetrate.145 It regarded the truce as a breather, not an opportunity to change 
organization or strategy. In later years, many PIRA leaders called the truce an error when 
they realized how effectively the British strategy was working. 
c. British Long Cycle Strategy Defeats PIRA. 
The British continued to make long cycle decisions to develop a log term 
solution, in contrast to the previous effort to stop the PIRA in the short cycle. This strategy 
ended internment, restructured and reorganized both the civil and military organizations, 
and led to a series of political and economic reforms for the Catholic community. The 
PIRA attempted to counter this long cycle accomodative strategy with a short cycle strategy 
of increased violence. 
Within a matter of months, the truce, the ending of internment and the restructuring 
of the army became operational and propaganda defeats for the IRA.146 
144 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, (New York: New York University 
Press, 1979), p. 154. 
145 The PIRA had been so badly defeated that the regime had to release PIRA leaders 
from jail to control the PIRA remnants for the cease fire. All the local leaders had been 
arrested. 
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3. 1975 to 1981. PIRA Reorganizes. 
The intransigence of the Protestant community prevented the UK from capitalizing 
on their tactical defeat of the PIRA. PIRA reorganized and adjusted their tactics during this 
period. It proved that it could sustain a steady level of violence, yet it offered no political 
solutions. Although the PIRA stagnated during this period, the inability of the UK to 
negotiate a political solution allowed PIRA enough space to survive. 
a. The Reorganization of PIRA and Sinn Fein. 
The truce period forced the PIRA to reassess their organization and strategy. 
PIRA decided to reorganize as a more efficient selective organization. True to their 
selective nature, no change in goals were considered. The objective remained centered on 
achieving a military victory. PIRA leadership blamed previous failures on the 
organization's inclusive structure which resulted in recruitment of uncommitted, 
untrustworthy individuals. The PIRA chose to reorganize in a tight cell structure and to 
shr ink from 2,000 members to about 300 highly committed members. 
The new PIFZA organization was a strategic choice. The Provos recognized that 
they could not win a military victory. The new organization was designed to maintain a 
steady level of violent activity in order to attrit the British and force them to leave. PIRA 
assumed the Protestants were irrelevant and that with a British defeat all objectives would 
be achieved. 
PIRA consisted of both an army organization and political wing called Sinn Fein, 
but the membership of the two organizations was the same. Traditionally, retired or 
inactive fighters waited in Sinn Fein until an opportunity to use violence appeared. Under 
the new organization, Sinn Fein became an open political party. PIRA wanted Sinn Fein 
to recruit the people who wanted to join PIRA, but who could not be used due to the small 
size and long indoctrination used by the cells. Previously, PIRA intermixed their covert 
and overt elements. Now they formally segregated the covert, selective, violent 
organization from the overt, mobilizational support organization. The entire organization 
was controlled by the PIRA with Sinn Fein in support. 
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b. The Peace Movement. 
Organizations within the Catholic and Protestant communities did not reflect 
the preferences of the population. The Peace Movement illustrates a strong preference for 
compromise not reflected in PIRA, the SDLP or the regime. In August, 1976 two 
housewives and a reporter formed the Peace Movement after three children were killed 
during a policePIRA car chase. By the end of the month, 10,000 protesters joined. At the 
end of September, the movement grew to 100,000 protesters from both communities who 
demonstrated for peace. 
The Peace Movement disappeared because it lacked effective leadership and 
organizational structure. No organization existed that supported the movement's goals, 
therefore it failed. A cross sectional organization was not formed due to mistrust between 
the communities. The movement produced latent mobilizational potential, but it lacked the 
mobilization space to for an organization to form and grow. The Peace Movement 
illustrates that preferences alone are not a causal factor in the task environment. An 
organization must capture mobilization potential for it to produce long term effect. 
c. Regime and PIRA interactions. 
The regime lost the initiative after the collapse of the Sunningdale 
agreement. Protestant opposition prevented the formation of a joint Catholic and Protestant 
government. The environment stabilized fiom the dynamism of 1969 to 1972 and terrorism 
became an accepted part of the environment. The regime reached a level of stability where 
it could not lose, but neither could it eliminate the PIRA. PIRA's new organizational 
structure of was very survivable. 
The SDLP grew steadily with strong support from the Catholic middle class. The 
party developed a reliable following of about two thirds of all Catholic voters. "In the 
1970s there was no coherent party to represent those who supported traditional republican 
 objective^."^^^ Reorganization of Sinn Fein began filling this available potential and space 
and built support within one-third of the Catholic population that was not pro-SDLP. 
147 Boyle and Hadden, p. 56. 
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These supporters did not necessarily prefer the utopian PIRA goals, but Sinn Fein 
represented the only alternative to the SDLP. 
PIRA was in a reorganization period from 1975 to 1977. It took two years to set 
up the cell structure and establish new organizational structures and procedures. From 
1977 to 1981, PIRA averaged 870 shootings and 321 bombings a year.I4' PIRA was 
capable of sustaining a steady cycle of violence, but this failed to shake the resolve of the 
British government. It increased the sectarian divide between Catholics and Protestants and 
alienated potential Catholic supporters. 
4. 1981 to 1986. The Rise of Sinn Fein. 
The hunger strikes broke the static environment in which caused PIRA to stagnate. 
An unanticipated surge of support convinced several PIRA leaders to seek a political 
method of harnessing popular support. However, the rapid rise and fall of sentiment proved 
too transitory to benefit the movement. This led to efforts to change Sinn Fein from a 
support organization to a full political party so that it could mobilize popular sentiment, 
allowing the movement to use both political and military methods. Rise of Sinn Fein 
derived from short cycle considerations, but created significant long cycle results. This 
development placed moderate political leaders in charge of the movement and opened 
doors to a future political compromise. 
a. The Hunger Strikes. 
The violent actions of the Provos failed to achieve any results. Government 
counter action put most of the PIRA into jail. With the bulk of the organization in jail, the 
focus of action shifted to the prisons. Hunger strikes were a short cycle activity conducted 
by the Provos to gain recognition as political prisoners. The effect of the strikes on society 
surprised the PIRA as they were .focused on interaction with the regime. The hunger 
strikes produced a wave of sympathy in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
During the H block protests, sympathizers arranged to have some of the hunger 
strikers run for elections as a means of protest. The hunger strikers won the elections. This 
148 Boyle and Hadden, p. 71. 
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success by Sinn Fein led to a reappraisal of strategy. Since the military campaign stalled, 
it seemed possible to achieve more short cycle gains through political mobilization. Gerry 
Adams developed the 1975 cell structure reorganization of PIRA. Now he played a critical 
role in pushing for a political role for Sinn Fein. Adams proved to be a capable long cycle 
decision maker previously overlooked by the IRA. 
A political strategy was not compatible with the goals and ideology of the IRA. 
The Provos split with the original IRA over a previous effort to adopt a political strategy. 
A bureaucratic struggle developed in the republican movement as Adams and his 
supporters gradually supplanted the hardliners. Sinn Fein attracted new supporters and a 
new faction within the party arose called 'the politicals'. This faction represented the new 
non violent members who emphasized political  solution^.'^^ 
b. Rise of Sinn Fein. 
The 1983 elections consolidated the dominance of the politicals in Sinn 
Fein. At the 1983 Ard Fheis meeting of the Sinn Fein, Adams took over as president of 
Sinn Fein.l5' Gerry Adams previously commanded the Belfast Brigade and his violent past 
lended him the credibility required to change the movement. The Republican movement 
was still governed by the principle of abstentation which held that no one elected could 
actually serve in office. Adams formed several committees and conducted a long 
preparation phase for changing abstentation. This organizing activity continued from 1983 
to 1986. 
In 1986, Adams was finally ready to change the abstentation policy. He 
reorganized Sinn Fein from a supporting organization of PIRA to the dominant 
organization in the Republican movement. The Provisional IRA conducted its first Army 
Convention since it split with the original IRA in 1969. A small element split from the 
movement to form a new organization called Republican Sinn Fein. The rest of the 
149 Brendan O'Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein. 1985 to Today, (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1993), pp. 12 1-2. 
I5O O'Brien, p. 116. 
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organization accepted Adams new strategy. This new organization would fight with a gun 
in one hand and a ballot box in the other. PIRA would continue the armed campaign, yet 
Sinn Fein was allowed to be an open political party to seek and hold office. 
Changes that occurred between 1969 and 1986 explain why PIRA supported Sinn 
Fein and Adams when the 1969 convention rejected the political process. In 1969, the 
violence of the period generated widespread Catholic support. Many of the Provos shared 
the expectation that military victory was possible. However, by 1986, it was evident that 
the military approach failed and that the movement had lost support. The Peace movement 
shocked the Provos and the demonstrations of support for hunger strikers clearly proved 
that the political strategy could increase popular support. The hardcore members who split 
demonstrates the failure of an insular organization to function in a long cycle environment. 
The Republican Sinn Fein failed to grow and remains marginalized. 
c. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Accord. 
The United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland signed the Anglo-Irish Accord 
on 15 November, 1985. This treaty institutionalized power sharing between the Protestants 
and Catholics in the Province. The Irish government received a direct role in the affairs of 
the Province. Protestants resisted the agreement, but did not totally reject it, as in the 1974 
general strike. 
This agreement did not solve differences between the UK and the Republic, nor the 
differences between the Catholics and Protestants. Parameters were proposed in which the 
respective parties could discuss their differences. Finally, the parties attained middle 
ground so that some sort of negotiations could occur. Previously, all players were in a zero 
sum game. Gains could only come at the loss of someone else's cost. The Anglo-Irish 
Accord allowed a non zero sum solution.'51 
The agreement proved to be popular to both sides in the Province. Seventy-two 
percent of Catholics approved of the treaty and the Protestants tacitly approved by their 
151 Brogan, p. 385. 
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lack of concerted action.'52 Neither side looked like it could win militarily, and a growing 
consensus advocated a political solution. 
5. 1986 to 1995. The Primacy of Politics. 
Sinn Fein experienced an initial surge of support when it mobilized existing 
mobilizational potential within the Catholic community. This proved to be the Catholic 
working class and unemployed: about one third of all Catholics and ten percent of 
Northern Ireland. Stability returned after 1986. PIRA sustained the rate of violence and 
Sinn Fein maintained a strong electorate. John Hume and the SDLP, which represented 
two thirds of all Catholics, took advantage of the new politically focused Sinn Fein to 
negotiate with both Sinn Fein and the UK. His actions proved decisive in starting the 
negotiations that led to the 1993 cease fire. 
a. Stalemate. 
Sinn Fein has evolved since the 1986 convention into a stable political party. 
It routinely receives about ten percent of all votes in the province. This represents one third 
of the Catholic population that supports them. Sinn Fein supporters are urban working 
class and unemployed Catholics. The SDLP sustains support fiom the bulk of the Catholic 
community and represents Catholic middle and upper classes, clergy, students and rural 
areas. It receives about 22 percent of the votes in elections. Receiving about eight percent, 
the Alliance Party, includes both Catholic and Protestant support. The Original IRA 
received only one to two percent and dissolved in the late 1980s. 
Electoral support for the political parties stablized in 1983. The supporters of the 
varying factions established organizations. Politically and militarily, Northern Ireland has 
been stalemated since 1986. Each organization has existing mobilization potential, space 
and presence. The PIRA may be illegal, but its presence is well established in Catholic 
communities. Even though the government knows who is in the organization, they can not 
remove them without local support. The regime learned this from its failed efforts of the 
1970s. 
152 Bell, 1987, p. 357. 
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b. John Hume and the SDLP. 
The original crisis developed from the actions of NICRA. The SDLP was 
NICRA's successor and was marginalized by the dynamic, violent environment. A 
stabilized environment allowed the SDLP to consolidate its support. The SDLP 
represented the bulk of the Catholic population and Sinn Fein's return to politics confirmed 
this dominance in every election. It sought a nonviolent political solution to the conflict. 
Britian desired a political solution while the Irish government wanted isolation and 
elimination of the IRA. The Republic remembered the IRA effort to overthrow their 
government in the 1920s and the IRA declared goal to do so again after they won in the 
north. John Hume was in a position to resolve the political impasse. He sought discussions 
with the PIRA in 1985 and 1988. 
The PIRA had no desire to negotiate. They received 240 tons of weapons from 
Libya in 1987-88. The Provos thought that they could use the SDLP to increase their own 
support. The 1985 talks failed when PIRA wanted to videotape the negotiations with 
Hume. In January, 1988 Hume and Adams started a new round of negotiations. These 
negotiations started a slow tedious process that led to the PIRA cease fire of 1993.153 The 
major difference between the two sides remained the PIRA use of violence. Sinn Fein tried 
to change the focus from the violent acts of PIRA to the British presence. Meanwhile the 
SDLP focused on the effects of PIRA violence on the Catholic community. 
The 1989 elections indicated the effect of the talks on the Catholic community. 
SDLP gained 20 district council seats and Sinn Fein lost 16.154 Sinn Fein efforts to use the 
SDLP backfired and pressure to regain political support drove Sinn Fein to truly negotiate. 
Whereas the organizational preference of Sinn Fein and PIRA was to avoid negotiations, 
the pressure from preferences of their supporters forced them to change. Sinn Fein adapted 
its organization to match that of its supporters, while overcoming the different preferences 
of its own membership. Sinn Fein's actions during this period illustrated how an 
153 O'Brien, pp. 172-175. 
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organization shapes the preferences of its members to be different than that of its original 
support base. Yet, the organization can not permanently vary its preferences from that of 
its supporters without losing its support base. Something had to give, and it was Sinn Fein. 
c. The Cease fire. 
PIRA ordered a cease fire on 3 1 August, 1994. The 25 year war has reached 
a new point and is again undergoing a transition. The cease fire took over a year of internal 
preparation within Sinn Fein and PIRA as well as the required negotiations with the UK. 
The process started with a message from Sinn Fein on 22 February, 1993. The Hume - 
Adams talks lasted from April to September of 1993. The Downing Street declaration in 
December represented the agreement of the UK and the Republic of Ireland. It took until 
August for Sinn Fein and PIRA to gain the agreement of their own 
Several reasons contributed to the PIRA decision to stop seeking a victory through 
military means. Most obvious is that the strategy was not working. The United Kingdom 
showed great resolve and determination throughout the conflict and the position of the 
PIRA deteriorated. The SDLP established itself as the dominant party in the Catholic 
community. In 1992, Joe Hendron, the SDLP candidate, defeated Gerry Adams in the UK 
general election. This defeat in West Belfast, the stronghold of the PIRA, sent an ominous 
message to the organization. The decline in Catholic support was the major factor in the 
decision for a cease fire.lS6 This drop in support is not just a preference shift, but a result 
of the effective organizational actions of the SDLP. 
E. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES. 
1. Contextual Environment. 
The contextual changes since 1969 reinforced the sectarian divide between the two 
communities. The political grievances of the Catholics resulted in significant reform. The 
remaining economic grievances still create tension between the communities. The effort 
lS5 IISS, Strategic Survey: 1994-1 995, (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 
118-122. O'Brien, pp. 287-320. 
lS6 IISS, pp. 124-5. O'Brien, pp. 320-2. 
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to solve grievances with violence was attempted by both communities without success. A 
political solution is possible, but depends on the two communities ability to compromise. 
a. Political Changes. 
The political structure underwent a steady process of reform since the end 
of Stormont in 1972. Since the collapse of the Sunningdale agreement in 1974, the British 
attempted to create a joint Catholic and Protestant government. The problem is that the 
Catholics wanted to join the Republic in order to become the majority and the Protestants 
wanted the return of majority rule within the province where they had the majority. For 
both groups, majority rule meant a tyranny for the larger group.'57 The 1985 Anglo-Irish 
Accord created a middle ground for negotiations. Political issues remain unresolved. 
Nevertheless, the major political demands of NICRA in 1968 were achieved. 
Stormont was eliminated, and the political system reformed. Now Catholics fully 
participate in the political process. Sinn Fein political activism included using demands 
for increases in local government benefits and services as a method to mobilize support.'58 
The political process has been given an opportunity to work. This increased the 
expectation in the Catholic community that the SDLP can solve the conflict and that PIRA 
is part of the problem. 
b. Economic Changes. 
The economy in Northern Ireland entered a period of decline after 1974. 
This was due to a lack of investment caused by the conflict, a general decline in the UK 
economy and the decline of heavy industry in general. During the 1970s, jobs in 
manufacturing declined from 32 percent of the total workforce to 23 percent. The service 
sector expanded from 41 to 54 percent. The net effect of this benefitted the Catholic work 
force and hurt the Protestants. Protestants traditionally dominated heavy industry. 
157 Moody and Martin, p. 35 1. 
Sinn Fein ''has organized groups to protest housing conditions, receive government 
benefits, obtain recreation centers, promote sporting events, repair streets and drains and 
work in a variety of other causes." Soule, p. 41. Far from rejecting the system, Sinn Fein 
is using the existing political system to furthert their own goals. 
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Unemployment climbed in the Protestant working class. The rise in the service sector 
benefitted the educated, Catholic middle class. 159 
The economic differences between the communities remained. Average income for 
Protestant households per week in 1988 was 228 pounds compared to 185 for Catholics.'6o 
unemployment remained high in the urban slums. The net effect of the economic changes 
was differentiated in the Catholic community. The urban working class that supported Sinn 
Fein still faced poverty and economic discrimination. The middle class that supported the 
SDLP saw marked economic improvement since 1969. 
c. Social Changes. 
The political and military deadlock is reflected in the social stalemate 
between the two communities. Effective use of violence reinforced the segregation of the 
two communities. Now urban 
neighborhoods are divided by concrete walls. The two communities still attend different 
churches and schools, and live and work apart. This increased divide between the 
communities prevented the rise of a cross sectional organization. 
The mixed neighborhoods of 1968 are no more. 
In the long term, demographics of the Catholics continue to change. Catholic birth 
rates exceed the Protestants and eventually, the Catholics will become the majority. The 
urbanization of the Catholics continues. The Fair Employment Act and other legislation 
helped increase the size and influence of the Catholic middle class. These factors increased 
the size and power of the SDLP, which sought to represent the new forces in the Catholic 
community. Sinn Fein represents the urban, uneducated poor who are not benefitting from 
the economic modernization of the Catholic population. 
The Protestants are becoming less cohesive over time. Two major Protestant 
religions are the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland. Presbyterian membership fell 
from 413,000, in 1961, to 336,000 in 1991. The Church of Ireland declined from 353,000, 
159 Moody and Martin, p. 352. 
160 Boyle and Hadden, p. 50. 
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in 1951, to 279,000 in 1991.16' Declining heavy industry resulted in Protestant urban 
ghettos existing next to the Catholic ghettos. The Unionist Movement has always been 
divided into a number of political parties and paramilitary 'groups. The Ulster Unionist 
Party dominated the Protestant community from the 1920s through the 1960s. Today, it 
is challenged by the hard line Democratic Unionist Party and internal divisions over 
accommodations with the Catholics.'62 
Political and economic relationships between the community have changed. 
Politically, the system has been reformed to allow both sides compete electorally on a level 
playing field. Protestants continue to hold most government jobs. Although discrimination 
is a factor many Catholics will not work for the security forces. Jobs in the security forces 
represent 11 percent the workforce and 90 percent of these jobs are held by Pr0te~tants.I~~ 
Political compromise is needed to address economic problems. 
Changes in the two communities does not preclude a negotiated end to hostilities. 
The growing power of the SDLP and the moderate consensus in the Protestant community 
holds great hope for compromise. Surveys repeatedly show that both communities desire 
an end to conflict. The organizational dynamics have become the major reason that conflict 
has continued for so long. 
2. Task Environment. 
The task environment fundamentally and permanently changed the 
interrelationships of the communities in Northern Ireland. Before 1969, no major 
organization represented Catholics and strong unified Protestant organization controlled 
the political and economic structure of the province. Today, the SDLP and Sinn Fein 
occupies a permanent, viable niche in the Catholic community. The Protestant community 
O'Brien, p. 3 1. 
Boyle and Hadden, p. 57. 
John W. Soule, "Problems in Applying Counterterrorism to Prevent Terrorism: Two 
Decades of Violence in Northern Ireland Reconsidered", in Terrorism, Vol. 12, No. 1, 
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lost its former cohesion and political and economic control. Politically and economically, 
the Protestant community maintains an advantage. community politically and 
economically, but its organizations lack the cohesion and adaptability shown by the SDLP 
and Sinn Fein. 
a. Regime. 
The political system was restructured under direct rule. Catholics have been 
able to participate in free fair elections since the time of the 1974 Sunningdale agreement. 
However, the UK has not been able to work themselves out of a job. It still brokers the 
political process to prevent the Protestant majority from abusing the system. The political 
process is making progress, but is not yet solved. 
Regime recruiting continues to focus on the Protestant population. The 
Ulsterization process has been successful in decreasing the British presence. This had the 
side effect of increasing the Protestant role in the government, since Catholics won't take 
government jobs.'@' The size of the British Army peaked at about 12,000. The Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC), RUC Reserve and the Ulster Defense Regiment number 18,000 
locally recruited members. Over 90 percent are Protestant and they live in virtually every 
Protestant neighborhood in the country.165 
The security forces are highly coordinated. The primary counterinsurgency 
organization is the police. The army operates in supporting role. The RUC is organized 
into 12 divisions. Local and regional support units can rapidly reinforce local units. Army, 
intelligence and police actions coordinate jointly from the local level all the way to a 
central Joint Intelligence center in the United Kingdom. The high degree of coordination 
allowed 30,000 security forces to control the Province of 1.5 million. 
Ulsterization created a strong and permanent regime presence in the Protestant 
areas. The regime failed to establish presence within the Catholic social networks because 
the social cleavages are too wide. Police recruited Catholic informers which increased the 
164 This isn't just patriotism. PIRA kills Catholics who work for the government. 
165 O'Brien, p. 90. Soule, p. 32. 
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conviction rates of PIRA activists. However, coercion was used to recruit them, which 
increased Catholic resentment.'66 There is no true government presence in the urban 
Catholic areas. Most crimes are not reported. PIRA resorted to beatings and kneecappings 
to keep some semblance of order in the area.*67 
b. Counter Regime. 
The growth of the SDLP is the true cause of the cease fire. The SDLP 
became the dominant Catholic organization. Competition between PIRA and the SDLP 
steadily marginalized the PIRA within their own community. The post-1986 PIRA 
prevented further decline in PIRA support. Sinn Fein stabilized its support base in the 
urban areas, especially Belfast. There are regional variations in South Armargh and 
Tyrone, but the SDLP is effectively gaining control of the Catholic community.'68 
The SDLP cooperation with the regime limited the actual counter regime support 
base to the Sinn Fein and the PIRA. Growth of Sinn Fein since 1986 includes many of the 
'politicals'. This group believes in the political process and not necessarily the violent goals 
of PIRA. The armed opposition base of PIRA steadily narrowed. 
Since 1985, PIRA has maintained a strength of less than 300. This is partly due to 
the cell structure and their fear of penetration. PIRA feels a small number of highly 
committed members is less vulnerable than a larger organization. The end of Stormont, in 
1972, makes the smaller size a necessity. Many who supported PIRA's violence stopped 
166 Soule, p. 40. 
167 There have been 1200 Catholics knee-capped since 1969. PIRA has no jails or other 
method to prevent crime except force. The beatings and murders of Catholics has increased 
the alienation between the PIRA and the Catholic community at large. 
At the micro level, there is considerable variation in local support. South Armargh 
has remained a Sinn Fein and PIRA area since the 1920s due to the activity of a few strong 
republican families through the generations. Established social networks have proven 
themselves capable of surviving over time, despite social and economic changes. See 
O'Brien, pp. 199-205. 
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doing so after Stormont was eliminated. PIRA failed to understand the preferences of its 
supporters. 
PIRA competed with violent rivals within the small social movement support base 
that espoused violent action. The Marxist Irish Republican Socialist Party of the 1970s 
became the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Its strength is less than 50, but for its 
numbers conducted more violent operations than the PIRA. INLA involved violent 
conflicts with the original IRA. In 1987, internal rivalries led to assassinations and a new 
splinter groups called the Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO).16’ 
The lack of success using the PIRA strategy caused rivalries within its SMI from 
both selective and mobilizational organizations. Sinn Fein proved the most successful. 
The open mobilization space, potential and presence created an opportunity for a 
mobilizational organization. Competition on the selective side can not be ignored. The 
PIRA/Sinn Fein shift to the political process increases the appeal of the radical splinter 
groups. As the PIRA has proven, a small, selective organization creates an impact out of 
proportion to its actual membership. 
c. Society. 
The violent period from 1969 to 1972 spawned a variety of new 
organizations. A middle ground appeared that represented neither the regime, nor the two 
sectarian communities. The Peace Movement is an indicator of a cross sectional 
preference, not reflected in the existing Protestant and Catholic organizations. The Alliance 
Party fills part of this area. It gets eight to ten percent of votes in elections and is evenly 
split in both Protestants and Catholics. A variety of middle class human rights associations 
also exist in the space between the two communities. 
Boyle and Hadden describe a small minority of people who identify with neither 
side in the conflict. This group includes mixed marriages and those who reject any 
religious label. This group represents five to fifteen percent of the population. It forms a 
169 Peter Janke, ed. , Ethnic and Religious Conflicts, (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 
1994), pp. 101-2. 
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portion of support for the Alliance Party. I7O Nevertheless, the overall behavior is 
consistent with free riding. This group is seeking to avoid the costs of being on either side. 
As such, their behavior is self seeking, and it would be expected that no strong organization 
exists. This is the casein Northern Ireland. Many members of this group resume their 
ethnic identity in times of high violence, seeking the safety in the larger community.171 
The existence of a small neutral sector reflects the sharp sectarian divide. Catholic 
and Protestant organizations dominate the task environment. Neutral organizations help 
the two sides negotiate, but lack mobilization potential or the organizational size to be 
decisive. 
F. ANALYSIS. 
Table 4-1 illustrates the relationship between the environment, organizational 
structure and growth for the competing organizations within the Catholic community. The 
regime failed to mobilize and organize Catholics in its own organizations, except for small 
numbers in the security forces. Most Catholics place their allegiance with their local 
political party, and not to the regime. 
The abbreviation MC stands for the middle class social movement that forms the 
preference base for the SDLP. WC represents the working class social movement that 
supports the republican movement of Sinn Fein, PIRA, INLA, Republican Sinn Fein and 
the other republican organizations. The Catholic community developed into two distinct 
social movement industries. The middle class group contains two thirds of the Catholic 
community while working class group consititutes one third. Members of Sinn Fein and 
the SDLP are from different neighborhoods with different socio-economic backgrounds. 
The conflict reinforced this division within the Catholic community. 
I7O Boyle and Hadden, pp. 62-6. 
l7I Boyle and Hadden, p. 65. 
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1. Growth. 
Table 4-1 illustrates the environmenal effects and outcomes for the major 
organizations within the Catholic community. Initial PIRA advantage in the chaotic period 
of 1969 to 1972 resulted in rapid growth. From 1972 to 1981, PIRA lost much of its 
strength and was reduced to a small group of survivors. The SDLP underwent a period of 
High 
Low 
Catholics I Potential I Space I Presence I Structure 
Urban association 



























































































ture and Ou 
Outcome Remarks 
Catholic -+- Growth Stagnant activation 
bmes. 
growth, then stabilized its support base. Working class Catholics favored the PIRA and 
remained unorganized until the hunger strikes. From 1981 to 1986, Sinn Fein grew as it 
mobilized the Catholic working class and then it stabilized. From 1986 to 1995, the SDLP 
and Sinn Fein have maintained their support bases with no significant changes. The 
Catholic community is fully mobilized within the existing environment. 
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a. PIRA Advantage Over NICRA, 1969 to 1972. 
The period from 1969 to 1972 illustrated the short cycle advantage of a 
selective organization in a dynamic and violent environment. PIRA became the dominant 
organization in the Catholic community because it was able to act faster than NICRA. The 
existing army structure of PIRA incorporated new members into battalions and brigades 
gave them defined tasks. NICRA was a new organization with weak infrastructure and fell 
apart in the dynamic environment. PIRA was more successful than NICRA for the 
following reasons. 
(1) Selective organizations are more capable of rapid action than 
mobilizational organizations. NICRA redefined its goals and achieved a consensus in the 
changing environment. With known goals and methods, the PIRA mobilized new members 
right away and conducted its first violent actions in February, 197 1. NICRA reorganized 
and the nascent SDLP remained ineffective until after the UK established direct rule. 
(2) A dynamic, violent environment favors selective organizations. 
The need for self defense favored PIRA more than NICRA. PIRA offered immediate 
security while NICRA could only offer defense after negotiations, leaving members 
exposed in the interim. Established organizations have competitive advantage over new 
organizations. Even though the IRA was much smaller than NICRA, it used its existing 
and developed organizational structure to grow. NICRA spent the period from 1969 to 
197 1 creating an organizational structure. 
b. Stalemate 1972 to 1986. 
The end of Stormont was a significant decision causing short and long cycle 
effects. In the short cycle, it resolved the major Catholic demand and helped stabilize the 
environment. In the long cycle, it left a stalemate between the UK, Protestants and 
Catholics. Even though the UK had enough strength to endure, it could not win a 
militarily, nor negotiate a political solution. 
c. SDLP Stabilizes its Support. 
British moves to close the No Go areas diminished both the dynamism and 
violence in the environment. In this situation, the SDLP consolidated and grew. It has 
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maintained a fairly constant and reliable support base since1 973. Growth of the SDLP in 
itself produced no effect on the violent conflict between PIRA and the UK. Prevention of 
further conflict represents its major contribution. PIRA lost the support of most Catholics. 
It sustained enough support to continue fighting, but not enough to win. 
d. Sinn Fein Stabilizes Support. 
Between 1972 and 1975, the UK nearly destroyed PIRA. From 1975 to 
1977, it reorganized. Since 1977, it has managed to survive with under 300 active 
members. The reorganization created a vacuum in the urban, working class, Catholic 
neighborhoods that traditionally supported PIRA. Neither the SDLP nor the UK were able 
to gain any members in these areas. Yet, the new structure of PIRA left this group 
unmobilized. The results of the hunger strikes indicated the potential power of this 
unmobilized group. PIRA's selective structure was not designed to mobilize this group. 
From 198 1 to 1986, Sinn Fein reorganized as a mobilizational organization and established 
a solid support base in these Catholic neighborhoods. 
The failure of PIRA to mobilize potential supporters depicts the organizational 
nature of internal conflict. The contextual environment favored mobilization of the 
Catholic urban working class. This group possessed the greatest political and economic 
grievances in the Catholic community. Although relative deprivation and macro societal 
explanations of revolution such as that espoused by Ted Gurr and Theda Skocpol predict 
that this group would mobilize. But because of the internal organizational choice of PIRA, 
no mobilization occurred. 
The decision to form a mobilizational organization can clearly be identified as a 
response to the hunger strikes. Efforts of Adams and McGuinness to reorganize the 
organization took five years. This time period resulted from the internal organizational 
desire to avoid a schism. Organizational dynamics explain this, relative deprivation does 
172 See O'Brien, p. 42-3 on deprivation variations within the Catholic community. 
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2. UK Ulsterization Policy. 
The United Kingdom chose to 'Ulsterize' the conflict in the mid 1970s. The 
Ulsterization policy reduced the British role and increases reliance on local solutions and 
local resources. Politically, this move lowered internal domestic opposition in the UK. It 
also led to searches for a political solution and efforts to negotiate with the Republic of 
Ireland, as well as the non paramilitary Protestant and Catholic organizations. 
Ulsterization had the inadvertent effect of increasing the sectarian nature of the 
conflict. The RUC police force and UDR military force are primarily Protestant. The new 
policy placed them in the forefront of the conflict and their casualties soared. Each death 
increases Protestant resentment and desire for revenge against the Catholics. 
3. Mobilization. 
The Catholic community became mobilized during the violent period of 1969 to 
1972. Managing to mobilize its potential strength by 1973 the SDLP remains stable. 
Hunger strikes activated the mobilization potential that Sinn Fein mobilized after 1983. 
Since 1983, the Catholic community has been stable. No new increases in mobilization 
have occurred. There are still sentiment shifts but the organizational stability of the SDLP 
and Sinn Fein means that there are no large groups of Catholics which lack representation 
in existing organizations. 
The UK attempted to increase Catholic membership in the administration, police 
and military. About 10 percent of the 18,000 local security forces are Catholic. This 
means that the government has more armed Catholics than PIRA. Yet, 18,000 Catholics 
out of a population of 500,000 is minuscule. The Catholics who work for the UDR and 
RUC hide their identities and live with the fear that the PIRA will discover them. 173 The 
UK has been more successful in increasing the Catholic presence in the administration. 
The SDLP and Sinn Fein together won 160 of 566 district council seats in 1985. These two 
organizations are gaining seats with each election. They won 164 of 566 in 1989 and 177 
173 Tony Parker, May the Lord in His Mercy Be Kind to Belfast, (New York: Henry 
Holt, 1993), pp. 189-203. 
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seats of 578 in 1993.'74 The local councils determine local government jobs and housing. 
Protestants still dominate the administration, but not to the degree that they dominate the 
police and army. 
The UK failed to establish effective presence in the Catholic community. The 
social contact networks of the Catholics remain impervious to British efforts. UK presence 
is limited to heavily bunkered police, army posts and roving patrols. It relies on informants 
who are normally coerced to provide information to avoid imprisonment. The British 
demonstrated remarkable ability in gathering extensive intelligence on PIRA without 
effectively to establish a voluntary presence within Catholic social networks. This allowed 
them to increase the effectiveness in their counter organizational struggle with PIRA. 
4. Organization Efforts. 
Without Catholics in the government forces, the regime has been unable to wage 
the counter mobilization effort that proved so decisive in Malaya. The UK can not 
eliminate the potential and space of the PIRA in the Catholic working class neighborhoods 
unless they use massive force. However, the UK accommodation strategy proved an 
effective way to isolate the insurgents within their own community. Today, the SDLP 
condemns PIRA violence and its declared goal is to foster peaceful resolution of the 
conflict. 





The two previous case studies demonstrate the descriptive capabilities of the 
organizational model. This chapter attempts to show the modelk utility as a prescriptive 
tool as well. Unique to this case is the absence of substantial external intervention in the 
conflict.'75 This enhances our ability to examine the explanatory and predictive qualities 
of the model. Additionally, the contextual environment includes Islamism, a phenomenon 
which many argue makes internal conflict A review of the development of the 
conflict combined with an assessment of the current situation in Algeria demonstrates the 
utility of the organizational model. 
B. CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT. 
Algerian political, economic, and social development over the past 40 years has 
been centrally controlled by a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. Politics preceded society 
in Algeria.177 This assertion simplifies the current predicament of the Algerian government 
and its poor relationship with the people. Made up of an elite group that grows smaller 
over time, the regime's efforts to manage the population by controlling the environment 
175This is based on the absence of major physical intervention by external actors. 
Many sources indicate that France continues to provide funding and recently began 
supplying limited amounts of high-tech military hardware; in addition to funding from both 
French banks and the IMF. The FIS allegedly has received funding and limited support 
from Iran, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. 
* 7 6 M ~ ~ h  has been published in recent years citing the unique nature of internal 
conflict caused by Islamism, or political Islam. While most of this material exists in the 
popular media, some scholars have argued that Islamism adds a dynamic worth considering 
as a new phenomenon (Samuel Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations,'' Foreign Affairs, 
1992). The authors do not agree that ideology or religion exist in a causal relationship to 
internal conflict. 
'77Susan Waltz, Human Rights and Reform: Changing the face of North African 
Politics, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
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produced favorable conditions for internal conflict. A description of the contextual factors 
defines the environmental structure of the current conflict. 
1. Geography and Historical Background. 
Much like the geographical limitations of Malaya, Algeria's population of 
approximately 27 million is confined to one-fifth of the total land mass that falls within the 
state boundaries. The country is divided into two distinct geographical regions. The 
northern, urban areas are located in the mountains, valleys and plateaus of the Maghreb 
region. This area is easily geographically subdivided from east to west by terrain features. 
The south, four-fifths of the Algerian countryside, consists of unhabitable desert. 
Twentieth century Algerian history began under French colonial rule which ended 
in 1962. As early as 1908 groups formed to pressure the regime for reform. Both secular 
and Islamist organizations, although small and ineffectual, existed until they were banned 
in 1929. By the late 1930s, these groups began to grow and mobilize the population. 
Attempts by the French to accommodate the growing Algerian Nationalist movement 
failed.178 Efforts during World War I1 also failed and by the end of the war the Nationalist 
movement elicited itself in mass demonstrations and civil unrest. 179 Algerians initiated 
their war for independence against France in 1954. 
The war lasted eight years and cost the Algerians close to 250,000 dead and stripped 
the infrastructure of French bureaucrats. Establishing a new authoritarian regime, the 
National Liberation Front (FLN), struggled to consolidate power. Far from cohesive, the 
front consisted of a wide array of interests. It nearly collapsed in the first few years into 
a civil war along an urban - rural divide. Characterized by internecine violence and 
17*The Violette Plan sought to offer certain socio-economic sectors of the Algerian 
population French citizenship. It failed to become law, rejected by the Algerians. 
179This final gesture was called the "Manifesto of the Algerian People" and like the 
Violette Plan failed to impress the Algerian leadership. 
180Some estimates place the number as high as one million. 
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rivalries between various elites, the FLN survived in large part due to the role of the 
military. To complete consolidation of power, the regime integrated Islamic institutions, 
coopted the clerics by requiring certification, and screened (sometimes composed) Friday 
mosque sermons.lS1 
2. Politics. 
Algeria developed into a bureaucratic authoritarian state. The chaotic power 
struggles after independence led to an effort to consolidate power and prevent the 
development of future challenges to the regime. The regime's policies can only be 
understood in the light of an urgent need to establish and maintain control. The political 
system became selective and steadily narrowed over time. This stratified the political 
system. The ruling elites became more and more insular. At the regional and local level, 
mass populist organizations mobilized members from virtually every possible social 
connection at the work place and in local neighborhoods. In the short term, this stabilized 
the dynamism of the environment and allowed stability. In the long term, the populist 
approach created political networks interwoven throughout society. The narrowing of the 
regime elites created a growing gap between the elites and the organizations within society. 
In 1965, Houari Boumedienne assumed Algeria's highest office in a military coup. 
He understood the necessity of balancing the interests of the elite and FLN with the desires 
of the military much better than his predecessor. Algeria is not a one party state. The top 
of the political structure represented a balance between the bureaucracy, the military and 
the FLN. Boumediene shifted the power relationships in this triad by establishing the 
primacy of the military and the bureaucracy over the FLN. He placed members of the FLN 
in local and regional government positions. National power was exercised through a 
network of patronage and control within the elite hierarchy, relegating the FLN to symbolic 
roles. 
'"Hugh Roberts, "Radical Islam and the Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism: The 
Embattled Arians of Algiers," Third World Quarterly. 10(2), (April, 1988) p. 556-559. 
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Boumedienne's ambitious "Revolution Socialiste," initiated a dynamic process in 
the contextual environment. He sought to control all associations and organizations in 
society to prevent the emergence of any future challenger. Over time this activity produced 
conditions favorable for the rise of a populist movement (Islamists would eventually 
organize it). Between 1965 and 1971, the regime assaulted the private property of 
Muslims. Acquisition of public property came at the expense of the private sector. In order 
to begin the agrarian reforms and nationalization programs, Boumdedienne mobilized the 
large younger generation. He used them to challenge the traditional symbols of authority 
and the defenders of the status quo within the regime SMI. 
By mobilizing the younger generation, primarily to challenge the old guard FLN 
and entrenched elites, short cycle growth and outcomes favored the regime. Boumediene 
narrowed the membership in the top elites by mobilizing new social groups against the 
middle hierarchy. Structural changes included: 
(1) the mobilization of rural society and subversion of traditional centers of 
authority, (2) develop[ment oq societal condemnation of private capital, (3) 
an attempt to establish the Party as an effective instrument for political 
mobilization, in order to bring the rural and urban working sectors into the 
national political community. 182 
Under the "Revolution Sucialiste, I' Boumedienne nationalized industry and a radical 
land reform program began in rural areas. This served the political purpose of eliminating 
any potential power base in the private sector. The FLN continued efforts to keep the 
population focused on the shared experience of the war of independence. The ultimate goal 
of the FLN was to reinforce the identity of the Algerian nation-state. Efforts to cultivate 
a national identity became paramount as the Algerian culture underwent severe strain 
caused by forced modernization. According to Hugh Roberts, 
The mobilization of rural society ...[ was] a process which involved the 
subverting of tribal and kinship structures and the elimination of traditional 
centers of authority in the countryside ... It was an offensive against private 
1821bid., p. 573. 
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capital (agrarian and commercial) combined with the stigmatization of the 
'bourgeois tendencies' of the new middle class. Is3  
The impositions of the radical ideas of Boumedienne on the traditional communities in 
Algeria led to a "climate of unremitting tension, and to a degree of political and ideological 
polarization ... in Algeria without precedent''.lS4 This tension produced a situation 
unfavorable for the regime when it failed to meet expectations of the growing population. 
The regime actions against the traditional social and business leaders required the 
regime to develop a new social base to rule the state. The regime selected a secular policy 
relying on an educated bureaucracy. Education became the credentialing criteria for 
political, economic and social status. Both the military and the bureaucracy recruited from 
this support base. The FLN became a backwater to pay off the old, traditional supporters 
of the regime. 
From independence to the elections of 1990, the military maintained a low profile, 
working behind the scenes to control the elites. To avoid implication for occasional violent 
repression, the military employed a paramilitary organization to stop rioting in the 1970s 
and 1980~."~ The power of the military can be seen in the periods of leadership transitions. 
Although the FLN selected candidates, until 199 1 the military influence in the decision was 
critical. 
lS3Ibid., p. 573-574. 
lS4Ibid., idem. 
'85Eur~pa Publications Limited, 1995, 41 st Ed., (London: Staples Printers 
Rochester Limited, 1995)~. 265. Human rights associations were illegal. The leaders of 
the Algerian League of Human Rights (ALHR) and the Sons of Chouhada were arrested 
in 1985. Clashes between the government and human rights organizations occurred 
regularly through the 1980s. 
lS6Waltz, Human Rights, pp. 86-87. Waltz points out that the military is generally 
designed as an institution for coopting potential opposition more than promoting the 
military as a body. 
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3. Economics. 
According to Spencer, "revolutionary socialism in Algeria . . . was as much a 
political as economic response to the fragmentation of ~ociety".''~ Understanding the 
regime as the patron of the people depicts the crucial role of the political economy of 
Algeria. Economic policy was driven by political concerns. This emphasis on control in 
the short cycle creating serious problems for both state and society in the long cycle. 
Boumedienne's patronage and control leadership methods hindered his attempts to 
diversify capital intensive industrial development. By focusing on capital-intensive heavy 
industry, little funding remained to support labor intensive business which increased 
unemployment.188 State projects employed the large technocracy. Boumedeinne feared 
that diverting funds from state projects might cause a negative reaction among the 
technocracy. He relied on their loyalty to administer his reforms. These polices eliminated 
the private sector and established the bureaucracy as the dominant political and economic 
force. 
Failure to diversifl resulted in major economic problems, particularly in agriculture. 
Export-led growth aggravated structural imbalances. Algeria's traditional agricultural 
sector stagnated while the public sector failed to respond to the politically motivated 
schemes of the regime. Once able to feed its population and export a surplus, 
Boumedienne's land reform eventually destroyed Algerian agriculture. Leaving the 
destitute rural areas in search of work. A massive rural to urban migration began in the 
1970s compounding the crisis. 
The regime's unbalanced and inefficient economic policy was masked by oil 
revenues. After the 1973 oil crisis, oil wealth exploded. This allowed the regime to 
continue its economically inefficient policies to politically coopt and control society. 
lS7Claire Spencer, "The Maghreb in the 1990~~ ' '  Alephi Paper No. 274 (London: 
Brasseys IISS, 1993) pp. 15-18. 
"'Helen Chapin Metz, Algeria: A Country Study, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1994) p. 94. 
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However, it was not possible to permanently mask the growing political, economic and 
social inequalities forever. Economic problems in the 1980s forced the regime to undertake 
limited reforms. 
Following Boumedienne in 1980s, Bendjedid Chadli's two five-year plans focused 
on diversification and constituted a break with Boumedienne's strict central control. 
Attempting to reverse the dismal performance of the agricultural sector, Chadli focused 
more on this sector from 1985-1989. By 1987, Chadli's liberal approach was manifested 
in the abolition of the Ministry of Planning. His final Five-Year Plan further reduced the 
role of the government in economic planning. This relatively decentralized approach 
constituted a major break with the trends of the first 20 years of the Republic. 
4. Social Factors. 
Major social divisions, although a historical feature of Algeria, are not ethnic or 
religious as they were in the Malayan and Irish case studies.lg9 The primary vertical 
cleavage in society lay between the ruling elites and the remainder of the population. 
Although division between the lower socio-economic strata and the educated, middle and 
business classes exist these are not impermeable barriers. Local associations and 
community organizations exhibit the strongest commitment from members. Many of these 
groups overlap. Ethnic and class divisions are not as wide or as deep as in the other case 
studies. Only the barriers between the elite and the general population constitute a 
significant permanent structural separation. 
In addition to these vertical cleavages, horizontal divisions in society exist. A rural- 
urban split developed during last 30 years, due largely to the failure of economic 
'89Azzenine Layachi, "Algeria: Reinstating the State or Instating a Civil Society?" 
in Collapsed States: The Disintemation and Restoration of Lepitimate Authority, (Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995) p. 174. The state controlled all official mosques. 
Unoflicial mosques began to form in the late 1970s as small groups of Islamists organized 
to meet the requirements of the growing urban population and to attempt to begin to 
mobilize support. Only a very minuscule portion of Algeria are non-Muslims. 
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development combined with the growing pop~lation. '~~ Algeria's population growth is one 
of the highest in the world. Unemployment rose with the simultaneous failure of labor 
intensive industry and agriculture. Compounding the volatility of this shift is the growing 
number of Algerians under the age of 30.19' 
Long a smoldering issue in Algerian history, the conflict over the official Algerian 
languages continues to exacerbate any political issue involving the Berber population, 
particularly in the Kabyle province. Berbers constitute approximately 20 percent of the 
population and demand acceptance of the traditional Berber language. Although the Berber 
community reflects the fragmented nature of the rest of Algeria, most Berbers unite on this 
issue. At a minimum, Berbers favor maintaining French rather than adopting a purely 
Arabic state. Arabophones, particularly the Islamists, threaten to place the Berbers at 
disadvantage in the society by advocating an Arabic-only national language. 
State education is taught in Arabic while the most prestigious professions and 
graduate schools teach in French. Children of the state elites occupy most vacancies in 
these schools ahead of their Arabic schooled peers. The disadvantage of not learning 
Arabic limits the capability of the non-elites to compete for the best state jobs. Language 
equals future ~pportunity. '~~ 
'90Bennoune (1 988), Between 1967 and 1979, 1.3 million Algerians moved from 
the countryside to the cities. 
'91Susan Morgan, "A Little Late in the Day," The Middle East, (June, 1994) p. 29. 
This is a good article to reference for details on Algeria's economic situation from 1993- 
1994. Morgan also provides compelling evidence on the demographic problem and how 
it affected the work force. "...only six million out of a population of over 27 million are 
potentially economically active." 
'92Ali El Kenz, Algerian Reflections on the Arab Crises, (Austin: University of 
Texas, 1991) p. 13. Disparity in language and position led to the current situation 
described by this source where, "French-speaking engineers and Arabic-speaking 
ideologues" must cooperate. Francois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement 
in North Africa, (Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, UT at Austin, 1993) p. 257. 
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The contextual environment at this point was characterized by low mobilization 
potential and no mobilization space for opposition movements. Under Boumedienne, 
cultural monolithism followed the strictly controlled political and economic program. Riots 
and other brief forms of civil unrest occurred but these cases represented unorganized, local 
protests easily contained by the regime. With little potential and no space or presence, 
opposition organizations did not appear until 1982. 
5. Contextual Dynamics. 
The contextual environment of Algeria created unstable conditions for the regime. 
Characterized by a selective structure, the political system offered little space for political 
participation or expression. The circle of ruling elites grew smaller and more exclusive.193 
Reduction in political opportunity occurred as the urban middle and lower sectors of the 
population grew. Meanwhile, the urban and rural economies performed dismally, 
amplifying the vertical and horizontal cleavages. Over the long cycle, these factors created 
a contextual environment that directly contradicted the needs of the task environment. 
Change to the contextual environment eventually occurred as a result of regime actions. 
These actions, however, compounded the existing problems because they contradicted the 
structure of the society and regime. 
C. TASK ENVIRONMENT. 
Algeria’s task environment was dominated by the regime effort to use populist 
organizations to capture all possible mobilization potential and space in society. The 
proliferation of organizations led to government penetration into all aspects of political, 
economic and social life. The regime was capable of sustaining this effort through the 
1970s due to oil revenue. In the 1980s, declining government income reduced the state’s 
ability to pay for organizational dominance in the task environment. 
‘93Todd Shields, “The Battle of Algeria: A Wary World Watches as Muslim 
Radicals Take Aim at Strategic Arab Nation,” U.S. News and World Report, 117(8), 
(August 22, 1994) pp. 44-47. 
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Algeria’s task environment reached it’s highest level of stability during the 1 9 7 0 ~ ’ ~ ~  
The FLN dominated government at all levels. Most believed in the FLN as the shrine of 
revolutionary nationalist values. Islam, the state religion remained a stabilizing fixture of 
the society. A few riots protesting specific actions or policies of the regime produced 
negligible effects. Popular support for the government remained high until various internal 
and external factors combined in the middle 1980s making it difficult for the government 
to continue dolling out food, housing and medical care.’95 
Then, as Chadli’s liberal economic policies began to impact the contextual 
environment, mobilization potential and mobilization space increased. 196 Chadli’s 
economic liberalization altered the mechanism designed to maintain political control over 
the population. Government presence declined and mobilization space opened. This new 
policy started an unanticipated systemic reaction in the task environment. This increase in 
munificence and dynamism led to the formation and growth of new political organizations. 
The selective organizational structure of the regime failed to establish effective presence 
at the local levels. Consequently, the absence of local level organizational structures 
impaired the regime’s ability to test ~ea1ity.l~~ 
‘94Layachi, “Algeria: Reinstating the State,’’ p. 175. “AS long as the state 
continued to perform it’s distributive function . . . opposition could hardly gather support 
by attacking the social and economic policies of the regime.” 
‘95Francois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa, 
(UT at Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1993) p. 86. 
‘96Lohouari Addi, “The Islamist Challenge: Religion and Modernity in Algeria,” 
Journal of Democracy, 3(4), (October, 1992) p. 77. In the 1980s, authoritarian models of 
economic development failed, precipitating the decline of the regime and the decision to 
turn toward more liberal policies. The authors note that this turn was required to ensure 
IMF assistance. 
197 An organization’s systemic viewpoint influences what factors it reacts to that 
drive organizational action and change. See Huse and Bowditch, pp. 3 10-3 12. 
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1. Origins of Conflict. 
Failure of Boumedienne's plans left a disenfranchised young generation and former 
opponents poised against the traditional structure of society. Coalitions between these two 
large sectors of society began to develop in 1979. With sharp divisions between the 
Boumedienne's successor and the elites beginning to manifest themselves in society, the 
dynamism and complexity of the environment increased. According to Tarrow, 
the most salient changes in opportunity structure (mobilization potential and 
mobilization space) are: (1)opening participation, (2) shifts in the ruling 
elites, (3) availability of influential allies, and (4) growing cleavages within 
the ruling elites.19' 
Algeria in the 1980s, met all four of these Tarrow's criteria. 
Counter regime organizations flourished under Chadli's injtah. Economic 
liberalization created a dynamic environment exceeding the capability of government 
control and increasing mobilization potential. The associated simultaneous withdraw of 
government presence in the cities and rural areas provided an unprecedented opportunity 
for political entrepreneurs. The Islamists filled the political vacuum created by the regime's 
declining support base. Regime decisions during this period represent one error producing 
an unfavorable systemic reaction, followed by another inappropriate decision. The long 
term dynamic produced a spiral away from regime control. 
2. Regime. 
The regime's authoritarian control, selective structure, and one-party dominance of 
politics continued, in spite of increasing munificence and dynamism in the task 
environment. Internally, the ruling elites competed for control and influence of the 
dwindling resources available to the regime. 199 This upset the established patronage 
'98Sydney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements. Collective Action, and 
Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 86. 
199Waltz, Human Rights, p. 90. Five distinct factions emerged in the middle 1980s. 
135 
networks. These developments placed massive internal strain on the regime SMI.200 As in 
the Irish case (see Chapter IV), the Algerian government structure prevented any long term 
analysis of its policies and led to short cycle decisions. 
Bureaucratic politics in the regime were balanced between the bureaucracy, military 
and FLN. The rise of the state controlled economy shifted power towards the bureaucrats 
and away from the FLN. The economic crisis led to elaborate economic plans that required 
high technocratic expertise. Chadli’s efforts to rule were constrained by the political rivalry 
between the rising technocrats and declining FLN. A compromise reached in the early 
1980s left him with control of economic policies while the FLN and military handled 
political and institutional issues. The FLN’s public visibility grew very strong during this 
same period, setting it up to take the blame for conditions that led to rioting in 1988.201 
Ultimately, this would lead to the FLN’s demise. 
The new middle business, bureaucratic and technocratic sectors relied on state 
projects for work and funding. But efforts to open the economy also threatened their 
security. This educated, middle sector of society sought greater autonomy in the political 
sphere and opposed liberal economic reforms that threatened to end the state patronage. 
This government apparatus accustomed to the patronage of the elites began to feel 
threatened. As a result, continued efforts to conceal the cleavages in the government no 
longer succeeded. The business sector began funding the nascent Islamist movement as a 
reaction to government activity. 
a. Front for National Liberation .(FLN). 
A front organization, not a political party, the FLN was characterized by 
disunity and multiple factions. The concentration of power in the FLN required that a 
group or coalition gain leverage over the leaders of the various districts of Algeria. The 
2ooJohn P.Entelis, “Political Islam in Algeria: The Nonviolent Dimension,” Current 
History, 94 (January, 1995) p. 15. Elite groups long accustomed to living on the benefits 
of the state were reluctant to surrender economic and social privileges. 
201Layachi, “Algeria: Reinstating the State,” p. 176. 
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elites administering these wilayas made no efforts to mobilize their constituents or recruit 
outside the elite networks. 
Normal dynamics within the FLN were zero-sum. Unable to develop a mechanism 
for compromise, the factions within the Front shifted back and forth in order to prevent any 
one coalition from dominating the organization. Ironically, the political culture of this 
organization, and arguably for the rest of the country, stressed unity but it was rarely 
manifested in behavior. The underlying ideology of the elite is egalitarianism. A coalition 
that begins to assume a dominant role often triggers a balancing coalition. Ruling factions 
often resorted to coercive tactics. At times assassination of internal opponents occurred in 
order for competing groups to maintain the balance of power.2o2 
The FLNs inherent problem with growth improved under Boumedienne, but 
remained deficient given the absence of competition and large potential. Having observed 
the poor performance of recruiting new members, he took control of the FLN apparatus 
himself. In 1977, he appointed Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui (apagsiste, member of the 
former Communist faction of the FLN), as head of the National Assembly. During his 
three year tenure, party worker strength rose from 5,000 to 15,000. This is also the period 
that the PAGS was given tacit control over the mass organizations, particularly the workers 
unions. But these groups were not cohesive. 
Boumediene’s death led to the dominance of the bureaucrats over the FLN. 
Benjedid Chadli came to power as a result of the military influence in the Fourth Congress 
held in January, 1979. Chadli consolidated his position by purging the Central Committee 
of all opponents.203 Chadli repesented an alliance of the technocrats and the military 
against the FLN. The FLN generally supported Chadli and his “consumption-oriented” 
202Waltz, Human Rights, p. 85-87. Waltz gives a very thorough explanation of the 
dynamic underlying the FLN. 
203Chadli fired all of Boumedienne’s cronies. Removal of Yahiaoui caused major 
consternation amongst followers of the late Boumedienne. Chadli’s appointment and 
subsequent dismantling of the failed Revolution Socialiste served as a catalyst for the 
coalition between Islamists and the urban peasantry. 
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economic ideals until 1985. Efforts to alter the National Charter to reflect the milder 
economic approach renewed regime in-fighting. The “enrichedtt National Charter was 
approved following the Fifth National Congress held in 1985. Growing tension and 
resentment formed in the FLN as their former influence and power waned. 
Although characterized by chronic divisions, the FLN’s greatest split occurred in 
the early 1990s over support for the regime. It developed a bicephalous leadership defined 
by the separation between ‘conciliators’ and ‘eradicators’. The conciliators favored 
Chadli’s moderate, accommodative strategy for dealing with the rising Islamist opposition. 
Eradicators pressed the regime for massive repression to terminate what was viewed as a 
serious threat to the elite. An identical split developed in the FIS when it formed, 
demonstrating the balancing dynamics of social movements. 
The divisions within the FLN represent a reaction to the waning power of the FLN 
relative to the bureaucrats. The internal divisions within the regime SMI became the 
dominant factor in determining the behavior of the regime. Having eliminated, suppressed 
or coopted all organizational opposition, the regime based its behavior on the need to 
control its own SMI. This led to the rise of new associations and organizations within 
society unobserved by the regime focused on its internal short cycle rivalries. 
2. Counter Regime. 
Prior to 1989, opposition organizations formed from FLN splinter groups. 
With links to the FLN, these groups did present a considerable political threat to the 
regime. In the late 1970s’ small grassroots Islamist groups began to form. Lack of 
potential and space prevented them fiom growing very large. These groups generally 
confined themselves to the new associational base that formed in the poor suburb 
neighborhoods of Algiers and Blida. Opening of the economic sphere created a dynamic 
that also loosened the regime’s political and social control over the population. This 
dynamic continued through the 1980s providing space for counter regime organizations to 
develop and grow. 
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a. Secular Opposition. 
Early secular counter regime organizations suffered from disunity and 
incoherent platforms like the FLN.204 They also failed to establish presence and reflected 
similar symptoms of elitism that continues to dominate Algerian politics. Waltz sights 
evidence of this flaw. In the early years, neither the FFS nor the PRS attempted to respond 
to potential constituents needs or articulation of their demands.205 Repression from the 
regime also constrained these organizations. The regime controlled space so that these 
mobilizational organizations had little room to grow. The regime coopted or repressed the 
leaders of any group that appeared viable. 
(1) Party of the Socialist Revolution (PRS). Organized in 1962, this 
group was led by Mohammed Boudiaf. Characterized by an selective organizational 
structure with a strict hierarchy, it failed to grow.2o6 Following their release from Algerian 
jails, the leaders resided in Paris and directed operations in absentsia. In 1968, members 
located in Algeria openly challenged this organizational structure and were ejected from 
the group. There after PRS membership declined and the organization died. 
(2) Front of Socialist Forces (FFS). Organized in 1963, this Berber- 
based group challenged the regime as illegitimate and called for rehabilitation of the 
compromised revolution. Unlike the PRS, the FFS suffered from a lack of organization. 
According to Waltz, the leadership discouraged development of an organizational structure, 
encouraging members to fight within the frameworks of existing organizations. This 
demonstrates the institutionalized nature of the local association. National level 
organizations appear to represent foreign concepts to Algerians. Throughout the sixties the 
204The authors use “secular” to refer to any counter regime or political organizations 
that exist outside the Islamist movement. This is an effort to simplify the discussion. Some 
analysts argue that the FIS is genuinely secular. The authors agree with this assessment but 
wish to differentiate between those who use Islam as an ideological front and those who 
do not. 
2051bid., p.95. 
2061bid., p. 95. 
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FFS used terrorism and other forms of political violence against the regime. After suffering 
decisive losses in open confrontation with government forces, Ait Ahmed escaped into 
exile and the organization went underground.207 It resurfaced in 1989 when space 
reopened. 
(3) Avant - Garde Socialist Party (PAGS). The only political 
organization allowed to exist along with the FLN, the PAGS was formed the 1970s. 
Boumediene managed to coopt the Communist Party of Algeria (PCA) in 1966. After 
reorganizing, People’s Communist Party of Algeria (PCA) became the PAGS. 
Boumedeinne used this organization to infiltrate the workers unions. Although it became 
a counter regime organization when Chadli Bendjedid dismissed Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui 
from the FLN leadership, the PAGS continued to maintain connections with selected elites 
within the FLN and regime. 
b. Islamists. 
This movement emerged in the early 1980s. The presence of this new 
movement was felt in the suburban neighborhood mosques and the universities. Members 
of these small, autonomous groups espoused social and cultural reforms by handing out 
tracts to individuals. 
The Islamist movement formed in the only space not closed by the regime. An 
Islamic country could not directly repress Islam. Indirectly, the regime funded mosques, 
certified imams and censored the Friday sermons. Nevertheless, the demographic explosion 
in the cities led to the development of small, adhoc mosques located in apartments and 
garages outside of state control. These new, local mosques formed the space that allowed 
regime opponents to use to organize. University students founded and ran the mosques, 
supported by funds from a disenchanted business and middle class. The mosques started 
local charity programs that tied together the students, businessmen and the urban poor. 
Initial indications of the growing strength of the Islamists surfaced after the police 
arrested Islamists following a clash between Islamist and Berber university students. The 
2071bid., p. 96. 
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arrests triggered a protest march of 5,000 Islamist sympathizers. A 14-point document 
demanding government reform was rejected by the regime. 
After a decade of gradual development, the Islamist movement represented about 
2,000 mosques located in cities and towns throughout the country. Each mosque 
represented an alliance of local elements of the community. There was no regional or 
national infrastructure to the movement due to regime opposition. The movement was 
based around political and economic reforms with Islam representing a moral code lacking 
in a secular, corrupt regime. 
(1) Armed Islamic Movement. The first Islamic political 
organization, it represented a radical, violent fringe. From 1982-1 987, Armed Islamic 
Movement (MIA), led by Mustafa Bouyali, began employing guerrilla forces against the 
regime. Using a selective framework, this group was organized into 16 cells across 
Algeria. Members came from all social backgrounds, most were educated and employed 
by the state. A small organization that experienced little growth, it disintegrated with 
Bouyali's death in 1987. This group received considerable clandestine support from the 
military and former FLN revolutionaries in the region of MIA operations. Elite power 
struggles were beginning to spread into the open. The jailed leaders reappeared a few years 
later to assume leadership positions in the FIS.'" 
(2) Islamic Salvation Front(F1S). Following the riots in 1988, Abbas 
Madani, a professor of sociology, announced the creation of the FIS. The two leaders of 
the broad Islamist movement, Ahmed Sahnoun and Mahfoudh Nahnah thought Madani's 
move ill-advised. But Madani, an experienced politician proceeded with developing the 
organization. In 1989, the FIS mobilized the neighborhood mosques in less than six 
months. The organizational development of the Islamist movement over the previous 12 
years produced impressive results. The number of mosques increased from 2,000 to 
208Frank Tachau, Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa, (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1994) p. 47. 
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10,000.209 As local mosques were mobilized, the message of the FIS went out to the large, 
diverse, disenfranchised sectors of the population. The FIS represented the first grassroots 
support political organization in the 30 year history of the Algerian Republic. Local 
associations were mobilized in support of a national organization. The mobilization 
potential that had developed in the 1980s acquired mobilizational space in 1988 which it 
rapidly filled. The rapid growth was caused by an extensive organizational presence in over 
2,000 local mosques. 
In less than two years the FIS built a capable political organization. According to 
George Joffe, 
By . . . June 1990, the FIS had created a five-level national 
organization. At the national level was the Bureau ExecutifNationaZ or 
MajiZs ash-Shura to which were linked five commissions responsible for 
organization, education, social affairs, planning and information. This 
structure was replicated at the provincial (walaya) level and at the 
communal level. Within each commune, a number of mosques were 
grouped together to form the fourth level and, around each mosque, were 
gathered a number of neighborhoods (quartiers). In each neighborhood was 
the fifth organizational level, the comite de quartier. Authority was 
delegated down the chain of command , and at its apex, above the Majils 
ash-Shura stood . . . Madani and Benhadj.210 
Tachauk analysis claims that actions at the lowest level were dictated from above. Madani 
appointed himself as the sole official spokesman for the organization. 
FIS drew its support from virtually all the disenchanted members of Algerian 
society. Members, supporters and sympathizers included highly educated technicians and 
students primarily from science and technical backgrounds. The non state controlled sector 
of the economy provided strong support, especially from parts of the private commercial 
sector and the members of the black market. These two private business groups provided 
209George Joffe, "Algeria: The Failure of Dialogue," in The Middle East and North 
Africa, 41st ed., (Europa Publications Ltd., 1995) p. 6 .  
210 Ibid., p. 6 .  Tachau, Political Parties, p. 41. Bureau ExecutifNationaZ consisted 
of 30 to 40 members. This was the decision making body and kept secret until the demise 
of the organization in 1992. 
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the bulk of the funding for the FIS. Most important to the FIS, however, was the massive 
mobilization base consisting of unemployed, marginalized, young males.21 
The FIS emphasized seizure of political power as a prerequisite to reform society. 
This type of appeal reflects the elitist bent in the leadership of the FIS and appeared similar 
to the rhetoric of the old FLN. A populist approach with little intellectual content produced 
an ambiguous image favorable for rapid growth. It’s great mobilizational power created 
growth but the large, open organizational structure fostered a politically heterogeneous 
group with lower commitment to the organization, than a more selective structure. The 
major division that developed within the FIS reflected that of the regime. One side 
favoring Madani’s moderate philosophy of conciliation with the regime. The other side 
demanded total elimination of the regime and fell under the influence of Ali Benhadj. 
(3) The Armed Islamic Organizations. The imprisonment of the 
Islamist Front leadership and repression of the movement, in 1992, changed the task 
environment. Security and organization survival became the dominant goal for counter 
regime groups formerly part of the FIS coalition. The only groups to survive 
organizationally switched to closed, selective structures. The Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) received most of the attention in press reports and analysis of the massive increase 
in violence. GIA’s base of support was regional centered on Algiers and the area extending 
to Blida. Limited expansion occurred in 1993, when the GIA formed a coalition with two 
other groups regionally based around Sidi Be1 Abbes and Jige1.212 Strength of the GIA in 
1995 was estimated as less than 5,000. 
The other major armed group formed based on old networks associated with 
Bouyali’s Armed Islamic Movement (MIA). According to Joffe, the MIA’s better, more 
2111bid., pp. 42-43. 
212Joffe, “Algeria: The Failure,” p. 1 1. 
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experienced leadership has avoided capture and the appearance of indiscriminant targeting. 
Oran appears to represent it’s center of support, including the hinterland behind K a b ~ l i a . ~ ’ ~  
However, the Western tendency to view former FIS as a homogeneous organization 
distorts reality. Some analysts project that at one point in time over 600 groups with less 
than 12 members conducted independent acts of violence. How many of these groups 
remain viable is unknown. The dynamism created by the sheer number of local 
organizations that operate on their own increases the complexity within the Islamist SMl2I4 
d. Organizational Dynamics. 
The contextual and task environment favored the growth of the Islamist 
Movement in the 1980s. Although the FLN possessed the resource advantage in the same 
period, the leadership refused to alter its organizational structure to accommodate the 
Islamists. The secular opposition suffered from the same elitist structure that characterized 
the FLN. It was unable to establish presence and activate ties with local associational 
networks which reinforced organizational inflexibility. 
The Islamist movement grew at the grass roots and developed independent, local- 
level organizations. Initially able to adapt to the absence of space, they focused on 
organizational maintenance functions such as survival and commitment. When space 
opened these groups responded by recruiting new members and developing ties between 
local groups. Experienced leaders (formerly associated with the established elites) built an 
organizational structure to link the local groups into a national organization. Possessing a 
much broader base, the FIS marginalized the secular opposition. 
2131bid., idem. 
214James Bruce, “Arab Veterans of the Afghan War,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 
7(4), (April, 1995) p. 175. The GIA area of operations appears to be the cities. Some of 
it’s leaders are Afghan veterans. The MIA although active around the western cities also 
has a more rural base. 
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3. Society. 
The regime's policies led to the alienation of society. The steady narrowing of 
power within the state elites pushed the regime's own populist organizations into 
opposition. Algeria is a self created problem. The regime shaped and nurtured the 
contextual environment in an unanticipated direction. The state economic policies ruined 
the old agricultural base of society, led to a huge population shift from rural areas to urban 
areas, created mass unemployment and education policies created an intellectual group with 
no hope of employment. Socially, the regime alienated the rural traditional leaders, the 
Berbers and the urban Islamists. 
The mobilization of society that began as a result of Boumediene's socialist agenda, 
combined with efforts of the FLN began to produce social movements in the 1980s. Riots 
and protests occurred more frequently. The political activism of the general population was 
an unprecedented phenomenon for the regime. Far from the previous trend of unrest caused 
by specific issues, all sectors of society began to ask questions about the governing ability 
of the ruling elites. 
Since the failure of Boumedienne's reforms, discontent increased in all sectors of 
society. The economy failed and with its stagnation, the regime became a despised 
institution for the first time.215 Openings in society resulting from Chadli's policies 
provided opportunity for the public to express their dissatisfaction. Algerian society 
contained many local associations opposed to the regime. Regime actions had prevented 
any organizations to develop in this space, but the initial success of FIS shows the high 
potential of any organization that can overcome the problem of mobilizational space. 
D. INTERACTION. 
The conflict in Algeria went through three phases leading up to the current situation. 
From 1988 to 1990, the Islamist and secular opposition organizations competed with each 
other in open mobilizational space. The FIS was the most successful organization, 
*I5Most analysts credit the exposure of massive government corruption as a cause 
for increasing the emotional, moral indignation of the society. 
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mobilizing massive bases of support. Regime groups lacked presence and mobilization 
potential, therein failing to conduct an effective counter mobilization effort. 
The second phase saw the initial electoral success of the FIS in June, 1990 until the 
government crackdown in January, 1992. The regime was caught by surprise by the FIS 
challenge. This led to internal power struggles and organizational change within the regime. 
During the 18 months it took the regime to formulate a response, the FIS grew rapidly and 
decisively won the 199 1 national elections. 
The regime closed political space and sought to reestablish its control during the 
third phase from 1992 to 1995. The military intervened to control both the regime and FIS. 
Government repression allowed the regime has dominated the environment but led to an 
active and widespread insurgency. New selective organizations arose in the Islamist SMI 
and the violent tactics of the GIA and other groups have polarized the task environment. 
By closing political space and establishing a low level presence in the suburbs of 
the major cities, the military stalled the growth of the Islamist opposition. Regime presence 
constituted by the military is limited to physical presence. Penetration and accommodation 
of social networks at the local level has not occurred.216 Absence of an effective political 
apparatus prevents this from developing. The FIS, severely damaged by the regime 
crackdown, attempted to control the fragments of it’s former organization. A clear break 
between the FIS leadership and the MIA occurred in 1993.217 
The internal war between the military and the GIA and MIA obscures the 
preferences and actions of society. Several demonstrations, many in Kabylia, protested the 
216Juan Goytisolo, “Algeria in the Eye of the Storm,” New Statesman and Society, 
7(3 16), (August 19, 1994) pp. 22-28. Goytisolo describes a visit to Algiers and Blida, an 
area contested by the GIA. Army units and paramilitary groups exist openly in during the 
day but once inside the cities, locals indicated that the influence of the GIA and other 
groups rule the night. 
217Joffe, “Algeria: The Failure,” p. 13. The FIS’s hold over the clandestine 
organizations weakened and a split placed the GIA and MIA in conflict. The GIA killed 
66 MIA militants as a symbolic warning to avoid agreeing to negotiate with the regime. 
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use of violence and condemned negotiations with the terrorists. Measuring the position of 
the general population is difficult at best. However, in 1993, 100,000 to 1.5 million people 
entered the streets to demand an end to the The violence continued and several 
attempts to negotiate failed to produce more than an wider gulf between the parties. 
1. Organizational Development 1979 - 1987. 
One of the most important decisions made by the regime occurred when Chadli 
began rescinding the strict policies of Boumedienne, without tailoring the political structure 
of the regime to meet the demands of the environment. 
Pressured by internal and external economic and political 
constraints, and by the domestic failure of the development strategy, the 
new regime made several decisions that, together, constituted a sudden 
retreat, or disengagement, of the state, not only from the economic sphere 
but also from the political and social control it once held. Faced with 
opposition on both sides of the ideological spectrum, left and right, within 
the FLN and military, Chadli Bendjedid attempted, while guaranteeing a 
minimum of social and economic benefits to the most impoverished . . . to 
do away with Boumedienne holdovers in the party [FLN].2’9 
Hugh Robert’s assessment supports Layachi. Contrary to the past policy that created a 
centripetal dynamic “which enabled the state to keep a grip on all the various currents in 
the society,”22o Chadli’s policies created a centrifugal dynamic. Failure to replace the old 
FLN ideology with a new one, designed to mobilize and unify the public in support of 
economic liberalization, left society to create its own. “The state lost the capacity to 
capture and canalize the various ideological tendencies and currents in the society.” 
The economic failure of the state led to crisis in 1988. Two developments explain 
the outcome of the state and society interactions in 1988. The first is the internal rivalry 
between the bureaucracy, military and FLN. The technocrats attempted to use the economic 
2181bid., p. 272. 
219Layachi, “Algeria: Reinstating the State,” p. 180. 
220Hugh Roberts, “The Algerian State and the Challenge of Democracy,” 
Government and Opposition, (1 992) p. 448. 
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crisis to replace the existing leadership while also establishing control over the military and 
the FLN. The technocrats believed that an opening of the political system would favor their 
looser, more inclusive structure over the selective military and FLN. While this is true 
within the regime SMI, it overlooked the fact that most of society had been excluded from 
the regime and formed a new society SMI. The focus on their own internal struggle in the 
task environment caused the technocrats to overlook the changes in the contextual 
environment. 
2. First Phase: Open Space, 1988 - 1990. 
a. Crisis of 1988. 
The combined explanations of Entelis and Roberts a compelling argument 
for the causes of the crisis in 1 988.221 Layachi calls the riots and associated malaise of 1988 
a deep crisis in the authority of the state.222 Having opened space and withdrawn its 
presence, the regime faced a disgruntled population ripe for mobilization. Failing to either 
recognize this dynamic or react to it with changes in structure, the regime was presented 
with a situation requiring major concessions or massive repression. Ironically, the regime 
chose the later followed by the former. It would repeat this contradictory policy following 
the annulment of the 199 1 elections. 
(1) Society. Bigger and more disruptive than ever before, thousands 
of young people took to the streets to protest the failure of the regime in meeting the needs 
of society, such as the lack of: housing, affordable food, employment opportunities, health 
care, and education. These material grievances were combined with the protest against the 
22'John P. Entelis, "Political Islam in Algeria: The Nonviolent Dimension," Current 
History, 94 (January, 1995) p. 14. Entelis says riots began as a result of material 
grievances. Hugh Roberts, "Radical Islam and the Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism: The 
Embattled Arians of Algiers," Third World Quarterly 10(2), (April, 1988) pp. 556-589. 
Roberts argues that the overwhelming majority of people rioted to protest the government's 
legitimacy. He notes that the riots ended with no material concessions from the regime. 
222Layachi, "Algeria: Reinstating the State," p. 176. Supports Roberts assertion 
that the regime's very existence was the heart of the protest leading to the riots. 
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government as a institution. Ultimately, these issues transformed Islamism into a broad 
based political movement.223 
It is important to note that the Islamists did not start or lead the rioting. The riots 
were initiated by a series of workers strikes centered around the industrial areas of Algiers. 
However, Islamist representation in the protest was large. Prominent leaders of the Islamist 
movement called for restraint in speeches given to the throng but to no avail. The political 
environment after the riots in 1988 lent itself to expression, rather than the recognition of 
the grievances which had accumulated during the first 30 years of Algerian independence. 
(2) Government Response and Consequences. The regime 
responded with indiscriminate repression. The army broke with it's low profile strategy and 
intervened with tanks and heavy weapons for the first time. The large Islamist presence 
offered a distinct target for government forces. Following the violence, special military 
courts were established to prosecute those suspected of taking part in the uprising. Human 
Rights Watch estimated that hundreds of civilians died with thousands more incarcerated 
in prisons under blanket charges and no 
Repression created a consensus across the diverse opposition groups under which 
to unite against the The actions of the regime in response to the riots increased 
the mobilization potential of the general population, thereby enhancing the Islamist 
movement opportunity for growth. Chadli's decision to open more space a short period 
after the repression, further enhanced the opportunity for opposition growth. 
Chadli met with Islamist leaders, primarily because they represented the only 
homogeneous group which took part in the uprising. By meeting with Ali Benhaj, Chadli 
lent an additional air of legitimacy to the Islamist movement. The meetings caused another 
223Entelis, "Political Islam," p. 14. 
224Human Rights Watch, "Middle East," 7(5), (August, 1995) p. 1 1. Torture, long 
associated with the French, became the regime's nemesis. 
225Burgat and Dowell, The Islamic Movement, p. 270. 
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shake up within the ruling elite. The regime distanced itself from the FLN by making the 
presidency separate from the Government, answerable only to the National Assembly. 
3. Second Phase: FIS Growth and Regime Response, 1990 to 1991. 
Numerous political organizations developed during the opening that followed the 
1988 riots. A highly munificent environment organizations formed and began registering 
with the government. In an attempt to counter the growing counter regime, the regime 
sponsored two political parties in an attempt to coopt moderates in the opposition and 
isolate the radicals. These two groups remain actor in the conflict and are the Rally for 
Culture and Democracy and the HAMAS, or Islamic Society Movement. The regime 
formed the RCD as a counter balance to the resurgent FFS in Kabylia, the region dominated 
by Berbers. Mahfoud Nahnah organized HAMAS to counter the growth of radical Islam 
in the FIS.226 
a. The Regime Creates a Counter Organization. 
The regime created the Rally for Culture and Democracy in 1989 before the 
legalization of “associations of political character.” Its support base was formed by former 
members and networks associated with the defunct Berber Cultural Movement (BCM). 
Designed to play a “clientist role in the Berber region of Kabylia; the RCD conducted 
campaigns to weaken and suppress this region, or agitate it when necessary.”227 
The RCD demanded separation of religion and politics. The politicization of 
language served as a mobilizing factor for this group. By drawing on the existing Berber 
fears of the Islamist calls for Arabic as the exclusive language of the state, the RCD 
226The RCD was created by the regime and acts with but inside the opposition SMI. 
It is more accurately classified a society SMO. The HAMAS formed from within the 
counter regime SMI and constitutes a genuine SMO competitor with the former FIS SMOs. 
HAMAS members have more association with areas outside Algiers than the FIS which is 
dominated by urban groups. It’s credibility has, however, suffered for its association with 
the regime. 
227Mohand Salah Tahi, “Algeria’s Democratization Process: A Frustrated Hope,” 
Third World Quarterly 16(2), (1995) p. 206. 
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provided a small counterweight to the Islamists.228 The leadership of the RCD continuously 
played the role of speaker on behalf of a government faction or army clan and maintained 
ties with the secret service. 
b. The FIS takes Action. 
Capturing the potential and space in the aftermath of the riots, the FIS 
presence in the network of neighbor mosques became a well connected, effective machine. 
The FIS decimated the FLN in the mobilization competition that culminated with the 
elections in 1990 and 1991 .229 In June, 1990, the stunning success of the FIS in the local 
elections (See Table 5-1) threatened to permanently marginalize the FLN. One result of 
the overwhelming victory of the FIS was the founding of HAMAS. Nahnah’s goal was to 
balance the radical element of the FIS, in the event it did well in the upcoming National 
Assembly elections. 
Violent confrontations occurred between the radical wing of the FIS and the regime 
several times from July 1990 to September 1991. The FIS victory emboldened Madani and 
Benhaj. FIS leaders demanded declaration of shari’a law, electoral law changes and a 
change in the scheduled 1992 election dates to 199 1. After several deaths resulted from 
clashes between Islamists and the police, Benjedid declared a state of emergency. A large 
schism between the regime and the FIS developed that has not been bridged since 1991. 
Victory in the National Assembly first round went to the FIS (See Table 5-2). President 
Chadli began to make power sharing arrangements, then the military intervened and 
violence began.230 
228Spencer, “Algeria in Crisis,” Survival, 36 (Summer, 1994) p. 157. 
229Lah0uari Addi, “Religion and Modernity in Algeria,” Journal of Democracy, 3(4), 
(October, 1992), p. 82. Addi estimated the number of sympathizers to be in the millions 
and number of activists in the thousands with in three months of the legalization of the 
Front. 
230Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, “Algeria’s War on Itself,” Foreign 
Policy, 99, (Summer, 1995) p. 135. The regime suffered a rude awakening when their 
scheme to use the French-style winner-take-all model. They assumed they could win more 
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PRA 65,450 (0.8%) 2 (0.1%) 61 (0.5%) 
PAGS 24,190 (0.3%) 0 10 (0.1%) 
OTHERS 5,367 0 7 
Table 5-1.231 
Number of Registered Voters: 12,441,769 
Number of Votes Cast: 7,984,788 
Rate of Voter Participation: 65.2 
4. Third Phase: The Regime Closes Political Space, 1992- 1995. 
The regime, failing to win the countermobilization battle, was left with counter 
organization as the alternative. It’s choice lay between adapting the organization to the 
environment, or choosing to eradicate the opposing organization with the existing regime 
structure. The military chose the latter. 
a. The Regime Reaction to National Election Results. 
The regime failed to recognize the changes in the contextual environment. 
Failure to adapt to the environment resulted in a crisis when the election results of 
December, 1991, were announced. The military entered the politics directly after Chadli’s 
overtures to the FIS. The technocrat challenge to the military and FLN triad within the 
SMI had nearly led to the regime losing power. Although Chadli “accepted the possibility 
of sharing power with the new popular movement, the army declared itself the guardian of 
seats with this arrangement than in a popular vote. 
231Tachau, 1994, p. 35. 
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democracy and modernity . . . [and] moved directly . . . into the political arena, removing 
Chadli in 1 992.”232 The military purged the technocrats from power and sought to restore 
the status quo both within the regime SMI and in regard to the regime relationship with 
society. 
The government annulment of the election results gave the high mobilization 
potential of the FIS an additional boost. The FIS won the most seats in the parliament in 
a an election with 49 or the 64 legal parties participating (See Table 5-2). In spite of the 
election results, the regime reneged on commitment to honor free and fair elections. It 
claimed that irregularities existed in 145 districts and fed the press reports that implied 
electoral The public was not impressed with the regimes veiled attempt to disguise 
its actions. 
Algerian voter turnout was only 23.26 percent of the population of 25 million.234 
Votes in favor of the FIS dropped by one million from the 1990 elections. Regime actions 
had the counterproductive effect of increasing FIS support. The FIS produced the greatest 
growth relative to all other parties. More indicative of the decline of the regime was the 
continued loss of support of the FLN and the RCD. 
Within a few days the government formed the Haut Comitee d’Etat (HCE) and 
replaced the old judicial apparatus with the National Consultative Council (CCN). The 
CCN became the rubber stamp for the HCE’s policies and directives. 
Demanding his resignation, Chadli stepped down under pressure from the military. 
In February, 1992, the HCE declared the FIS illegal and arrested key leaders. In a pattern 
similar to the regime’s actions in 1988, the HCE offered to meet with the opposition to 
discuss potential concessions following massive repression against Islamists. 
232Tahi, Algeria’s Democratization, p. 198. 
233Human Rights Watch, p. 14. These allegations of foul play remain a point of 
disagreement in the material available for research. 












Table 5-2. Dc 
1 VOTES CONSTITUENCIES 
WITH CANDIDATE 
I SEATS WON I RUNOFFS I 
430 (100%) I 3,260,222 ~ (47.3%) 
1,612,947 
(23.4%) 
510,661 (7.4%) I 322 (75%) 
368,697 (5.3%) I 380 (88%) I I 5 (1/4) I 
309,264 (4.5%) I N/A I 6(1/5) I 
cember 26, 1991 , APN Election Results (First 
Number of Registered Voters: 13,258,554 
Number of votes cast: 7,822,625 
Rate of voter participation: 59 percent 
Blank or spoiled ballots: 924,906 
Chadli’s move in the late 1980s to by-pass the FLN by slightly altering the structure 
of the regime made the departure of the FLN from the regime SMI all but inevitable. 
Denied influence, the FLN split in two. Some of the FLN moved over to support the FIS. 
They saw the FIS as the reincarnation of the old FLN. The FIS’s populist approach 
mirrored the original FLN. When the military stepped in and declared the election results 
illegal, what remained of the formal FLN elite within the regime SMI evaporated. Addi 
called the creation of the HCS and appointment of Mohamed Boudiaf the point at which 
235Tachau, 1994, p. 26. 
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the FLN became a member of the opposition. However, some militant members supported 
the HCS. 236 
b. Space Closes and Violence Increases. 
With in six months of the military decision to annul the elections, the 
military began closing space. After declaring the FIS illegal, paramilitary units and police 
began occupying neighborhoods. Threatening to lock up or destroy illegal mosques if 
members did not comply with religious regulations. This approach did not enhance the 
regime’s image.237 With the severe increase in violence the government declared a state of 
emergency and altered the judicial system to streamline the prosecution of suspected 
terrorists. No efforts were made to begin fighting a counter mobilization battle. This 
repesented a counter organization strategy designed to wipe out the radicals and coopt the 
moderates. 
(1) The FIS Social Movement Industry Responds to Election Results. 
The FIS and other parties condemned the government decision to annul the elections. 
Annulment increased the number of FIS sympathizers and encouraged many supporters to 
condone violence.238 Confronted with the arrest of the FIS leadership and thousands of 
supporters, Islamist groups disbanded or reorganized into closed structures. Groups 
formerly under the leadership of Belhaj began a campaign of violence while regime efforts 
to meet with the leaders of the opposition were rejected. Following the collapse of the FIS 
mobilizational organization structure, mobilization potential remained high and continued 
to rise. 
The structural change within the Islamist movement occurred too slowly for many 
members. Thousands of Islamists were rounded up and imprisoned. Even moderate 
Islamist groups were forced underground by the onset of government repression. Regime 
236Lah0uari Addi, “Religion and Modernity in Algeria,” Journal of Democracy, 3(4), 
(October, 1992) p. 78. 
237George Joffe, “Algeria: Failure,” p. 1 1. 
238Entelis, “Political Islam,” p. 16. 
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sweeps of FIS controlled neighborhoods resulted in the arrest and incarceration of 
thousands of members, supporters and sympathizers. The government’s shift to a counter 
organization policy of eradication worked further isolated the regime and increased 
sympathy for the FIS. It wasn’t until the radical groups within the former FIS began using 
indiscriminate violence that popular support began to decline. 
The intense dynamism in the environment caused the Islamist coalition of 
organizations split into two independent groups: the Salafiyyists (extremists) and the 
Djarz’arists (moderates) made up of hundreds of local associations. Cleavages within the 
two groups added to the growing complexity of the task environment. They were generally 
split between degrees of conciliation or eradication. The nascent Armed Islamic Movement 
(MIA) led by Abdel Chebouti consisted of both Salafiyyists and Djarz’arists. The Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA) clearly constituted a eradicator-Salafiyyist organization.239 The GIA 
has successfully prevented the moderates from making gains, although at great cost to the 
Islamist movement. 
(2) Between eradication and conciliation, 1993-1 995. Estimates 
place the casualties of the conflict in Algeria since 1992 at over 300,000 lives.240 The 
strategy of the Zeroual regime continues to combine tough military measures intended to 
destroy the radical Islamist groups while simultaneously seeking dialogue with moderate 
Islamist organizations. Although the repression initially increased the popularity of the 
counter regime, Algerian society grew weary of the violence with in a few months. 
d. Society. 
The society perception that the violence perpetrated by both the regime and 
counter regime resulted in the appearance of vigilante groups. Two groups claimed 
239Tahi, Algeria’s Democratization, p. 2 12. 
240Graham Benton, “Current Affairs: Algeria - Killing Fields,” The Middle East, 
(February, 1995) p. 8. 
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responsibility for deaths of several Islamist leaders.241 Berbers, former members of the 
armed forces and police may comprise the militants in these groups. The potential 
development of a new faction within the military may seek to mobilize portions of the 
moderate society. The so-called “Troisieme Force”, consisting of younger, middle-ranking 
officers, feel that “the regime is compromised, whether it seeks conciliation or 
confrontation. They advocate a new initiative based on the St. Egidio declaration.242 The 
alleged support of high ranking police officials, however, limits the credibility of this 
assessment. 
E. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES. 
1. Contextual Environment. 
What little link existed between the regime and society completely dissolved as a 
result of the changes in the contextual environment. Opportunities to enhance, rather than 
destroy the vestiges of a relationship came and went. They were ignored by the inflexible, 
closed, elite organization running the country. Government rejection of the results of free 
and fair elections led to violence. The violence only increased the polarization of the 
regime and counter regime. Maximum separation between society, the regime and the 
counter regime now holds the country in a stalemate. 
a. Political Change. 
The political structure changed very little in the 35 years since 
independence. In spite of a few token reforms that offered more economic and social 
241Graham Benton, “Current Affairs: Algeria - Looking for Scapegoats,” 
Middle East, (May, 1994) p. 2 1. Two recognized anti-Islamic vigilante groups formed in 
the wake of violence: The Organisation Secrete de Sauvegarde de la Republique 
del’Algerie (OSSRA) and the Free Young Algerians (OJAL). Both claim responsibility for 
several assassinations of Islamists. 
242George Joffe, “Algeria and the Maghreb--The Future Looks Grim,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, 7(5),(May, 1995), p. 220. Pierre and Quandt, “Algeria’s War,” p. 137. 
The St. Egidio meeting occurred in January, 1995, in Italy. It was a meeting mediated by 
the Catholic Church in an effort find a solution for peace. The opposition attended the 
regime did not, declaring that it constituted meddling in affairs of a sovereign state. 
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liberty, the process for acquiring power remains unchanged. It is difficult to separate the 
economic and political factors in this case. Political power, largely established with little 
interaction with the society, existed solely on the basis of the regime's ability to buy public 
support. Efforts by the FLN to add a shroud of national unity failed miserably over the 
long term. The roots of the conflict in the 1990s are symptomatic of an impotent economic 
structure and absence of unifling identity. 
b. Economic Changes. 
Movement away from Boumedienne's socialist economy represents the only 
positive development since the founding of an independent state. Favorable changes in the 
economy, however, were offset by the dynamic political and social environments directly 
affected by the economic policy. The bankrupt revolutionary socialist programs of the 
1970s produced little in long term results. The liberalization reforms of the 1980s opened 
the private sector and helped eliminate the prevailing bias against private capital. 
Economic growth, however, failed when the world oil market prices fell. An open 
economy promised the best outcome for Algeria but stalled largely due to the declining 
living conditions of the elites. The economy today is a basket case over $26 billion in debt 
with little capability to raise revenue to pay the interest. The lingering insurgency 
continues to delay any repairs, the long cycle effects of which will endure for years after 
stability returns. 
c. Social Changes. 
The FLN's nationalist rhetoric in the early years replaced by Islamism in the 
past decade reduced some of the traditional divisions in society. Yet, the same basic 
cleavages remain: the unbridgeable canyon between the regime and the society and the 
fight over access to benefits of the state. 
The language issue is the closest characteristic to an ethnic division like those in 
Malaya or Ireland. It continues to set the French-speaking elites, technocrats and Berbers 
against the Arabists, which consist of lower socioeconomic strata and the Islamists. 
Algeria's zero-sum political culture irritates this issue. Willingness in either side to 
compromise exists in an inverse relationship with the increase in environmental dynamism. 
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2. Task Environment. 
The task environment has fundamentally and permanently changed the 
interrelationships of the regime, counter regime and society. Separation of the FLN from 
the regime and rise of the military altered the public attitude toward the government. No 
longer able to draw support from old Nationalist slogans the regime remains isolated. 
Islamist organizations exist but for the short term are experiencing little to no growth and 
appear to be stuck in a cycle of self-defeating violence. Society demonstrated it’s 
weariness for the violence of the Islamists by voting overwhelming to support Liamine 
Zeroual in the Presidential election of 1 995.243 
a. Regime. 
After fifteen years of rhetoric about the opening of society, the regime finds 
itself in a dilemma. Its policy toward the opposition, broadly defined as the society and 
counter regime organizations, contradicts stated goals. According George Joffe, the 
regime’s policy is trapped in a contradiction. 
On the one hand, it sought to persuade the Algerians that it was 
seeking to recreate the political aura of the ‘historic FLN’ and the 
Boumedienne era as a means to rally popular suppo rt... On the other hand, 
it sought [seeks] to crush and de-legitimize its opposition through 
repression which was increasingly general in its effects. Indeed, whenever 
there was a choice between dialogue or repression . . . repression was [is] 
the preferred option for the state.244 
The regime’s efforts to retain power has blocked any organizational adaptation. Regime 
polices are designed to retain power for the elites within the current organizational 
structure. This is not possible. The regime must address the problems within its SMI and 
243The authors believe that the results of the 1995 Presidential elections represent 
balancing behavior discussed in chapter 2. Dissatisfied with the regime, the electorate 
voted just as convincingly for the Islamists. Violence that ensued following the elections 
caused a negative reaction in the populace resulting in a preference for stability. This does 
not constitute renewed support for the ruling coalition. 
244Joffe, The Middle East, p. 1 1. 
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between itself and society. Repeated efforts since the 1970s on short cycle adhoc measures 
have led to a widespread and volatile crisis. 
b. Counter Regime. 
The birth of the FIS occurred in an extremely dynamic, complex and 
munificent environment. Political, economic and social characteristics of Algeria in the 
late 1980s increased mobilization potential. This was an opportune moment for the 
existing Islamist groups to recruit members and garner support. The regime decisions to 
open, and subsequently, withdraw presence created the requisite political space for the 
Islamists. 
By June 1990, the FIS five-level organization managed to develop a mobilizational- 
selective, structural hybrid to support the growth of the organization. With the favorable 
environmental changes, the flexible organizational structure worked well in the 
environment. However, this structure was vulnerable to the sudden changes in threat levels 
initiated by the regime in 1992. 
The FIS decision to grow quickly with an open organizational structure meant 
acceptance of a higher level of risk in the event the environment turned hostile. The 
divisions within the FIS demonstrate the concept that an inclusive organization is less 
cohesive and allows individuals and groups to move in and out of the organization at lower 
cost-benefit ratios. Factions moved in and out of the Front coalition. Repression and 
violence increased the dynamism of the task environment and the cost of membership in 
the Islamist groups. The surviving remnants of the FIS shifted to selective structures or 
were destroyed. 
c. Society. 
The mobilization of society in the 1970s laid the foundation for future 
conflict. Destruction of the traditional power structures resulted in new coalitions and 
associational networks. A split between the rural and urban sectors divided the society 
between supporters of the old guard FLN and the rising counter regime organizations. 
Divisions within the elites and failure of the FLN to establish effective presence caused the 
gap between the regime and society to grow. 
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The riots in 1988 completely severed the tenuous relationship between the regime 
and the people. Preference for anything other than the regime produced votes for the 
various counter regime groups in the 1990 and 1991 elections. The reaction of society to 
the acts of the regime and the Islamists since the annulled elections passed from very 
supportive of the FIS and anti-regime, to anti-regime and anti-radical Islamist. Whether 
the FIS survives depends on the ability of its leaders to distance themselves from the 
violent factions. Two years of relentless violence helped swing the society away from the 
Islamists and toward the regime in a phenomenon that may be explained as balancing 
behavior. 
The evidence indicates a significant mobilization potential for reform. The sudden 
and rapid surge for the FIS in the 1990 elections was not retained as the 1995 elections 
showed a similar surge for the regime. The lack of mobilization space in the first election 
led the population to vote for the only nation wide opposition organization. The insurgency 
led for a vote for stability. The population has shown loyalty to neither side in the conflict. 
F. ANALYSIS. 
1. Growth. 
Table 5-3 depicts the environmental effects and outcomes for the major opposition 
organizations and the regime. Although the FLN and the regime existed in a single-party 
structure it grew very little. Even at the height of the FLNs popularity in the early 1980s, 
growth was unimpressive. The fallout over the government's heavy hand in suppressing the 
riots of 1988, irreparably damaged the FLN. It's size and influence declined. The Islamist 
movement filled the void left by the fall of the FLN. Growth in the FIS organization 
occurred at unprecedented rates, peaking in early 1990. It's membership stabilized in 1991 
prior to the closing of political space in 1992. The advantage shifted back to the regime. 
a. 1962 to 1988, The Regime Monopoly. 
The environment during this period went from dynamic to stable, then 
turned extremely dynamic by 1988. In a single-party state, the advantage for growth lies 
with the regime. The Algerian government's ability to grow was limited to the number of 
technocrats accommodated by the elites. The only efforts to mobilize and recruit the 
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population existed during the 1970s. Bournedieme's program mobilized thepopulation but 
not with the goal of adding members to the organization. The selective nature of the ruling 
elites, the officer corps and FLN prevented growth. 
Opposition to the regime came from disenfranchised elites and occasional from the 
workers unions. The selective elite groups certainly wanted influence but not growth. 
Workers unions demanded settlements to grievances, not more members. However, 
belowthe surface of the dominant political and social structures, the Islamist-based, 
grassroots groups began to organize. These nascent groups existed in an environment with 
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b. 1988-1990, The FLN Falls and the FIS Rises. 
During this period the FLN organization suffered a major mobilization 
defeat. Identified by the public as the perpetrator of the policies that led to the demise of 
Boumedienne’s reforms and the establishment of economic liberalization, the FLN became 
the target of public protests. This setback in the battle between the regime SMI and society 
coincided with FLN losses within the regime SMI. As the regime opened the economic 
and political environments, the FLN became the regime’s scapegoat. The decline of FLN 
credibility offered little support for the regime’s goal to remain in control. It was forced 
out of the regime SMI. Elimination of the FLN opened additional space for the growing 
FIS organization. 
(1) The Stagnant Regime. Growth requires mobilization 
potential, space and presence. Mobilization space for the regime closed steadily from the 
late 1970s through 1995. Although the regime occupied space associated with the Islamist 
movement, it suffers from a structural flaw that keeps it from becoming effective. It has 
no political party apparatus to connect the people and their social networks to the 
government. This situation continues and indicates little opportunity for future growth. 
For example, even decisions that indicate an effort to expand potential and presence 
fail if the structure cannot implement them. Efforts to make concessions during Chadli’s 
term might have produced better results if the regime structural changes corresponded with 
the opening environment. However, as the case study indicates, the regime efforts to 
accommodate the opposition consistently failed. This is directly related to the entrenched 
nature of the regime and the lack of an organization designed to bridge the gap between it 
and the people. 
The regime elite adapts well enough to internal SMI conflicts to remain in power 
but consistently fails to adopt policies that increase the likelihood of long term success in 
the task environment. Thirty years after independence the fundamental elitist structure of 
the government remains unchanged. Meanwhile, increasing munificence, dynamism and 
complexity characterized the contextual and task environments. 
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Potential for growth in the regime SMI remains low. The selective, closed structure 
and absence of a political organization confine the regime to stagnation. Genuine structural 
changes occur with difficulty in selective organizations. Failure to develop and preserve 
a political party prevents the regime from establishing effective presence. In the short 
cycle, this arrangement is efficient but not effective. The passage of time increases the risk 
that the regime’s failure to grow will destroy it. 
b. The Fragmented Opposition. 
The fall of the Islamist Front organization left the diverse groups of the 
Islamist opposition in disarray. Violence escalated and remains a problem that neither 
leaders of the FIS, nor the military effectively control. Moderate Islamists have fared 
poorly since 1992. High levels of violence in the environment constrains the ability of 
these open groups to grow. 
Radical groups use violence on both internal and external opponents creating a 
efficient cycle that no longer provides a short cycle payoff in the system. Indeed, after 
three years of violence, long cycle effectiveness of continued violence may benefit the 
regime. The regime’s isolated position is becoming more attractive to society, simply out 
of the need for stability. As long as the GIA and other violent organizations dominate the 
counter regime SMI, low potential for growth will persist. 
c. Society. 
The society needs a political organization that can exert pressure on the 
regime to support a constitutional arrangement for peaceful transfer of power and 
representative government. The regime and counter regime SMIs produce little space for 
moderates. Both the regime and counter regime are closed, selective organizations which 
leaves the majority of society without a political connection. The mobilization potential 
of Algerian society is extremely high. Look for the formation of new or reorganized party 
seeking to harness this human resource. 
2. Forecast. 
The relentless level of violence, much of which appears indiscriminate, produced 
a reaction that adversely affected all three sectors of the system. This dynamic has directly 
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affected the potential for growth. In the regime, the opposition’s campaign of violence 
resulted in a shift in the preferences of society. This was reflected in the results of the 
Presidential election held in November, 1995. Shifting away from the closed and 
increasingly isolated FIS to the opposite extreme is step in the balancing process of social 
movements that seeks resolution in the middle between the two extremes. 
The recent presidential elections indicated overwhelming stability and an end to the 
violence. Ignoring GIA death threats, 75 percent of the electorate voted and gave Liamine 
Zeroual a 95 percent approval rating. But what does this vote really mean? In 1991,25 
percent of the population gave the FIS candidates for National Assembly a 98 percent 
victory. The massive shift from support for the FIS to the regime most likely represents 
a preference shift in the general public. Society is exhibiting balancing behavior in an 
effort to find middle ground. 
The unceasing campaign of violence appears to have produced a backlash against 
the GIA, who is perceived to represent the Islamists. Indiscriminate violence, often blamed 
on or claimed by the GIA pushes the organization to the extreme margins of the counter 
regime. In order for Zeroual to receive such a high number of the votes, the regime 
apparently managed to shield itself from the same backlash effect. 
In the fight between the regime and counter regime, neither side can win.245 The 
Islamists lack space and presence, even as potential remains high. Positive short cycle 
effects of violence produce diminishing returns. Meanwhile the regime is an elite without 
a people. Absence of potential and presence the government SMI cannot grow. 
2 4 5 B r ~ ~ e ,  “Arab Veterans,” p. 179. Jane’s Intelligence analysis considers it 
“inconceivable for that the Islamic guerrillas can be crushed, while they are not strong 
enough to defeat the government militarily.” 
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Algerian society represents the future outcome of this struggle. The only way for 
this stalemate to end is if both sides make major concessions or a new organization emerges 
to capture the massive potential present in the Algerian 
246Pierre and Quandt, “Algeria’s War,” p. 137. This article proposes that 
negotiations theorists might predict that the two parties are in a “hurting stalemate,” which 
is often a precondition for serious negotiations. 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter will expand the organizational model from the perspective of the 
competing organizations within a state to the perspective of other states seeking to 
influence the outcome. The focus will be on the implications of the organizational model. 
A theoretical model will be discussed. This chapter forms a framework for adapting the 
model to the needs of an external intervenor. The role of the United States as an external 
intervenor will be examined so as to deternzine the policy implications of the organizational 
model. 
B. THE EXTERNAL INTERVENOR. 
The external actor is governed by a different contextual and task environment than 
the intervenee state. The contextual and task environments for the intervenor are 
fundamentally different. The contextual environment is the country's own political, 
economic and social structure. The domestic environment constrains the resources and 
policy options available for intervention. The task environment is the world system of 
states. The states fulfil the same role as organizations at the substate level. Actions taken 
by one state leads to reactions in others. The task environment as a system can balance 
against an action or reinforce the impact of an action. 
The United States faced a bipolar task environment during the Cold War. The US 
and USSR each sought to balance the actions of the other. The shift to a multipolar world 
has greatly complicated the task environment. In a bipolar world, the systems dynamics are 
predictable. The US and its allies are relatively consistent in their behavior with the USSR 
and its allies. In a multipolar world, the states that seek to balance against an action or 
reinforce an action will vary with each specific situation. 
C. INTERVENTION 
The dilemma of intervention is that the external actor's environment is different than 
that of the intervenee state. The external actor is constrained by his own contextual and task 
environment which responds to his domestic contextual and international task 
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environments. The intervenee state is constrained by his own domestic contextual and local 
organizational task environment. 
The outcome will be determined by the environment of the intervenee state unless 
the external actor permanently occupies and annexes the territory. The factors that influence 
the competing regime and opposition organizations remain local as described in Chapter 
11. The external actor can increase the amount of resources available to one side or the 
other. This action leads to systemic interaction in both the local contextual and task 
environment. The additional resources can have the unintended effect of helping the wrong 
organization. 
The external actor can also deploy his own organizations. This act will put the two 
systems of the external actor and the intervenee state into tension. The external actor's 
organizations respond and adapt to their own contextual and task environment. The host 
nation organizations respond to their own environment. The external actor faces a grave 
difficulty in adaptation and action. Its organizations will not normally change in 
accordance with local conditions. The US forces deployed in Korea, Japan and Germany 
are not changing their organizational structure and operations due to local conditions. They 
change to meet the domestic and international needs of the US. 
1. The Powell Doctrine. 
The organizations of the external actor face their own dilemma. If they do decide 
to change to match local conditions, they will be making themselves unsuitable for 
operations in other states. The United States can not have one military for Korea, one for 
Haiti, another for Germany and whatever other crisis pops up next. 
The United States resolved this dilemma by developing the Powell doctrine. This 
doctrine grew from the 1973 Nixon or Guam doctrine where the US would support other 
states but the intervenee state would fight the main battle. The Weinberger and later Powell 
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doctrines further defined the US role. The US would only intervene with massive force for 
a short period of time.247 The US feared the domestic political consequences of a prolonged 
campaign. 
Figure 6-1 illustrates the Powell doctrine. In an ideal case like Panama or Haiti, the 
US invades with massive force and quickly withdraws. The new government restores order 
and takes over as the US withdraws. Three situations must occur. In the invasion phase, the 
US must overwhelm all opposition and establish control. In the transition phase, the US 
maintains 'control while handing off responsibility to the host nation government as soon 
as it is capable of taking over. In the final phase, the host nation government's organizations 
consolidate control and rule over the stabilized country. 
UNlTED STAT!?S HOSTNATION 
Figure 6-1. The Powell Doctrine Process. 
2. Problems of the Powell Doctrine. 
The organizational model reveals several problems for the Powell doctrine. 
a. Systemic Behavior. 
A massive and rapid movement will generate a strong countermovement. 
The major shift in the contextual environment will lead to balancing behavior by all those 
247 Edwin G. Corr and David C. Miller, Jr., "United States Government Organization and 
Capability to Deal with Low Intensity Conflict", in Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, Low 
Intensity Conflict, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 17-45. p. 30. 
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groups that benefitted from the previous status quo. In Panama, this counter movement led 
to the reelection of Noriega's party. The situation in Panama is shifting back towards the 
original status quo. 
Systemic balancing behavior can be countered by organizational action. The rapid 
handover of authority as the US withdraws hinders the ability of the new regime to operate 
effectively. The case studies and operations research theory say that major organizational 
changes take two to five years to implement. The US plans on conducting the transition in 
months, not years. 
b. Transitions. 
US doctrine calls for an invasion and then a handoff to the new regime. The 
conditions and standards for when and how this transition will occur are defined by the US. 
The Powell doctrine has a clear concept of the organizational structure of the invasion and 
handoff. In the invasion, the US forces are controlled by their own organizational chain of 
command. After the handoff, the US forces leave and the host nation controls its own 
organizations as a sovereign state. The weakness of the doctrine is in the organizational 
interaction during the transition. 
The issue is on whether the US and host nation organizations should combine into 
one organization or remain separate. The United Kingdom formed integrated civil and 
military organizations from district to national level in Malaya and Northern Ireland. The 
US prefers to keep US organizations apart. The US will provide advisors but does not 
integrate US and foreign units. This means that there are two parallel organizational 
structures within the host nation during the transition. The US commands US forces and 
the host nation controls its own. 
Coordination does occur, but coordination is not command. The separate 
organizations also separate the US and host nation systems. The US organizations will not 
need to adapt or change to the local environment. This also means that they will not 
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learn.248 From the perspective of the US task environment, this is beneficial. From the 
perspective of the host nation, the US organizations can inadvertently cause adverse 
systemic reactions. The US lacks a doctrine for the organization and training of the new 
regime for counterinsurgency. The effort the US takes to preserve its forces for an 
international task environment means that the host nation should not copy US organizations 
or methods. The effort in Vietnam to create ARVN as a mirror image of the US Army 
meant that South Vietnam lacked an integrated local, counterinsurgency force until the start 
of the Phoenix program in 1 968.249 
c. US Organizational Confusion. 
The United States lacks a unified organization to plan and control US efforts 
in a given state. The players in US support to insurgency or counter insurgency include the 
National Security Council, Department of State, Department of Defense, the military 
services, the CIA, USAID, USIA, Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, 
Department of Commerce, and the ambassador and his country team.250 At the US national 
level there is no unified interagency process to control the actions of the separate 
agencies.251 
d. Organizational Cohesion. 
The United States does not have a unified organizational structure for 
foreign intervention. This makes a transition to host nation government difficult. It also 
reinforces the law of unanticipated consequences. The lack of cohesion leads to US 
agencies taking actions that negate the actions of other US agencies. This prevents long 
248 James Clay Thompson, Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policv and Program Failure, 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 135-155. 
249 Ronald H. Spector, After Tet, (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 283. 
250 Con and Sloan, pp. 33-40. 
251 Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986). pp. 81-1 07. Komer discusses the coordination and 
control problem at the national, theater and country team level of operations. 
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cycle planning and leads each agency to focus on its own short cycle interactions. 
Inconsistent US activity increases mistrust and confusion in the host nation organizations 
and society as to the actual intentions and goals of the United States. 
The US intention of rapid withdrawal increases the dynamism of the environment 
for the mechanistic US organizations. This increases the coordination problem between US 
agencies. It is an unfortunate and common perception in foreign countries that US agencies 
work together for common goals. This means that misguided or poorly implemented 
policies are perceived as part of an overall plan. This does not always occur in the US 
system. Bureaucratic politics plays an increased role in a dynamic environment.252 
2. Problems of Intervention. 
Any intervenor faces certain constraints whether or not it uses the Powell doctrine. 
These constraints include asymmetry of interest, asymmetry of power, political ambiguity 
, duration and adaptation. All of these issues are caused by the overlap of the external 
actor's system of contextual and task environment with the host nation's system of 
contextual and task environment. 
a. Asymmetry of Interest. 
The external actor is less committed to the struggle than the competing 
organizations in the host nation. The intervenor is conducting foreign policy and the 
intervention is one out of many foreign policy concerns. The host nation organizations are 
vitally concerned with the outcome. They have far more at risk than the external actor. 
b. Asymmetry of Power. 
An external actor such as the United States has far more political, economic 
and military power than an insurgent organization such as PIRA in Northern Ireland or the 
FMLN in El Salvador. However, US power is more applicable for use against other states 
than for employment against a sub state actor. Internal war is manpower intensive and 
involves local social networks. The advantage here rests with the indigenous organization. 
252 Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, ed., Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New 
World, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 10-1 1. 
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There are different types of power between international politics and domestic politics in 
a specific state. "Not only does superiority in military force (conventionally defined) not 
guarantee victory; it may, under certain circumstances, be positively counterprod~ctive."~~~ 
c. Political Ambiguity. 
A conventional war has clear cut objectives so that success or failure can be 
easily determined. Internal war can be similar or very different. Internal war can be either 
a zero sum game for total victory or defeat for one side. In many cases it is a non zero sum 
game where each side gains or loses. The United Kingdom in Malaya defeated the MCP 
but at the cost of allowing a very profitable colony to become independent. Political goals 
shift in internal war over time. This makes it difficult for the external actor to maintain his 
commitment. 
Political ambiguities also affect moral judgements. There are few angels in internal 
war. "Counterinsurgency usually entails US aid and pressure to shore up and reform an 
inefficient, corrupt and abusive g ~ v e r n e n t . " ~ ~ ~  Supporting insurgents such as the Contras 
in Nicaragua or UNITA in Angola also involves support to organizations with human rights 
issues. It is difficult to portray internal war in a good guy - bad guy relationship. 
d. Duration. 
Protracted conflicts make it difficult for the external actor to justify his costs 
in its own contextual and task environment. The Powell doctrine is designed to minimize 
the length of intervention. Another option is an extended low visibility commitment to 
minimize its effect on the external actor's system. The time requirement for organizational 
change and the nature of the organizational and mobilizational struggle indicate that years 
of preparation are required before one side can move towards an end of the conflict. The 
United States exhibits a strong desire for rapid, decisive outcomes. Patience is a virtue in 
internal war. 
253Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict", in World Politics, 27 (October 1974-July 1975) pp. 175-200. p. 177. 
254 Corr and Sloan, p. 260. 
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e. Adaptation. 
The external actor's organizations change in response to its own system of 
contextual and task environment. It is very difficult for operations in another system to 
change organizations. The environment that creates and sustains US organizations is 
isolated fiom environmental influence of the host nation. The United States in Vietnam 
feared that any local adaptation would diminish the US capability to operate against the 
USSR.255 
It is not impossible for the external actor to adapt, but it is very difficult. Adaptation 
involves organizational restructuring and changes to doctrine, strategy and tactics. It also 
requires the organization to identify the system level of analysis and change to match the 
system.256 Too often, change is conducted by military organizations in response to 
insurgent military organizations. This ignores the political, economic and social aspect of 
the struggle. 
Partial systemic adaptation can be more damaging than none at all. In Vietnam, 
"lack of any overall management structure contributed to the overmilitarization of the war 
by facilitating the predominance of the US and GVN military in its Focusing 
on the military aspect of the struggle increases the bureaucratic power of selective, armed 
organizations and decreases the space and operations of moderate, mobilizational 
organizations. A focus on the military side of a struggle inhibits the development of non 
zero sum solutions. The role of the MCA in Malaya and SDLP in Northern Ireland has been 
overlooked by military orientated theorists. 
255 See Komer, pp. 69- 80 on the problems the US faces on adapting to an internal 
conflict. He recommends methods to induce adaptation on pp. 167-9. 
256 See Thompson, pp. 135-153, on the specific problems of adaptation faced by the 
United States. 
257 Komer, p. 82. 
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D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS. 
The Powell doctrine has some serious side effects when applied to an internal 
conflict situation. This section identifies methods to improve the existing US approach and 
to develop alternative strategies. 
1. Improve US Unity of Effort. 
Many theorists have suggested a variety of options to improve the US organization 
for low intensity The organizational inertia in the US has defeated all of these 
efforts. Progress is being made, but it is slow and inconsistent. Empirical reality dictates 
that the current US organizations will have to improve their cooperation in organizational 
action, since a reorganization of the US is very unlikely. 
There is a consensus that the US military is resistant to change and does not desire 
to participate in internal wars.259 However, since the Goldwater - Nichols act the US 
military has founded the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and an Assistant 
Secretary for Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC). 
The Department for Defense has shown far more adaptation than any other US agency 
including the Department of State, USAID and the CIA. 
2. Develop a Doctrine. 
The United Kingdom has an integrated all agency doctrine for internal conflict.260 
The United States can benefit by adapting the UK doctrine for interagency cooperation. The 
transitions required by the Powell doctrine from US control to mutual control to host nation 
control is an area in vital need of development. 
The military can also improve its own doctrine. Current area studies examine the 
contextual environment of the political, economic, social and military structure of society. 
These studies are static in that they reveal a picture of the current situation. The area study 
258 See the conclusions, to Komer, Thompson and Corr and Sloan for typical examples. 
259 See Corr and Sloan, pp. 266-7 
260 See Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion. Insurgency and 
Peacekeeping, (London: Farber and Farber, 197 1). 
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can be improved by adding a dynamic task environment. The task environment should be 
analyzed to determine its relationship with its own social movement, the competitors within 
its SMI and its interaction with other organizations in other SMIs. This is a dynamic 
analysis to determine trends, momentum, opportunities and constraints. Current area 
studies are nonprescriptive. A dynamic analysis develops political and military options. 
The task environment section should identify not just existing organizations but 
their connection with different social bases. What do the different social movement 
industries look like and where are they going? The threat is not all organizations in an 
opposing SMI. It is often possible to isolate radical, violent organizations within their own 
SMI by allowing gains by moderate organizations. A short term loss can lead to a long term 
gain. 
US AirLand battle doctrine was designed to fight a Corps level conventional war 
against the USSR. It is time to create a new doctrine for internal warfare. Internal warfare 
is unconventional warfare. Political aspects and police type operations dominate military 
concerns. US bureaucratic politics prevent changes in conventional doctrine because of 
fear that change threatens US ability to fight conventional war. This fear is overstated. The 
UK is successful in both types of warfare. 
The true need is a doctrine so that military personnel can operate in an internal 
environment before returning to their conventional role. The United Kingdom has 
maintained a high readiness level in both types of warfare. When you improve the training 
and capabilities of personnel, you improve their capabilities to conduct all types of 
missions. The quality of personnel matters more than the equipment. 
3. Role of Special Operations Forces. 
The US Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the vanguard of unconventional 
warfare capabilities in the US. SOF contains personnel highly trained in a wide variety of 
military and political skills. The organizational structure and training of SOF units 
emphasizes operations in support of other nations. SOF personnel are trained in the 
language, culture and contextual and task environments of every state in the world. SOF 
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will remain very important to US unconventional warfare efforts until and unless the US 
reorganizes its foreign policy infrastructure. The advantages of SOF are in presence, size, 
visibility and quality. 
a. Presence. 
In a US intervention, the military provides the largest number of US 
personnel. The organizational model indicates that organizational presence plays a crucial 
role in the effect of organizational actions on the local environment. For the local 
population, the US platoon in the local community has a far greater impact on their own 
expectations and incentives than a staff member in the embassy. The day to day actions of 
the military have a systemic effect far greater than other agencies with organizational 
presence in the US or only the embassy. 
This creates advantages and risks. The other agencies must plan for the 
organizational presence and resources of the military. Efforts to change preferences from 
the top can fail due to the actions of US units on the bottom. SOF units are trained to be 
sensitive to host nations systems and reinforce this training with constant deployments to 
a variety of different nations. 
The majority of military forces are not SOF. SOF units advise and train 
conventional forces on activities in the local environment. A large intervention is a 
conventional operation led by conventional commanders. SOF are only part of the solution, 
not all of it. Joint doctrine and training are needed to improve the coordination of 
conventional and unconventional operations. The transition period from US control to joint 
US and host nation control is a conventional operation that needs improvement. 
b. Size. 
SOF forces are only 1.2% of military manpower. Nevertheless, SOF has 
over 10,000 trained operators ready for deployment. This exceeds the deployable 
manpower of all civilian agencies. Department of State, Department of Justice, USAID, 
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ICITAP all have limited manpower.26' SOF has the trained manpower to operate at the 
regional and local level. The civilian agencies only have the manpower to operate at a 
national level. 
SOF forces have the potential to be a force multiplier for the civilian agencies. 
Unconventional warfare requires central planning and decentralized operations. SOF 
personnel at regional and local level can help advise, assist and monitor an interagency US 
and host nation campaign plan. It is not the mission of SOF to develop interagency plans, 
but they can augment the ability of the US to actually implement a national plan. 
c. Low Visibility and Long Duration. 
SOF forces have low visibility. SOF units are currently deployed in every 
continent. El Salvador received lots of media visibility, but the low numbers and remote 
operations of SOF allowed operations to continue despite significant domestic opposition. 
SOF forces can deploy before a situation becomes a crisis and stay long after the situation 
has stabilized. The low visibility of SOF allows them to stay for the duration of the 
conflict. This allows SOF to overcome some of the constraints that drive the short duration 
of the Powell doctrine. 
Conventional forces rapidly redeployed after the invasion of Panama, Desert Storm 
and Haiti. All of these operations are used as examples of the Powell doctrine. However, 
in contravention to the Powell doctrine, US forces are still there. Both conventional and 
SOF forces remain in Panama, Haiti, Kuwait, and Kurdistan. The low visibility of small 
forces allows these extended commitments without internal US opposition. 
d. Quality. 
SOF personnel receive extensive military, cultural and language training. 
Members are selected from personnel who are above average performers in the 
conventional forces. SOF units more mature and experienced than normal conventional 
261 Deployable SOF manpower exceeds the entire manning of several agencies such as 
ICITAP and USAID. Foreign policy agencies are designed for routine state to state 
diplomacy. They do not have deployable contingency subelements. Their role and mission 
is diplomacy, not governing foreign countries. 
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units. The organizational structure, training and operations of SOF are designed for 
unconventional warfare. Other organizations such as the DOS or ICITAP, not designed, 
manned or equipped for UW must undergo organizational restructuring to fit the 
environment. Organizational theory and the case studies in this thesis show that major 
organizational changes take at a minimum months to implement. SOF units are capable 
of immediate effective actions while non-SOF units and agencies require months to adapt. 
SOF forces are already established and trained for adaptation. On the conventional side, 
during Desert Storm SOF forces were tasked to provide coalition support teams to all of 
the allied forces to help integrate them into the US - Saudi chain of command. This was not 
a SOF mission, but the units rapidly adapted and were successful. 
On the unconventional side, SOF forces in Haiti were deployed at regional and local 
levels throughout the country. The military regime lost control after the US arrival and 
these forces found themselves in a power vacuum. In many cases, SOF teams at village 
level assisted in establishing new local governments, police and judiciary. SOF advised and 
assisted in restoring government services and improving the health and welfare of the local 
area. 
4. Conventional Forces. 
Unconventional warfare can not be fought by SOF alone. Conventional forces are 
responsible for the planning and conduct of an intervention of all conventional and 
unconventional forces. The problem is that the conventional forces have been allowed to 
evaluate a mission as successful based on their own operations. The conventional forces 
should be equally accountable for the organization, training and operations of the host 
nations organizations during the transition period. Early withdrawal of US forces puts the 
host nation organizations at a serious disadvantage. 
5. Alternate Strategies. 
The Powell doctrine is one possible option for a US intervention. The range of 
military options for the US should include several options to allow the US a more adaptive 
response to future contingencies. 
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a. Protracted Strategy. 
The Powell doctrine is an effort to achieve rapid victory. It is only 
applicable in certain unique circumstances. In many cases the US will support an internal 
war without committing massive forces. The three phases of the Powell doctrine: US 
control, joint control, and host nation control, are reduced to the last two. For example, 
in El Salvador the US supported the government with a few hundred advisors and large 
amounts of economic aid.262 
The protracted strategy should focus on reforming the organizations of the regime. 
The US is not bound by internal bureaucratic forces to preserve the status quo in the host 
nation. True political and economic reform often requires outside support to overcome the 
regime's internal resistance. The US can also operate in its own task environment of 
international diplomacy to recruit other state allies and to persuade or coerce states 
supporting the other side in the conflict to cease their support. 
Moderate support over an extended period of time is more suited to system 
dynamics than the Powell doctrine. Massive force in a short duration creates a dynamic 
environment that hinders the ability of the regime to achieve stability after the US 
withdraws. Moderate changes create less long term problems for the regime. 
b. Transitions. 
US support to a host nation government creates a control dilemma. The 
larger the US commitment, the greater this problem. Congressional pressure increases 
proportionally with higher US commitment. The US prefers to operate in other countries 
under its own command and control. This leads to US and host nation forces conducting 
parallel operations in the same country. Coordination is tenuous at best and only conducted 
at the national level. 
262The US spent over six billion dollars and increased the armed forces from 10,000 to 
57,000. Guerrilla forces decreased from 12,000 to 6,000, but military victory could not be 
achieved. Finally, El Salvador's political reforms resulting from US pressure, led to a 
negotiated solution. Far from optimal, this solution was more favorable to the US, than 
Vietnam. See Bruce Hoffman, "Current Research on Terrorism and Low-Intensity 
Conflict", in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 15(1) (1992), pp. 25-38. p. 31. 
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A more optimal situation is at least joint command at regional and local level. In 
some circumstances, US forces will command host nation forces and in other 
circumstances, US forces will be under host nation command. The United Kingdom has 
been successful in this approach in its operations. 
Another option is secondment: attach US advisers to the host nation. The US 
advisers will become part of the host nation. This allows US advisers to command host 
nation forces. This allows direct training for the indigenous forces and the improved 
command leads to more efficient and effective operations. The greatest advantage that 
advanced countries have over third world countries is a better trained and experienced 
leadership. 
The problem with transitions and alternate command and control arrangements lies 
in US bureaucratic politics. US leadership wants to retain the ability to rapidly break 
contact and withdraw. It is time to reexamine this policy. US joint command was effective 
in Korea. US forces have been very successful in leading host nation forces in the 
Philippines, Haiti and Nicaragua in the early 20th century, worldwide during WWII and 
in Vietnam in the 1960s. 
c. Organizational Change. 
Organizational change requires extended support throughout the transition. 
The US faced the problem in Panama and Haiti of trying to withdraw before organizational 
change was complete. In Panama, much of the old Panama Defense Force was left in place 
as there was not time to organize a replacement. This led to chronic problems for the new 
regime including an attempted coup. Finally, the regime completely disbanded the PDF. 
In Haiti, the US originally thought it could reorganize the police force in 30 days. Over one 
year later, US support remains crucial to maintain order. The Haitian police force has not 
finished reorganizing. 
(1) Time, Persistence and Patience. It will take three to five years 
after a major event such as an invasion to complete a reorganization. In routine cases like 
El Salvador, even a decade of effort failed to reform the regime. Again, organizational 
change takes time. US efforts to hurry this process will lead to systemic interaction that 
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will make the problem worse. The US must be persistent and patient. Persistent requires 
a cohesive, systemic plan of organizational change and organizational action that includes 
political and military aspects of the organizational and mobilizational struggle. Patience 
is the long term commitment to implement this plan. 
(2) Organization. The US separates the training of military and 
police forces between the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice. The 
problem is that in the countries in which the US intervenes, there is no such separation. In 
Haiti, the administration, army, police and fire department were all part of the same 
organization. 
The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) 
and the US Agency for Internal Development Administration of Justice Program are the 
US agencies that train foreign police forces. They lack the organizational structure, 
presence, size and quality factors of their military Special Operations Forces counterparts. 
This is not their fault, their organizations are not organized, manned or equipped for 
unconventional warfare. 
In Panama, the Military Support Group (MSG) initially placed four man teams 
down to local, precinct level. The teams consisted of two Spanish speaking Special Forces 
members and two Reserve Corps members whose peacetime jobs were as civilian police. 
The Ambassador cancelled the program and replaced it with ICITAP. ICITAP tried to 
change the Panamanian National Police by conducting temporary ad hoc training seminars. 
"For its first six months, ICITAP had no permanent staff in 
ICITAP had to reorganize itself before it could take on the new mission. It was not 
prepared to train a 12,000 man police force. Conventional police operations in the United 
States differ from those in the third world. General Thurman commented that "ICITAP 
263 John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing The Restoration of 
Panama, (Carlisle: US Army War College, 1992), p. 50. A former PNP leader called the 
training programs useless. In December, 1990 the 'new' police mutinied. 
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did not have the manpower, resources or lesson plans. ICITAP was ill prepared to set up 
a new police It had less than ten personnel in country at the end of 1991 .265 
The problem will not be solved by blaming ICITAP. It was given a mission that 
it was not organized, trained or equipped to carry out. A more useful option would have 
been to place the MSG teams under the purview of ICITAP. ICITAP could have used their 
expertise to develop a program using the SOF trainers and reserve police personnel to 
implement it. ICITAP has the management and law enforcement experience to develop a 
national plan but lacks the manpower to implement and supervise it. SOF has the 
manpower and cultural skills needed to interact with the host nation. Bureaucratic politics 
within the US led to the failure of the program. Haiti has seen a repetition of Panama. 
E. CONCLUSION. 
The external actor is constrained by the tension between its own system and the 
system of the state in which it is intervening. A systemic perspective must drive the 
planning and conduct of operations of the intervenor. The Powell doctrine can have a 
serious counterproductive systemic reaction in the long tern that negates the cost and effort 
of the external actor. 
The United States is especially constrained by a non unified foreign policy 
infrastructure. It is unlikely that the US can change its poor organizational structure. This 
means that US actions must seek to overcome the constraints of its domestic environment 
and the US organizational environment while trying to conduct operations within the host 
nation's contextual and task environment. 
This chapter examined organizational and operational methods to overcome the 
systemic constraints on US behavior. The US needs to develop an improved interagency 
doctrine and an improved doctrine within the military. The differences between 
264 Richard H. Schultz, Jr., "The Post Conflict Use of Military Forces: Lessons from 
Panama, 1989-1991", in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 1993, pp. 
145-172. p.160. 
265 Schultz, p. 160. 
conventional and unconventional war require different doctrines. Special Operations 
Forces are not sufficient to wage unconventional war. It is a problem for conventional 
forces which will plan and conduct unconventional warfare operations with SOF support. 
Two options exist for the US military. First, it can have two separate force 
structures with different organizational design and doctrines; one for conventional war and 
one for unconventional war. Second, it can preserve existing force structure and develop 
two doctrines to operate in either type of war. The US picked a third suboptimal option 
resulting in one organizational design that operates under one doctrine and accepts repeated 
failure in unconventional operations (Vietnam, Panama, and Somalia). Given resource 
constraints the best option for the US is to develop an unconventional warfare doctrine for 




This chapter will examine the hypotheses in light of the evidence from the case 
studies. Then, the theory itself will be examined in its relationship to theories on the 
origins, process and outcomes of revolution. 
B. AN EVALUATION OF THE MODEL. 
This section examines the model and the three hypothesis. It provides an 
assessment on whether the evidence supported or failed to support the theory. Overall, the 
model proved effective in revealing the environmental and organizational constraints and 
opportunities that form the parameters of organizational action. At the same time, the high 
quantity and types of factors that exist in the contextual and task environment make 
prediction very difficult. In the long cycle, it is difficult to predict the beginning of the next 
insurgency. In the short cycle, it is difficult to predict the next action of an organization 
and the net impact of an individual act. The model is of value in explaining the interaction 
of the organization within its environment and the net systemic effects of organizational 
behavior. 
1. Hypothesis One. 
Hypothesis one examines the systemic interaction of the environment, 
organizational structure and organizational actions on the long term growth of the 
organization. The organization is capable of operating independent of its environment. It 
can survive in a hostile environment such as the MCP in Malaya from 195 1 to 1960 and 
the PIRA from 1975 to 1995. Orghzations can also grow in non munificent environments 
such as the MCP from 1948 to. 195 1. Obviously, the most rapid growth is where a 
munificent environment, a flexible organization design and organizational action are all in 
harmony. The rapid growth of the FIS in Algeria following the riots of 1988, Sinn Fein 
after the hunger strikes, and the MCA after 1952 in Malaya illustrate this optimal condition. 
The environment frames the parameters of organizational action, but does not cause it to 
occur. 
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Organizational action is also affected by organizational structure. Organizational 
structure has a behavioral effect and a time effect. The behavioral effect represents the 
selective and mobilizational organizational designs impact on the organization. Selective 
organizations are more action oriented and less patient than mobilizational organizations. 
The time factor equals the time it takes to change organizational structure. The 
development of Sinn Fein from a support organization of PIRA to a political party took 
from 198 1 to 1986. The other organizations reviewed in the case studies required from 18 
to 36 months to implement new organizational structures. 
Organizations still have free choice. Environment and organizational structure are 
not deterministic. The IRA survived for fifty years on faith alone from the 1920s to the 
revival in the 1970s. It is a mark of organizational competence for an organization to 
overcome adverse environmental and structural. Sinn Fein under Gerry Adams exhibited 
a high level of competence, as did the MCA in Malaya from 1952 to 1960. 
2. Hypothesis Two. 
The second hypothesis examines the role of mobilization potential, mobilization 
space and organizational presence in producing growth. Mobilization potential is formed 
by the contextual environment which is the existing political, economic and social structure 
of society. Mobilization space represents the physical and demographic space available to 
the organization in the task environment. The task environment is formed by the current 
presence and activities of all other organizations in society: regime organizations, counter 
regime organizations and neutral organizations. Organizational presence equals the 
presence of organizational members within society. 
a. Overlap Between Mobilization Potential and Space. 
The case studies reveal an overlap between the contextual and task 
environment. The political structure of society can be quickly and radically changed by the 
regime operating in the task environment. Templer's reforms in Malaya, direct rule in 
Northern Ireland and the electoral period in Algeria were contextual changes with a rapid 
impact implemented by the regime. Mobilization potential and space also overlap. Areas 
with high popular support for the counter regime often coincide with mobilization space. 
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. .  . . 
The utility in keeping the two concepts apart is demonstrated in the Malayan case. The 
sector providing mobilizational potential in the cities had very little mobilization space due 
restrictive regime activities and the opposition of the secret societies and KMT within the 
Chinese community. Conversely, the potential support from squatters was lower but there 
were no rivals in this mobilizational space. 
b. Organizational Presence Redefined. 
Organizational presence needs to be redefined. In Malaya, the regime 
established a presence with Malays in Chinese villages. In Northern Ireland, the regime 
also established presence with Protestant and British members in Catholic areas. In both 
cases, the effort proved ineffective and counter productive. The alien presence increased 
public sentiment for the opposition. In Malaya, the regime allowed the Chinese MCA to 
enter and recruit locals into the administration and Home Guard. 
c. Presence and Social Networks. 
Presence is most effective when it can take advantage of local social 
networks. This requires willing participation of local community members. It was 
possible in Malaya, but not in Northern Ireland. The United Kingdom demonstrated great 
ingenuity and organizational skill in acquiring information on the IRA without Catholic 
membership. The informant program and a massive intelligence campaign proved 
effective. Yet, the overwhelming presence of security forces and coercive nature of the 
reinforced mobilization potential and space for the PIRA. The security forces know the 
membership of PIRA nearly to the man, but can not stop PIRA activity. Without local 
community membership and assistance, the UK effort restricts the overt mobilizational 
space and maneuver room for PIRA. PIRA organizational presence remains rooted in the 
local community and can not be eliminated. 
Organizational presence redefined as members who are part of existing social 
networks has more explanatory power. The MCA competed with the MCP in the same 
social networks. In Northern Ireland, the regime has no presence in the Catholic 
community. The SDLP's social nets are in the urban middle class and rural areas. Sinn 
Fein and PIRA dominate the urban working class. An anomaly like the PIRA stronghold 
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in rural South Armargh is explained by the long established republican, violent tradition 
of a few families in the region that predates 1969. 
The role of social networks in the growth and sustainment of organizations became 
a subset of social movement theory in the 1970s. Individual social networks can overcome 
Olson's free rider behavior.266 However, once established these same networks sustain the 
organization even as the environment and the organization itself changes. The nature of 
the IRA in South Armargh has been fairly constant from the 1920s to today. This area 
provided strong opposition to Sinn Fein efforts to stop the war, which is consistent with 
their stand during the 1969 PIRA - OIRA split. It is consistent with their support for the 
IRA in the North long after the decline of the IRA in other areas. 
d. New Proposition. 
The importance of social networks, as the case studies indicate, is that 
current theory overlooks the value of establishing organizational presence. Political 
culture examines the long term continuity in social behavior in some countries such as the 
existence of violence in Northern Ireland, or in Columbia after the La Violencia sustained 
civil war. The ability of social networks to survive and sustain themselves even after the 
demise of the original organization indicates that sustained conflict creates a serious long 
term effect in a society. The American Civil War left bitter memories in many areas in the 
Southern States 120 years later. 
This leads to the proposition that once an organization establishes itself in the local 
community it produces a long cycle effect. Once local social networks are mobilized to 
support a political organization, they sustain themselves and are easily activated when new 
organizations arise. This reinforces the theory that insurgent organizations must be 
defeated early. Yet, the social network approach does not mean that the regime will lose 
if the organization survives for ten or more years. It means that once the social networks 
are activated, they must be coopted, neutralized or eliminated. 
266 See Knoke, pp. 57 to 84 for a summary of the role of social networks in 
organizational growth and a summary of the major theorists in this field. Of particular note 
are Klandermans, Huckefeldt, Zald and McCarthy. 
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The British successfully coopted the MCA in Malaya and this solution proved 
viable in the long cycle. It is still working after forty years. Neutralization means isolating 
the opposition in a marginal segment of society. This happened to the MCP in Malaya. 
The UK would love for this to happen to the PIRA. The last option of genocide proved of 
value to the Russian, Chinese and Cambodian Communists, but it is no longer acceptable 
to the Western Democracies and the international system. That has not deterred Burundi 
and Rwanda so it is will continue. 
2. Adaptation. 
Adaptation represents the ability of the organization to change itself to match 
changes in the contextual and task environment. Adaptation will not cause one side to win 
or lose by itself. All things being equal, in an extended conflict the more adaptable 
organization has a significant advantage over its rivals. If the environment determines 
outcome, then adaptation is not important. Adaptation provides the key argument against 
the structural approach to revolution. 
The case studies show that organizations like the MCP and PIRA can adapt to 
survive in a hostile environment. Organizations like the MCA and SDLP can overcome 
slow growth in a difficult beginning period to achieve long term stability with a large 
support base. PIRA has been adaptable in its search for survival and new ways to use 
violence. This has not helped the long term goal of increasing mass support for removal 
of the British. The MCA, SDLP and Sinn Fein adapted more to the long cycle than to the 
short cycle factors that drive change for the PIRA. This supports the predictions on the 
relative emphasis of selective versus mobilizational organizational designs. It also raises 
the question about the difference between effectiveness and efficiency. A few observations 
arise from the case studies concerning the difference between efficiency and effectiveness, 
systemic behavior and the factors that influence organizational change. 
a. Efficiency and Effectiveness. 
Organization theory defines organizational competence as a combination of 
efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency defined as maximizing the utility of organizational 
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resources. Effectiveness is defined as organizational goals. Although they complement 
one another, the two concepts are not synonymous. 
The search for efficiency can reinforce the nature of selective organizations and lead 
to a systemic reaction against the organization. The Briggs plan in Malaya was primarily 
used to increase the efficiency of the security forces. This allowed the security forces to 
increase their presence in the country and increase the scale and scope of military 
operations. It also led to great resentment in the Chinese community against the greater 
intrusion on their lives from the security forces. This problem was not solved until 
Templer's reforms. The spread of the Home Guard led to a massive increase of a fairly 
inefficient, poorly trained militia. Yet, the local nature of the Home Guards increased local 
support for the regime and forced the MCP into the jungle. The drop in efficiency was 
matched by an increase in effect. 
The post 1975 reforms in Northern Ireland exhibit a similar effect. The government 
intelligence and security system has become very efficient. 30,000 men stabilized the 
situation in a country of 1.5 million. Yet, the Catholic living in the slums resent the heavy 
security actions in their neighborhoods. The results of UK efficiency preserves a stalemate. 
In the long run, this may prove effective if the UK can outlast PIRA. The current cease fire 
is a tribute to British patience. But it still illustrates that efficiency alone can not produce 
a long term solution. 
The same criteria apply for insurgent organizations. In 1949 and 1951, the MCP 
sought to improve their efficiency. Similarly, the 1975 reorganization of the PIRA was 
also a search for efficiency and survival. Each achieved the short cycle effect of preserving 
the organization and allowed the number of violent incidents to increase. This increase in 
violence increased opposition from the opposing ethnic groups, the regime and the bulk of 
their own ethnic group. 
This is not to say that the MCP or PIRA ever reached a level of efficiency even 
remotely approaching that of the security forces. J. Bowyer Bell's point on the inherent 
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inefficiency of the underground is well supported empirically. 267The point is that insurgent 
organizations keep searching for better efficiency or for that one single action that will 
bring victory. The case studies indicate that one spectacular act of violence systemically 
increases the opposition of regime and allied parts of society. 
Effectiveness is the search for an optimal outcome for the organization. The MCA 
became part of the ruling government in Malaya and remains so today. The SDLP 
consolidated its position as the majority voice in the Catholic community and achieved a 
significant minority role in the government. Man for man neither of these organizations 
has as much of an impact as their violent rivals. In Northern Ireland, the regime and media 
remained fixated on the 300 man PIRA while treating the 300,000 supporters of the SDLP 
as a sideshow. Yet, it was the SDLP that overcame the opposition of both the Republic of 
Ireland and the UK to bring Sinn Fein and PIRA to the negotiating table. 
b. Systemic Behavior. 
The organizational model uses the society and the state as a system. Systems 
exhibit balancing and reinforcing behavior: violence leads to counter violence and 
movements to counter movements. There are times to act and times to organize. The 
balance between efficiency and effectiveness lies with an actor that responds to systemic 
behavior. 
In a system, the outcome of individual acts are hard to predict. The reaction of 
other organizations in society can vary. Actions and reactions between organizations lead 
to an impact on all of society. Societal impacts vary with the varying social movements 
and groupings in the contextual environment. The 1969 march in Derry and the 1981 
hunger strikes led to a systemic reaction that none of the participants expected. 
This implies that theories that focus on the appropriate tactics and doctrine for 
insurgency are misplaced. Tactics and doctrine will vary within each different state. The 
US effort to transplant the Strategic Hamlet program implemented in Malaya into Vietnam 
267Bell, 1990, pp. 194-2 1 1. 
191 
was a disaster. Similarly, Che Guevera died in a futile attempt to export the tactical 
methods of M-26 to an alien environment. 
c. Organizational Change. 
The model explains explains organizatinoal change using four factors. 
These include internal (1) bureaucratic politics; (2) competition between the organization 
and rival organizations within the same support basehndustry; (3)competition between the 
organization and organizations from different support basehndustry; and (4) environmental 
changes. The problem lies in determining which of these factors drives a new strategy or 
decision by the organization. 
The decision of the MCP to start a revolt was partly due to the new leadership 
consolidating power after the defection of Lai Teck; increasing resistance from the secret 
societies and KMT within the Chinese community; increasing resistance from the regime 
and the Malayan community; and the closing of the favorable environment that existed 
since the end of WWII. In other words, parts of all four levels of analysis influenced the 
MCP decision. 
d. Theoretical implications. 
Two factors complicate a systems view of the organization. The first is 
predicting the outcome of a single act. The second is in determining what factors influence 
organizational behavior at a given point in time. The systemic influences described in this 
thesis cast doubt on any theory that claims it can predict short cycle behavior. However, 
in the long run it is possible to predict outcomes Qf behavior. This is due to the effect of 
time on actions and outcomes. 
It takes years to change an organizational design. Contextual changes also take 
years to have an effect. The task environment and actions within the task environment can 
change rapidly but the relationship between the task and contextual environments remains 
fixed in the short run. Individual acts are not predetermined since organizational choice 
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varies. The overall behavior of an organization acquires its own unique pattern. 
Organizational acts may not be predictable, but organizational behavior can be predicted 
based on past behavior. 
From the perspective of adaptation, organizations can be classed by their behavior 
as tending towards either short or long cycle behavior. The short cycle actor responds and 
adapts to events and the actions of other organizations in the task environment. This allows 
for rapid response of action and counter action. PIRA's tit for tat behavior is typical of this 
type of actor. 
A long cycle actor adapts to changes in the contextual environment. The SDLP in 
Northern Ireland demonstrated a better appreciation of the impact of the 1985 Anglo - Irish 
accord than either of the two governments that signed the agreement. The accord pushed 
the new Sinn Fein into a corner. To pursue a political strategy, Sinn Fein had to take a 
stand towards the accord. To reject it outright would nullifl the move towards politics. 
The SDLP used the accord and the new Sinn Fein to open negotiations. 
Long cycle adaptation is crucial in prolonged conflict. By itself it will not bring 
victory. It increases the ability of the organization to compete within its own SMI and 
against other organizations in the rest of the task environment. Theories that focus on 
winning militarily overlook the importance of this variable. If neither side can win by 
force, the outcome can only be a prolonged stalemate or a negotiated solution. The latter 
two options are not zero sum. The adaptable actor achieves the next best optimal solution. 
The failure of the MCP to accept any negotiated solution left them with nothing, while the 
more flexible MCA became part of the regime. 
C. THEORY. 
The organizational model has some utility in examining the insurgency process. 
This section will examine the value of the model compared to existing insurgency theories. 
The organizational model will be examined as to its relationship to the origins, process and 
outcomes of insurgencies. 
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1. Origins. 
The organizational model expects that revolutions are not spontaneous and that an 
extended period of organizational growth precedes the start of an insurgency. Three case 
studies are not sufficient to draw conclusions as to the origins of an insurgency. Gurr 
concluded in the Minorities at Risk study that organizations took an average of 13 years to 
develop before the initiation of violence.268 This does not explain why organizations turn 
to violence to achieve their aims. The case studies indicate that there is no consistent 
pattern in why organizations start an insurgency. The decision varies with each case. 
The revolution as an event theory is not supported by the case studies. The 1969 
outbreak of violence appeared spontaneous due to the rapid spread of violence throughout 
the country. Yet, the case studies reveal the organizational dynamics that preceded the 
crisis led to the insurgency. The contextual environment has value in that it explains the 
intensity and scope of grievances in the Catholic community. But the systemic interaction 
of organizations is part of a process that can override or change the contextual environment. 
Organizations can build support where they previously had none, or lose the support of an 
existing preference base. 
This means that the theories that examine the preconditions of revolution have value 
as tools to examine the task environment. They usefully outline the vertical and horizontal 
cleavages that stratify society and that define the competing social movements. These 
theories do not explain the shift from conditions to actual revolt nor the process followed 
in insurgency. The organization approach includes the organization as a variable that 
determines the probability of a revolt. The organizational approach fails to provide a 
general theory that can predict outbreaks of political violence in a world system of over 200 
very different states. 
268 Ted Robert Gurr, Tommunal Conflicts and Global Security", in Current History, 
Vol94, No. 592, May 1995, pp 212-217. p. 215. Gurr is commenting on the average in 24 
Western democracies and this average is expected by him to be lower in the third world. 
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2. Process. 
The best application of the organizational model is for examining the process of 
revolution. The conditions that create grievances in society that precede violence are not 
the ones that determine the trajectory of the revolution nor the eventual outcome.269 The 
case studies all show that the contextual factors that favored the initial growth of an 
organization do not determine the survival of the organization. The MCP and PIRA both 
survived when the environment became unfavorable. After the outbreak of violence, 
changes occurred both the contextual and task environment. Neither relative deprivation 
theories nor historical inevitability theories can explain this process.27o 
The organization forms the link between the environment and outcome. The 
organization as a level of analysis forms the needed connection between the origins of 
insurgency and the final outcome. As the model demonstrates, the contextual and task 
environment form the parameters in which the organization operates. Concurrently, 
organizational design creates short cycle constraints on organizational behavior. 
The task environment is very useful in explaining the behavior of the organization. 
Many theories of insurgency focuses on insurgency as a competition between the guerrillas 
and the government. The competition of the guerrillas with other organizations within their 
own social movement is ignored. In Malaya and Northern Ireland, the true center of gravity 
was a moderate political organization within the opposition SMI. The selective MCP and 
PIRA both used violence against their respective rivals, the MCA and SDLP. The outcome 
in Malaya was determined by cooperation between the MCA and regime. In Northern 
Ireland, the SDLP brought all the competing sides to the negotiating table. It will be a 
critical factor in the resolution or continuation of that conflict. 
3. Outcome. 
The organizational model is not sufficient to determine the outcome of an 
insurgency. The outcome varies with the changes in the contextual and task environment. 
269 DeNardo, p. 13. 
270 See DeNardo, pp. 18 - 32; Gurr, 1983, pp. 245-7. 
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The organizational model predicts growth, but growth alone will not cause victory or 
defeat. Within the task environment, the regime, counter regime and neutral organizations 
all tend to grow during violent conflict. Violence increases the costs of staying neutral and 
drives individuals into organizations for protection. Relative growth is an indicator of 
success or failure and influences popular expectations of the outcome.271 An influence is 
not deterministic. 
The models value lies in its ability to determine the relative position and momentum 
of the various organizations. Organizations must balance actions and organization 
development. Knowing one's position relative to the environment and the position of the 
opponent allows for more effective policies. In Malaya, the UK managed to push the MCP 
steadily away from their support base. The presence of the MCP went from the urban 
areas, to the squatters, to the jungle fringe, to the aborigines to the deep jungle. Yet, the 
regime did not reestablish control until after the MCA mobilized and consolidated support 
in the previous MCP support base. 
In Northern Ireland, the PIRA remain established inside their local communities. 
UK efforts to drive them out failed. Given these conditions, a military solution will not 
succeed and will only further increase the links between the Provos and their supporters. 
A better alternative is to isolate the Provos and their supporters within the Catholic 
community. The SDLP and Sinn Fein are fulfilling this task. The 70 year history of the 
IRA clearly indicates that they will not voluntarily stop fighting. However, the futility of 
their situation led Sinn Fein to agree to a ceasefire. 
4. Patience. 
A common maxim in insurgency is that if the insurgents survive, they will 
eventually This is not supported by the evidence. The MCP survived for fifty years 
and the Provisional IRA has survived for twenty six years. A stalemate does not inherently 
271 See the Appendix. 
272 Bell, 1986, p. 21 1. 
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favor either side. A stalemate indicates a situation where a military victory by either side 
is not possible under current environmental conditions. 
The organization must consider alternative strategies if it can not win by military 
means alone. The insurgents start weaker and smaller than the regime and seek to increase 
power and capabilities. The alternatives for the insurgents are to grow, to use violence to 
increase growth, to use violence to defeat the regime, to seek a coalition, or to seek a 
negotiated solution. These alternatives depend on the situation. 
Ideally, the organization mobilizes its support base. If its support base is large 
enough, full mobilization will bring victory. This is the Marx - Mao - Skocpol approach. 
The regime can block access and restrict the available space so that mobilization is limited. 
The organization can use violence to create space to enhance growth. The MCP did this 
in 1948. This is different than an effort to win through military means alone. The Tet 
Offensive in Vietnam in 1968 was a pure military effort to win with available resources. 
It was not an effort to increase the growth of the organization, but an effort to win in one 
big push. It was hoped that a bandwagon effect would bring the assistance or at least 
cooperation of the population. This is different than efforts to increase membership into 
the organization. 
A problem arises if the potential support base of the insurgents is not 100% of the 
population. The organization can reach an optimal mobilization of its support base and still 
be too small to win. It can use persuasion and coercion to expand its support base. The 
MCP managed to shift from its initial urban base to the squatters and later to the non 
Chinese aborigines. Both sides seek to sway neutral elements to their own benefit. Success 
would allows a new mobilization effort in a new social group. 
In a polarized society it may be very difficult for an organization to expand its 
support base to other social groups. Very few Malays or Indians joined the MCP. In 
Northern Ireland, few Catholics are in the security forces and few Protestants are in PIRA. 
The organization may seek a coalition with other organizations in society. This is common 
in successful revolutions and occurred in Russia, Iran, Nicaragua, Cuba and other cases. 
This sets the stage for a post revolutionary struggle for power. 
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The organization can also accept that it can not win by military means and seek a 
negotiated solution. This is a common outcome. The regime stays in power, but political 
and economic power are redistributed. This occurred in Malaya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, El 
Salvador, South Africa and many other cases. Negotiated solutions are not as well 
examined as the more glamorous revolutionary victories. 
The final option for an organization with a limited support base is to fight harder 
and hope for an attritional victory. In conventional war between states, this a situation 
similar to World War I where both sides lose. The problem with this approach is that 
changes in the contextual and task environment can lead to an unexpected outcome. Eritrea 
won its independence fiom Ethiopia after decades of effort. A serious risk is that the 
organizational efforts to win alone will lead to countermovements of other small groups. 
Liberia and Somalia are both cases where there is no faction able to defeat the others 
without outside assistance. 
D. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL. 
Max Manwaring developed a paradigm on the outcome of internal conflicts. The 
outcome is determined by six factors. 
1. The legitimacy of the government. 
2. Organizational unity of effort. 
3. Type and consistency of support for the targeted government. 
4. Ability to reduce outside aid to the insurgents. 
5. Intelligence. 
6. Discipline and capabilities of a government's armed forces. 273 
273 Max G. Manwaring, ed., Uncomfortable Wars: Towards a New Paradigm of Low 
Intensity Conflict, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 20-24. Edwin G. Corr and Stephen 
Sloan, ed., Low Intensitv Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1992), pp. 12-16. 
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1. Discussion of the Manwaring Paradigm. 
The Manwaring paradigm addresses outcome while the organizational model in this 
study focuses on process. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the Manwaring paradigm 
from the perspective of the organizational model. Manwaring's paradigm will be examined 
and modified using the model. 
a. Legitimacy. 
Legitimacy is all things to all people. Sloan calls it "the moral right to 
govern. It is a preference. Preferences are expressed by social groups reflected through 
organizations. Organizations use assisted preferences to overcome free riding to recruit 
members. Thus, legitimacy and preferences alone are a contextual environmental factor. 
They are less important than the nature and type of organizations competing to recruit from 
the preference base. 
A systemic view of the contextual and task environment focuses on the relationship 
of preferences (legitimacy) to organizations competing for the preference base to 
organizations competing with each other from other preference bases in society. 
Legitimacy is an ambiguous concept. The crucial factor is to define the system and identify 
the contextual and task environment. 
b. Organization and Intelligence. 
Unity of effort is a function of the command and control design of the 
organization. Revising organizational structure takes strong leadership and minimum 
period of 18 months.275 The regime in Malaya under Templer created a highly unified 
organizational structure that proved decisive in winning the war and providing long term 
stability. The administration, police, intelligence and military forces were unified at the 
national, province and district level. 
274 Corr and Sloan, p. 12. 
2750rganization Theory predicts that it takes three to five years to change organization 
structure. The pressures associated with military operations compresses this time period, 
as shown in Malaya and Northern Ireland, by both sides of the conflict. Selective 
organizations changed in 18 to 24 months in both cases. 
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Intelligence is a function of organizational presence. Intelligence in internal war 
is a police function because presence requires a permanent organization enmeshed in local 
social networks. It is not possible to move the intelligence organization from region to 
region since it is tied into existing social networks. Military organizations are transitory 
and not suited for unconventional intelligence operations. 
Intelligence is an organizational function dependent on permanent organizational 
presence. Therefore, it is a job for a host nation police organization. If one does not exist, 
it must be created which will take years of organizational effort. The United Kingdom in 
Northern Ireland has created an effective intelligence organization using presence even 
though the regime has had great difficulty recruiting willing Catholic informants. This 
shows that intelligence is possible with permanent presence not including members of local 
social networks, but at a very large expenditure of resources and effort. 
c. External Support. 
The Manwaring paradigm stresses the role of external support which is 
expected since it was written for the US Southern Command. "Long term consistent 
support during and after a low-intensity conflict is critical to success. Studies show that 
moderate support over a period of time significantly enhances the probability of success. 
277 Yet what type of support matters? 
Leites and Wolf examined the role of direct aid.278 Putting additional resources into 
Aid must be controlled so that it benefits the a society can benefit either side. 
276 Corr and Sloan, p. 13. 
277 Karl Jackson, "Post Colonial Rebellion and Counter Insurgency in Southeast Asia'', 
in Chandran Johnson, ed., Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia, (Boulder, 
Westview Press, 1985),pp. 3-52. p. 37. Jackson studied 26 insurgencies in SE Asia. 
Manwaring found a similar result in his study of 43 insurgencies since 1945. See Corr and 
Sloan, p. 16, endnote 10. 
2781mproving income allows the local population more ability to express their preexisting 
preferences. So bulk, nonorganizational aid increases capabilities for sympathizers of both 
sides. In the United States, welfare payments in poor neighborhoods often lead to increased 
animosity towards the state. Leites and Wolf, pp. 19-21. 
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organizational and mobilizational struggle. Too much, too fast and it will exceed the 
capability of existing organizations and increase the likelihood of systemic balancing 
behavior. 
The proper role of aid is to benefit organizations in the task environment. It would 
require massive amounts of resources to significantly change the contextual environment 
of even a small country such as Haiti. The external actor can use its influence to overcome 
host nation resistance to organizational reform. It took years, but the US gradually changed 
the political structure of El Salvador and reformed the government administration and 
security forces. 
A cautionary note must be sounded with regard to cutting off aid to insurgents. By 
definition, insurgents are part of the existing social system. They are not caused by 
external aid, but benefit from it. Cutting aid to insurgents will not stop an insurgency. 
Malaya, Northern Ireland and Algeria all illustrate protracted insurgencies with minimal 
external support. The PIRA peak strength in Northern Ireland was 1972, over ten years 
before Libya started supplying arms. 
d. Organizational Efficiency. 
Improving the discipline and capabilities of the government's armed forces 
is only part of the need to improve the efficiency of the regime's organizations. The regime 
has administrative, police, intelligence and security forces. All of them must be improved 
to optimal efficiency in an internal conflict. 
Improving efficiency means organizational change. This requires systemic planning 
to obtain optimal results. The Briggs plan in Malaya was an admirable plan that improved 
the efficiency and unity of effort of the regime's organizations. It is a necessary but not 
sufficient part of the UK victory. It was not until Templer framed a political solution that 
the regime was able to eliminate the insurgency. In Northern Ireland it was not until after 
the 1985 accord that a political solution was possible. This led slowly to the current cease 
fire. 
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2. A Revised Paradigm. 
This section establishes a revised paradigm in light of the organizational model. 
It includes methods to maximize efficiency and effectiveness in both the short and long 
cycles. Insurgency is a system, and contextual differences means that exact tactics and 
techniques from El Salvador are rarely applicable in Algeria. The focus is on the 
organization and its relationship to its own context. 
a. Think Systemically. 
Identify the contextual and task environment and determine the relative 
permeability of the system boundaries. Identify the degree of external support to 
organizations within the host nation system. The boundaries of the host nation as a 
contained system vary with geographic location and ties to external powers. 
b. Organize efficiently. 
Identify organizational weaknesses and the degree of coordination and 
cooperation between organizations. Unity of effort should be established between the 
administration, police and military at national, regional and local levels. New organizations 
may need to be created or old ones significantly reorganized. Planning must include what 
actions to take while some organizations are in transition. 
c. Act effectively. 
Organizational actions have short and long cycle effects. Organization 
actions may lead to benefits in some parts of the systems and costs in another. Anticipate 
systemic balancing and reinforcing behavior. For example, the movement and counter 
movement process in Malaya from 1946 to 1948, Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1975 and 
Algeria from 1989 to 1995 were all predictable. Organizational actions must address the 
mobilizational struggle and the organizational struggle. 
(1 ) Organizational Struggle. The organizational struggle occurs 
over mobilizational space and organizational presence. The regime seeks to maximize the 
space available to its own organizations and to increase organizational presence. It 
attempts to minimize space and presence of the opposing organizations. Mobilizational 
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space represents the geographic and demographic space within the competing social 
movements. Organizational presence is the location of actual members of the competing 
organizations. 
The difference between the two illustrates the role of discriminate violence in 
internal war. Destroying mobilizational space means waging war on the geographic and 
demographic space containing the opposition social movement. The bulk of the individuals 
in this space are neutrals or free riding sympathizers and only a minority are members. 
Indiscriminate violence can convert neutrals into sympathizers and sympathizers into 
members. 
A more efficient use of resources focuses on limiting and controlling space and 
using violence against organizational members. This is easier to say than to do. It requires 
the establishment of a permanent presence to provide intelligence. Presence also serves as 
a selective incentive that influences both organizational action and the preferences of the 
local environment. 
(2) Mobilizational Struggle. The mobilizational struggle concerns 
the preference base that supports the insurgents. In the short cycle there is no solution to 
this problem. It takes time to change preferences. However, the opposition normally 
contains several competing organizations. A political solution of reforms and compromise 
should be designed to aid moderate organizations within the opposing social movement. 
In Malaya, the Malaya Chinese Association was founded in cooperation with the 
regime. It actively collaborated with the regime to defeat the insurgents. In Northern 
Ireland, the Social Democratic Labor Party started as a moderate organization opposing the 
regime and gradually reached a position closer to the regime than to the insurgents. The 
long term solution to these conflicts involves a political compromise. 
Preferences are only slightly effected by ideology and propaganda. The small 
deeply committed group of individuals likely to act on an appeal with little or no social 
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contact networks will not be swayed by a counter appeal. 279 Developing and spreading 
organizational presence is more efficient and effective. The key decision for the individual 
is not what side do they prefer but on whether or not to join an organization. 
Expectations of who ultimately wins form part of the decision to join. The other 
part is the selective incentives offered by both sides. A problem with the hearts and minds 
propaganda school is the belief that expectations and selected incentives are uniform 
throughout society. They are not. Expectations and incentives vary with every village and 
community. Organization presence and actions at the local level are crucial to 
understanding the mobilizational process. 280 
d. Recognize External and Internal Systems. 
The international system of states operates differently than the internal 
operation of a state. External states can supply resources and manpower to either side in 
a struggle. However, these external resources interact with the host nation system to 
produce an outcome. The internal system dominates the external system in internal 
conflict. 
It is a common error for external actors to blame other external actors for causing 
an internal conflict. In Vietnam, the US believed that the Viet Cong were formed and 
controlled by North Vietnam. The United States bombed North Vietnam in an effort to 
deter the actions of the South Vietnamese insurgents. In Bosnia, the US and UN imposed 
sanctions on Serbia to deter the actions of Bosnian insurgents. This encouraged Bosnian 
and Croatian attacks on Serbs and a Serbian counter reaction as part of a systemic 
escalation of the scope and intensity of violence. The methods and theories of international 
279 See DeNardo, CH 2 on ideological appeals. See the Appendix in this thesis for an 
expanded view of this process. 
280 Sam Sarkesian identifies the village as a crucial and often misunderstood level of 
analysis in internal conflicts. see Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New 
Security Era, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993, p. 134. 
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diplomacy are not applicable to the dynamics of internal conflict. Domestic politics and 
organizations are influenced more by their own contextual and task environment than the 
external system of international politics. 
e. Adaptation. 
Organizations, strategy and tactics must respond to the system of the host 
nation. Organizational change takes time and effort. The external intervenor's optimal 
strategy should be to help overcome organizational inertia and bureaucratic politics to 
reform the host nation's organizations. The US failed to do this in Vietnam and lost, it did 
this in El Salvador and won. 
Large changes lead to systemic balancing. Moderate changes over time can take 
advantage of systemic reinforcing behavior to help make the environment more munificent 
for one side or the other. The organization that can adapt systemically has a significant 
advantage over other organizations in internal conflict. 
E. CONCLUSION. 
The organizational model is more effective for analyzing the process of internal 
conflict than existing theories. It can describe the origins or the outcome but it can not 
predict them. All general theories are limited to describing origins and outcomes due to the 
many variables and differences between cases. 
The organizational model is prescriptive in describing organizational actions. The 
successful organization seeks to expand potential, space and presence. The organization 
capable of long cycle adaptation has an advantage over those that do not. A systems view 
of the relationship of the contextual and task environment provides a guide to 
organizational action and growth. 
The organizational model provides an alternative to existing theories on internal 
conflict. The concept and nature of the task environment provides a point of departure 
from structural and individual theories of revolution. The environment does not determine 
outcome. A specific ideology, strategy or policy will also not determine outcome. The 
outcome depends on the dynamic actions and reactions of all organizations that exist in 
society. 
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APPENDIX. RECRUITMENT, COMMITMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT. 
This appendix examines the relationship between the organization and individuals. 
The organization behaves as a unitary actor in the process of internal war. Yet, the 
organization consists of individuals who make their own decision on whether or not to join 
the organization. This section examines the formation of preferences by individuals and the 
incentives that cause individuals to overcome free riding behavior and join an organization. 
A. CONVERTING PREFERENCES TO MOBILIZATION. 
Preferences are influenced by the existing political, economic and social structure 
of society. The context of a specific country creates horizontal and vertical cleavages in 
society. Some of these subdivisions gain from the existing status quo while others are net 
losers. The existence of an opposition organization to the state shifts the existing winner- 
loser relationships. Some stand to gain more and lose less with one side or the other. This 
leads to socio-economic groups whose preferences can be identified with one side in the 
conflict. 
Preferences are a necessary but not sufficient cause for joining an organization. A 
preference requires little commitment and is subject to change. Skocpol views individuals 
as always ready to revolt if only the repressive power of the state weakens. Gurr’s relative 
deprivation theory states that when preferences become strong enough, mobilization occurs 
(Skocpol: 1979, Gurr:1970). Neither theory explains why people don’t just stay at home 
and let others bear the risks of conflict. 
Organizations use selective incentives to encourage support and commitment. Leites 
and Wolf called this activity the use of assisted preferences.281 Selective incentives offer 
positive rewards or negative sanctions beyond that of the public good in order to produce 
281 Leites and Wolf, pg. 13. 
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participation fiom the benefitting group. The organization can use selective incentives to 
overcome free rider problems.282 
The contextual environment cost-benefit relationship produces the base preferences 
of the supporting group - the social movement or mobilization potential. Likewise, the 
organization offers benefits and incurs costs for joining or not joining while competing with 
the government and other organizations. What factors make one organization's incentives 
more attractive than another? 
1. Expectations. 
The expectation that the reward or punishment will actually be received is critical. 
In the contextual environment, the expectation of victory influences preferences. In the 
task environment, expectations are influenced by the relative presence of the competing 
organizations. If an organization has members in a village with no other competing 
organization, its relative influence is high. Additionally, villagers may be coerced into 
joining an organization even against their preferences. 
2. Ideological recruiting. 
DeNardo distinguishes between ideological and organizational recruiting appeal. 
An ideological appeal is the stated goals and policies of the organization. It influences 
preferences. Leites and Wolf called this the "hearts and minds" approach.283 Ideological 
recruiting is most important at the very beginning of an organization. The number of 
282 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1971), p. 5 1. James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations, (New York: Basic Books, 
1973), p. 200. Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political 
Terrorism'' in Orbis, Vol. 29, No. 3, Fall 1985, p. 474. Crenshaw lists four types of 
incentives for recruitment: the 
desire for action, need to belong, social status and material reward. 
283 DeNardo, pg. 43. Leites and Wolf, p. 33. 
208 
recruits who will join purely due an ideological cause is small. Yet, the members who do 
join based on ideology are extremely committed and form the cadre of the organization.284 
Broad appeals have little effect on the bulk of even a sympathetic population. 
“Impersonal communication alone is insufficient to generate commitment to the 
organization.”285 Except for the few highly committed individuals who wish to join, most 
people are still driven by free riding behavior. 
3. Social network recruiting. 
The organizational approach of DeNardo has nothing to do with organizations but 
represents the fact that most recruiting for an organization is done through preexisting 
social nets.286 Social networks such as family, friends and associations influence the 
effectiveness of recruitment. Selective incentives motivate individuals to join, not due to 
an abstract cause, but by an organization driven cost-benefit calculus. Social network 
recruiting is the most effective form of recruiting as the organization 
Social networks explain the crucial role of the organization in the recruitment 
process. “Political organizations are formed in response to structural factors which then 
attempt to influence social networks so as to achieve mobilization.”288 The organization 
uses social networks to overcome free riding. The organization converts preferences to 
mobilization through its actions to create positive expectations and selective incentives. 
Ideological and social network recruiting influence the decision to join the 
organization. Ideological factors produce a few highly committed cadres and serve to 
influence preferences for the rest of the population. The social network factors are more 
284 Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements, 2nd edition, 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984), pp. 57-67. 
285 Wilson and Orum, p. 283. 
286 David Knoke, Political Networks: The Structural Perspective, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 69-74. DeNardo, p. 45-6. 
287 Knoke, p. 84. Wilson and Orum, pp. 280-3. 
288 Wilson and Orum, p. 285. 
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relevant for the bulk of the population. Ideology might start an organization, but it is 
through social networks that an organization grows. 
Recruiting through social networks reveals the importance of mobilization space 
and presence. The organization must be in the community and be able to operate within 
it. Individuals and entire associations can be recruited. Recruiting associations dramatically 
increases the social network surrounding the organization and increases the potential 
contacts for further recruitment. Popkin uses the term contact nets to describe this 
process.289 The organization mobilizes sympathizers through contact nets by building long 
term relationships with the community. 
How does an organization create presence? It is difficult for the organization to 
grow if it has no social ties with a potential group. In Peru, various left wing organizations 
composed of white urban intellectuals attempted to recruit rural Indians. They met with 
repeated failure until Sender0 Luminoso used a university to create associational ties to 
Indian students. These students returned to their home communities as teachers and used 
social ties to recruit villagers. It took ten years to produce the desired recruiting objectives. 
Presence and selective incentives form the mechanism by which preferences are 
converted into commitment and membership in the organization. Network factors of 
recruitment are dependent on presence. This confirms the vital importance of presence. 
Organizations must establish presence at the village level (Sarkesian, 1993). Presence at 
this level in society increases the organization's mobilization potential, simultaneously, 
decreasing the mobilization potential and space for opposing  organization^.^^' Villages and 
barrios are crucial targets for pre~ence.2~' Recruiting through existing associational social 
networks will be much more effective than trying to create new ones.292 
289 Popkin, p. 224. 
290 Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons From 
Malaya and Vietnam, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), p. 134. 
291 Popkin, pp. 184-5. Lichbach, pp. 150-1 I 
292 McCarthy and Zald, p. 191. Knoke, pp. 72-83. 
210 
B. LEVELS OF COMMITMENT. 
The individual may be committed to the group's goals, to an individual leader or 
to his fellow members. Studies have shown that an individual's commitment to the 
organization increases not with rewards but with sacrifices. Cognitive dissonance theory 
shows that higher initiation costs and personal investments in an organization increase 
commitment.293 
There are three levels of commitment. Moving from the weakest to the strongest 
levels these are: sympathizers(free-riders), supporters, and members (leaders/followers). 
According to resource mobilization theory sympathizers are those individuals and 
organizations whose preferences favor a given organization. They share the goals of the 
movement. Supporters are those who provide resources: material, time and indirect 
physical support. Members are those actively participate in the organization serving as 
leaders and followers.294 
Rational actor theories (Leites and Wolf, and DeNardo)insufficiently explain why 
individuals decide not to join a given organization. The social network model explains why 
an individual joins an insurgent organization more effe~tively.~~' Selective incentives 
provide material rewards, and offer social incentives such as social status, companionship, 
e t ~ . ~ ~ ~  "The pure utility-maximizing egocentric actor of Olson's model does not fare well 
293 Wilson and Orum, p. 278. See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957) for studies on sacrifice and commitment. 
294 See Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), 
pp. 1 8-2 1. and Kenneth L. Wilson and Anthony Orum, "Mobilizing People for Collective 
Political Action", in George Kourvetaris and Betty Dobratz, Political Sociology, (New 
Brunswick,NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), pp. 280-1. Both use cadre, agents, members and 
sympathizers. McCarthy and Zald use mass and elite, cadre and worker, bystander publics, 
adherents and constituents, McCarthy and Zald, pp. 23-5. 
29s See Wilson and Orum, pp. 277-8; and DeNardo, p. 43. 
296 Crenshaw, p. 474. 
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in the real world." Individuals make choices not in isolation but as part of social 
influences. 297 
Preferences shape mobilization potential. Mobilization requires that preferences be 
converted into action and commitment. Mobilization also requires presence and 
mobilization space to reach sympathizers and offer selective incentives designed to recruit 
or coerce them into the organization. Mobilization involves both individual and collective 
behavior. The environment shapes individual preferences and social factors which 
motivates individuals to overcome free riding behavior for collective action.298 
C. THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS, COSTS AND BENEFITS. 
Growth does not directly lead to victory. It indirectly influences the system through 
its effect on expectations. This section examines the relationship of expectations on 
preferences and mobilization. Perceptions are a function of a rational actor cost-benefit 
calculation, where E(B) > E(C). E is the expectation of receiving a given benefit or cost. 
B is the benefit received and C is the expected cost. The preference decision between the 
regime and opposition is based on which organization is expected to provide better 
conditions for the individual. The benefits and costs are discounted for the future. 
Individuals expect to receive benefits from, or pay costs to, the insurgent organization after 
it has succeeded in changing or replacing the current regime. Thus, E represents the 
expectation of victory for one side or the other. 
While preferences exist at the national level of analysis, selective incentives are a 
local level phenomenon. Expectations of society are influenced by the presence of 
competing organizational infrastructures--that of the regime and the insurgency. Contact 
with organization membership allows socialization and affects individual expectations of 
receiving the attention of the organization. Anonymous support is not likely, given the free 
297 Knoke, pp.65-6 
298 Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague,"Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: 
Political Structure, Social Structure and the Party Canvass", American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 86, No. 1, March, 1992, pp. 70-86. p. 84. 
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rider phenomenon. The organization must know the actions of individuals and seek to 
influence those acts. 
Presence provides this information and increases the ability of the organization to 
react. The organization must be capable of identifying its supporters and those who oppose 
it, and then demonstrate the ability to reward and punish. The cost benefit calculus is near 
term and not discounted for the future, as in expectations. The interaction of these forces 
can be depicted as: 
E(EI-ER)(BI-BR) E(EI-ER) (CI-CR) 
The decision to join an insurgent organization I, is effected by the ruling regime 
organization R. E is the expectation of insurgent victory and is the same factor that 
influences preferences. (EI-ER) equals the expectation of receiving a selective incentive 
from the insurgent organization discounted against the expectation of receiving a selective 
incentive from the regime for not joining. (BI-BR) is the actual value of the selective 
incentive received for joining the insurgent organization, I ,  discounted against the value of 
the selective incentive from the regime organization, R, for not joining. (CI-CR) is the cost 
incurred for not joining the insurgent organization, I ,  discounted by the cost of joining the 
regime organization, R. 
The expectation of victory, E, is still a factor. It effects the expectation of further 
rewards or punishments over time. However, preferences are not vital in the decision to 
join. Coercion may cause many sympathizers, favoring one side or the other, to remain 
neutral. A combination of social pressure and coercion may cause members of an 
organization to refuse to conduct operations or defect for fear of retaliation. This supports 
Leites and Wolf in their contention that critical factors in insurgency rest with the supply 
side of internal war, rather than preferences. 
Leites and Wolf looked at the organization as a system consisting of inputs, 
production and output.299 However, an organizational approach is not simply supply and 
demand. The national supply and demand condition is not the same as supply and demand 
299 Leites and Wolf, p. 35. 
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at the local level. Selective incentives effect both cost and benefit. The organization 
attempts to influence the supply and demand of its own organization and that of its 
competitors. This is an insufficient view of the insurgency system. 
A better concept designates the state as the system. The organization is part of this 
system. It acts in and is acted upon by the contextual and task environments. In systems 
theory, looking at cause and effect is misleading due system dynamics. A benefit in the 
near term can overlook long term costs. The systems view enables the analyst to look at 
relationships across the system (cross sectionally) and over time(longitudinal1y). Positive 
effects in one part of the system may cause negative effects in another part. Movements 
lead to countermovements and actions lead to counteractions. What are the systemic 
relationships in the mobilization calculus? 
First, examine the factors the organization can influence to get members to join. 
Creating benefits and inflicting costs for selective incentives requires the expenditure of 
resources. The insurgent organization's small size, relative to that of the state, is a 
disadvantage. The state begins conflict with greater resources. This directly affects the 
benefits (5') and costs (C) resulting in marginal rates of return. 
Since the insurgents have fewer total resources than the regime, they must 
maximize the rate of return. Expectations (E> has a high payoff. It effects preferences on 
the competing sides of the selective incentive equation. Expectations provide a high 
leverage approach for the insurgents. However, influencing expectations is tenuous because 
they shift rapidly and are only indirectly influenced by the organization. 
Unlike expectations, presence is a factor that can be directly applied by the 
organization. Presence provides high leverage in three ways. First, the organization 
operating in a political vacuum invests few resources and receives a high rate of return. If 
ER is zero, the organization is simply trying to overcome inertia and free riding behavior. 
Second, using resources to eliminate regime presence also is a reasonable strategy which 
effects both sides of the equation. Third, creating presence where the organization 
previously had none disrupts the opposition's efforts and increases the opportunity for 
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future operations. The process is similar to jiujitsu. One constantly reacts to an opponent, 
putting strength against weakness to maximum advantage. 
The organizational approach described above differs with that of Leites and Wolf, 
who conflate the local and national levels of analysis. According to their theory, if the cost 
benefit relationship shifts sufficiently, everyone joins. In this view, revolutions are rapid 
events occurring in little space and a short time period. Leites and Wolf find the regime's 
comparative advantage in it's ability to raise the costs of joining. While the insurgent's 
strength is efficiency in supply and demand functions. This view relies on the preference 
factor and does not take into account actual processes of recruitment. It also ignores 
interaction of state and society on both sides of the cost-benefit equation. 
The expanded view of the mobilization equation supports the empirical reality of 
the activation process. John Baylis noted this relationship between organization presence 
and preferences. Using political, economic and social causes to increase popular support 
is a preference tactic. Mao and Giap used this tactic successfully when opportunities 
opened to develop infrastructure. Che Guevera relied on preference alone and paid the 
ultimate price for failure.3oo Although preferences exist in munificent environments, 
organizations must act to grow. 
D. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT. 
The recruitment process varies as the organization grows. Political organizations 
are founded by small groups of ideological motivated and committed members. As the 
organization grows it exhausts the ideological .base and recruits members from its 
preference base using selective incentives. The process of internal conflict creates a 
situation where over time, most people who can be recruited have joined an organization 
on one side or another. The final stage involves not recruiting the previously neutral, but 
recruiting individual defectors from other groups or forming coalitions with other groups 
in a band wagoning effect. 
300 John Baylis, "Revolutionary Warfare", in Contemporary Strategy, 2nd Edition, (New 
York: Holmes and Meier, 1987, pp. 299-232), pp. 218-9. 
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Mao’s three stage process illustrates the changing nature of recruitment and 
organizational development. The first stage is an initial organization and preparation phase. 
The second is a guerrilla war to weaken the state and expand control. The third stage is a 
war of movement where the insurgents overwhelm the stage in a conventional offensive. 
Mao’s phases stress the importance of organization and controlled operations. 
The first stage is contingent on the penetration of the target social system by the 
revolutionary cadre.301 Mao believed that mass mobilization started at the local level 
through local issues. “Ma0 recognized the need to exploit opportunistically any political 
issue that might bring about the desired level of mass organization.”302 Local issues are 
used to establish presence and influence preferences. Once established, the organization 
uses local conditions to establish selective incentives to spur recruitment. The local 
population serves as a resource base and as an intelligence network for the insurgent 
organization. 
The second stage for Mao is an organization expansion phase. The organization 
recruits through selective incentives and expands organizational presence. Violence is used 
to create and expand mobilization space. The goal is to create a dual power situation where 
the insurgents monopolize the mobilization space in a given area. As the guerrilla 
organization expands, the government’s influence contracts. The guerrillas seek to isolate 
the government in the cities and control the rural areas before the final offensive. 
The third stage involves a conventional offensive. The insurgents mobilize forces 
within the areas they control and attack the government remnants in the cities. Mao’s 
strategy is a sophisticated blend of political and military action to achieve organizational 
goals. However, not even Mao ever reached the third stage. In China, the Japanese invasion 
gave Mao time, space and a nationalist appeal to rebuild and reorganize after crushing 
301 Sam C. Sarkesian, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 
1975), p. 8. 
302 Chalmers Johnson, “The Third Generation of Revolutionary Warfare”, in Sarkesian, 
ed., 1975, pp 357-374. p. 360. 
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defeats. The KMT was not beaten by fighting to the last man such as the Russians storming 
the Reichstag in WWII. Rather, they disintegrated. 
In fact, revolutions do not end in Mao’s third stage. When expectation of victory 
shifts in favor of the insurgents, the government disintegrates. Some flee to avoid 
punishment from the insurgents and others defect. Many other organizations within society 
bandwagon with the insurgents. The end of the struggle in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran and China 
all show a similar pattern. 
From the perspective of the recruitment process, the bandwagoning is due to the 
shift in expectations. Expectations reach a crossover point where the dynamism of the 
environment rapidly increases. Defections and disintegration of the government are 
matched by a surge in insurgent support. Revolutions may be long and protracted, but the 
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